

BULLETIN OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS

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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

*Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts*

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CONCERNED
ASIAN SCHOLARS**

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Anthropology and the Third World

Kathleen Gough Aberle

(Revision of a speech delivered at the CCAS conference, March 28, 1969)

I should like to say a few words about how I see Anthropology and anthropologists, in relation to the Third World, in the past and today.¹ It is almost a cliché nowadays to say that Anthropology has been in some sense a child of imperialism. Anthropology as we know it began in the eighteenth century, both as a humanistic study and as a branch of modern science. In intention, it was a holistic study of man and his works, which it was believed would both enlighten men and improve the human condition. As a university discipline, however, Anthropology became specialized in the late nineteenth century, when the Western nations were busy conquering the whole world and dividing it up into colonies or spheres of influence. I think that the very scope of our subject matter has been largely determined by this fact. Thus, one common description of Anthropology is that it is the study of all peoples and their cultures, with a primary emphasis on primitive (or pre-literate) cultures. In practice, however, this has tended to mean that Anthropology has concentrated on the study of conquered peoples. I realized only a few years ago that the subjects of anthropological studies turn out very predominantly to have been conquered non-white people such as American Indians or Black people in the United States, or occasionally, villages or other small communities of poor whites, as in Wales or Ireland, which one might also refer to as "conquered" in a broader sense.

Anthropologists' actions and theories have therefore been strongly conditioned by imperialism. I do not mean to say that their theories have been determined only by imperialism. That would be foolish. It is ob-

vious that the general state of knowledge of the times - for example the development in other disciplines such as Geology, Astronomy or Physics - strongly influenced anthropological theories. So, of course, did the precise state of anthropologists' own discoveries and data -- the fact, for example, that totemism was being discovered or described, or that particular types of fossil men, or of ancient tools, were being discovered in sequence, obviously had the utmost to do with the particular theories that were developed. Nevertheless, I think that our general theoretical context has been broadly connected with the phases of imperialism.

I have neither time nor knowledge to explore these phases adequately, but will suggest three lines of thought. First, before the Boasian period in American and World War I in Europe, cultural evolutionism dominated most of Anthropology. This was obviously much connected with the rapid expansion of imperialism, especially between about 1860 and 1900. Western society was seen as the apogee of civilization. It was a hopeful, optimistic outlook (if one ignored the temporary cost of human life). The general approach was one of trying to map out stages of cultural development, with the assumption that Western industrial culture was so far the best, if not the final, stage, and that we would bring this culture to the rest of the world through our conquests.

Leaving aside complicated developments and regional variations in the interim, a second main period fell between the two World Wars, when structural functionalism became so prominent in British and European anthropology, and a somewhat different kind of functionalism, in culture and personality studies in the United States. It

seems to me that these studies belonged to a period when the empires had settled down; economically, they were relatively stagnant; independence movements were being effectively contained; and emphasis was being placed on maintaining the status quo. The tragedies of World War I had made people less optimistic about progress; the stress now was mainly on stable societies and personalities, on the interrelations of their parts, and on how the parts maintained one another.

There have been a number of different developments in Anthropology since World War II. One is a revised form of cultural evolutionism, closely linked with studies of cultural ecology. It may be that the prominence of such studies in the United States (as distinct from Britain and Europe) has some indirect connection with American technological dominance and overseas expansion, even though individually, anthropologists concerned with these studies have tended to oppose American expansionism, and especially the war in Vietnam. Another strong trend has been concern with applying Anthropology to problems of economic development in new nations, always, of course, within the framework of international capitalism. Since such studies necessarily assume that significant economic development is possible in the Third World through capitalist institutions, they are tending to be increasingly challenged by thinkers in the new nations where such development is not in fact occurring. Other kinds of departures have been into small-scale and limited ethnographic descriptions and into highly abstract treatments of problems in linguistics, ethnoscience and kinship - all far removed from the disturbing events of the real world in the last twenty years. At the other extreme are the fairly small number of anthropologists who place themselves actively in the service of branches of the United States government in order to help further its attempts at conquest or at economic and political penetration abroad. In general, while perhaps only a small proportion of anthropologists actively favour imperialism, the vast majority acquiesce in it by denying its existence, by choosing problems remote from the contemporary world, or by taking a long view of cultural evolution and assuming that man's actions are largely or wholly culturally determined.

I wish now to turn to our social roles as anthropologists, which greatly affect both our data-gathering and our theories, as well as our impact on people. I see three main types of social roles: (1) in relation to our "informants", often in Third World nations; (2) in relation to our employers - governments, universities and foundations; and (3) in relation to each other; and through each other, to our discipline as a collective endeavour.

With regard to informants, I think that anthropologists have tended to vacillate between emotional detachment and a kind of white liberal approach. Anthropologists tended to conclude either that their science was or should be wholly value-free, or else could be used to alleviate some of the suffering that imperialism had brought about. It was not, of course, usually realized that imperialism had brought these sufferings - anthropologists have been singularly blind to the effects or even the existence of imperialism. With regard to employers, there has been a general tendency not to criticize them too much, not to take very radical stands, obviously because they provide the money and you can't go on being a professional anthropologist if you are completely out of favour with your government or with your university, whose administration is, in effect, an indirect arm of the government. With regard to our colleagues and our discipline, I suggest that the assumption of value-free social science, while uneasily held and often challenged by individual anthropologists, flourished partly because it offered an escape from the fact that the interests of our informants and of our employers were often deeply opposed, and that we availed ourselves of the privileges and protection of the conquerors while claiming good will toward the conquered. In effect, the assumption of value-free social science provided implicit support for the status quo.

I think that today, we are being squeezed out of these approaches and these roles by two sets of forces. One is that of active counter-revolution, and especially of American expansionism all over the world. The other force is, of course, that of the revolutionary movements in

significant parts of the Third World, as well as, incipiently, in the Western nations themselves.

Two years ago, I tried to count the populations of the Third World nations which had either active, fighting revolutionary movements within them or large revolutionary parties coupled with serious social unrest. At that time, the outcome of my enquiry was that roughly a third of the former "Third World" had already had revolutions and become socialist; about another third contained guerilla movements or large revolutionary parties; while the remaining third contained relatively stable satellite, colonial or ostensibly independent nations. Since that time the most significant developments are, I think, that both India and Pakistan appear to be entering a proto-revolutionary stage. Thus we have had the recent uproars in Pakistan, and in India there has been the formation of a new Revolutionary Communist Party, linked with various tribal and peasant uprisings against landlords and government. Thus, even in that part of the Third World which has seemed relatively stable, one cannot escape the fact that under capitalism, the gap between rich and poor is continually increasing, so that revolutionary upheavals, and counter-revolutionary reprisals, are very probable in the near future.

Because of such developments I think that anthropologists are being increasingly torn apart between their informants (or a majority of their informants) and their employers, who are, or who represent, the counter-revolutionary powers. What does an anthropologist do who is working for a counter-revolutionary government, in a revolutionary or proto-revolutionary world?

I see this as our central dilemma. I believe we have to choose where our loyalty is, between these two main sets of forces. One reason we must choose is that if we do not choose, the counter-revolution will choose us, whether we like it or not. Or even whether we are aware of it or not. In this connection, an instructive statement was made in 1967 by the Panel of the Defense Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences in the United States.² Briefly, the statement says that the behavioural science community at large must be made to accept responsibility

for recruiting Department of Defense research managers. These in turn, without talking directly about counter-insurgency or counter-guerilla warfare, will be responsible for organizing both "independent" and applied scholarship, both by Third World scholars and by American scholars and research institutes abroad. Particular emphasis is laid on the fact that studies made by independent (or one might say, "innocent") scholars supported by non-defense agencies, can be very useful to the Department of Defense if their data are "exploited" by suitable research teams inside the United States, especially if care is taken to see that appropriate subjects are investigated by research agencies abroad. It is this kind of statement which convinces me that the idea of a neutral, value-free social science investigation of modern society is a snare and a delusion. Therefore, social scientists must be very clear in their minds why they are undertaking a study, whom they hope to benefit by it, and whom they might conceivably harm.

I do not mean to say that it is necessary for us just heedlessly to leap into battle or to swear allegiance to particular revolutionary movements simply because they are revolutionary. But I think we have to decide, basically, whether we favour the continuance and further expansion of Western imperialism or whether we oppose it. The choice is, of course, most acute for those who study contemporary society, but it is not entirely absent for archaeologists, palaeontologists and others who study the past. Thus, for example, if such scholars accept money from the United States government, or seek its protection, to do research in places like Thailand, without making a strong and vociferous protest against their government's policies, they provide a respectable scholarly smokescreen for the kinds of counter-revolutionary and often brutal activities going on there, not to mention in next-door Vietnam. Clearly, however, the dilemma is much worse for those of us interested in modern peasant societies and in modern social change.

I think that I must be opposed to imperialism and that I must identify myself with those in the Third World who oppose it.

I must be committed to the general objective of revolution against imperialism, even though I differ and argue with some of the theories and actions of particular revolutionary movements.

What are the implications for an anthropologist who decides that he or she has become committed to an anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and (I would say) socialist approach to society? First it seems to me that there is a vast and exciting body of intellectual work awaiting us. Anthropology, like the other social sciences, has had a profoundly conservative bias ever since it became a university discipline. But fortunately, there has also been, throughout, an "underground" stream of radical scholarship, mainly although not always stemming from Marx. I think that we who have recently woken up to our heritage and our situation have a primary intellectual task to read and master this radical literature, to bring it into confrontation with what we have learned in our cold-war universities, and to sort out what we can agree with in the light of the most modern data, and what we must reject. Incidentally, if we do this I think we automatically cease to be solely anthropologists and have also to become, as far as possible, political scientists, economists, and sociologists as well.

I see all this as a very serious matter and am not yet aware of all its implications. I do not think it is something that we can get away with without penalties. If we take anti-imperialist, socialist value positions and if this approach really impregnates our work, obviously it will have consequences for us. In this connection, I much admire a statement by some 500 intellectuals from 70 countries made at the Cultural Congress of Havana in 1968, and addressed to all intellectuals of the world. I would like to place it in opposition to the other statement to which I just referred, by the Panel of the Defense Science Board:

"We recognize that this enterprise of domination assumes the most diverse forms, from the most brutal to the most insidious, and that it operates at all levels: political, military, economic, racial, ideological, and cultural; and we also recognize that this undertaking is carried on with e-

normous financial resources and with the help of propaganda agencies disguised as cultural institutions.

"Imperialism seeks, by the most varied techniques of indoctrination, to ensure social conformity and political passivity. At the same time, a systematic effort is made to mobilize technicians, men of science and intellectuals generally in the service of capitalistic and neo-colonialist interests and purposes. Thus, talents and skills which should contribute to the task of liberation and progress become, instead, instruments for the commercialization of values, the degradation of culture, and the maintenance of the capitalist economic and social order.

"It is the fundamental interest and the imperative duty of intellectuals to resist this aggression and to take up, without delay, the challenge thus posed to them. What is required of them is support for the struggles of national liberation, social emancipation, and cultural decolonization for all people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and for the struggle against imperialism waged in its very centre by an ever greater number of black and white citizens of the United States; and to enter the political struggle against conservative, retrograde and racist forces, to demystify the latter's ideologies and to attack the structure upon which these rest and the interests they serve...

"This commitment must begin with an unqualified rejection of the policy of cultural subjection to the United States, and this implies the refusal of all invitations, scholarships, employment and participation in programmes of cultural work and research, where their acceptance could entail collaboration with this policy."³

So this is really a serious matter. It may mean, for example, that many of us will no longer be able to do fieldwork at first hand in Asian countries; partly because much of the money that might be available to us would entangle us in imperialist goals or networks of relationships; and partly, of course, because most of the money won't be offered to us when we begin to write about the things we see

as important. Some of our work may be prevented by the lifting of passports or the refusal of visas. Nevertheless, if our primary interests and knowledge are in Asian studies, we must see how much we can do, and that may be surprising; I'm looking now at William Hinton sitting in the back row and thinking how much humanistic and intellectual work he accomplished in China - more, probably than most of the academic scholars in this room.

I do not wish to give the impression that I believe we Western students of Asia should be making Third World revolutions. I don't think we can, or that this is our primary duty. As a by-product of our work, we may sometimes be able to give limited aid to revolutionary movements with which we become especially identified. It seems to me, however, that the main focus must be our own society, which is after all where the main trouble lies. It is probable, in fact, that many young Asian scholars will actually leave Asian studies in the near future and work at home, researching or organizing their own society. For those of us who remain in Asian studies, perhaps we can form links between the inside and the outside, between the various metropolitan countries and the vast domains of imperialism. Particularly if we become organized, we ought to be able to put up some kind of political struggle for the interests

of Asian peoples, to whom we owe so much of our knowledge. Chiefly, however, our main goal should be to enlighten ourselves and our own countrymen about the lives and the contemporary struggles of Asian peoples. By doing so we shall aid in the change of consciousness of our own people and thus in the reconstruction of North America.

Footnotes:

- ¹These thoughts are explored more fully in the "Social Responsibilities Symposium", Current Anthropology, December 1968, pp. 391-435. The only justification for summarizing them here is that they may reach a different audience.
- ²Defense Science Board, National Academy of Sciences. 1967. Report of the Panel on Defense Social and Behavioral Sciences. Williamstown, Mass. Quoted by Andre G. Frank in "Social Responsibilities Symposium", loc. cit., p. 412.
- ³Proceedings of the Cultural Congress of Havana, 1968. Appeal of Havana. Reprinted in Granma, January 21, 1968; quoted by A.G. Frank, loc. cit., pp. 412-13.

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Kathleen Gough: Co-author and editor with David M. Schneider of

Matrilineal Kinship, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1961.

Recent articles:

"Kerala Politics and the 1965 Elections", International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1967, pp. 56-88.

"Communist Rural Councillors in Kerala", Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol. III, Nos. 3 and 4, July and October, 1968, pp. 181-202.

"Peasant Resistance and Revolt in South India", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 4, Winter 1968-69, pp. 526-544.

"Social Change in a Kerala Village", forthcoming in K. Ishwaran, ed., Social Change in India, Columbia University Press.

Pakistan, Economic Change and Social Scientists

Arthur MacEwen

(Revision of a speech delivered at the CCAS Conference, March 28, 1969)

Last Tuesday when a military group took over the Pakistan government, General Yahya, who then became Chief of State, gave his so-called "speech to the nation" in English. At the maximum, five percent of Pakistan's people understand English. Yet if Yahya is like his predecessor, Ayub Khan, or Pakistan's first leader, Mr. Jinnah, he may have difficulty with both Urdu and Bengali, the national languages. Yahya gave the speech in English because he was speaking to an elite, the elite which he considers relevant when speaking to the "nation".

The gap between those who rule Pakistan and the mass of the Pakistan people is, of course, not only linguistic and cultural. It is a gap which is also economic and social. Pakistan, like many other poor countries, is dominated by a very rigid class structure.

Yet the fundamental issues regarding class division and class structure are generally speaking ignored by economists studying Pakistan. Western economists or, for that matter, Pakistanis who have learned economics in the West, view their primary function as determining technical prescriptions for economic development. Economic development, in turn, is defined simply as a rising GNP; and a rising GNP is seen as being in the interests of the Pakistan "nation". The fact that there may be a division of interests within Pakistan, a division along class lines, is never an issue for Western economists.

Actually, that last statement is not quite true. Some economists have given attention to class aspects of society in

their work on Pakistan. The point they make, however, is that the class divisions in Pakistan are good, or in some sense needed in order to bring about development.¹ For them the problem of development is viewed primarily as the problem of accumulating capital. By directing all increments to income into the hands of a small elite, a relatively high rate of savings will be obtained. The elite will supposedly use its savings to increase the quantity of productive assets, and the economy will grow. The process, of course, yields more income inequality which, so the argument goes, yields more growth. Social services and projects to help the poor people are something for the future after the stage of accumulation has been undergone.

It turns out that two of the chief proponents of this sort of theory are, first, the Chief Economist of the Pakistan Planning Commission, and second, the director of Harvard's Development Advisory Service (which provides the Planning Commission with most of its so-called technical assistance, i.e., economists who have been writing Pakistan's development programs for the last 15 years). In their terms, of course, such a theory is not at all silly. If one measures progress simply in terms of a rising level of average per capita income without regard to the distribution or the content of the goods and services that are being provided, then the theory provides a reasonably good description of Pakistan's economic development since the advent of the Ayub Khan regime in 1958.

What happened in the 1958-68 period can be viewed as a result of Ayub's success

in bringing about a coalition of a number of elites in a society which had prior to that time been in conflict with one another. A traditional agricultural elite, a military elite, and a relatively new industrial elite were brought together to provide a political stability necessary for the kind of growth that I have described.

This political consolidation and economic growth has taken place under the watchful eye of the United States. Using economic aid as an instrument, the United States has encouraged the "class-divided" development of Pakistan. To consider a few key factors: first, a large part of the aid has been military or related to military, and it has served generally to strengthen the hand of a conservative military group in the country's affairs. Secondly, our aid programs emphasize the development of the agricultural sector, especially in areas where agriculture is dominated by large landholders. Furthermore, the type of technical program we choose to support pays off most directly for the landlords, while we place relatively little emphasis on technical change through education, a type of change which would pay off for a much broader group.

But, as I have said, little is being done in Pakistan which benefits the "broader group." While the policies of the Pakistan government have raised GNP significantly over the last 10 years, the lot of poor people has not changed. One recent study indicates that in East Pakistan the standard of living of rural laborers has not changed since the early fifties. Another study shows that there has been no increase in the real wages of industrial laborers.²

There is, of course, nothing unusual in development being accompanied by a highly unequal distribution of income. Within the context of capitalist development it is hard to see what other options there are. Under such circumstances income must be channeled into the hands of an elite; for however well or badly it does, there is no one else to lead development. That is to say, capitalist development is capitalist development.

Capitalist development, with its great inequities, is, of course, not the only way. There is an alternative. The prerequisite to that alternative is that power be taken by the workers and peasants of Pakistan. Revolution and the creation of socialism in Pakistan and other very poor countries would certainly lead to a vast redistribution of income. The redistribution of income, in itself, however, would not make people much better off. The most important role of income equality in socialist development is as an incentive. Only through equality will the mass of people feel, and rightly so, that their interests are the interests of the state. The priorities of a socialist Pakistan would be very different from what they are today; for example, education, health, public transportation, would be of high importance. When the people receive the benefits of development through these sorts of projects, they will want to participate, to work harder. Thus socialist development would not only be more humane, but it would also be more successful.

In the context of this vision of a socialist path for developing countries, I do think social scientists can perform some useful functions. However, it is quite clear that these functions are limited. There is a revolution to be made, and it will be made by the people of Pakistan. If we can take an optimistic view of the past year's turmoil in Pakistan, it would seem that a movement is already developing.

The problem is, how can social scientists who are interested in poor countries service this movement? First, we have a job of education to do here in the United States. I have not said much about American imperialism, but we all know that fighting here in the United States against imperialism is one way to help poor countries break their yoke of underdevelopment. Social scientists, by presenting the people of this country with information and analysis of events in poor countries, can help build an anti-imperialist movement in the United States. Our experience in and knowledge of poor countries would seem to make us especially useful in this respect.

Secondly, I think to a somewhat lesser extent we can perform a similar function vis-a-vis the revolutionary movements in the poor countries. Most intellectuals in a country like Pakistan are removed from revolutionary activity by the combination of repression and cooption, and support of them by outsiders like ourselves may be especially needed. While intellectuals will never be the core of a revolutionary movement, our analysis can be of some use. For example, economists can expose the development programs of Pakistan for what they are, i.e., a cover for the continued dominance by a small elite.


The third aspect of the social scientists' role stems from what is, for me, an essential feature of any radical analysis. A radical analysis of a society depends upon posing basically different alternatives. For example, we can only see what is really wrong with Pakistan's development programs if we examine them in the light of the socialist alternative.

Furthermore, developing a clear picture of the socialist alternative helps people to work toward that alternative. Social scientists can help a revolutionary movement figure out where it is going.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, social scientists must not think that their only role is a professional one. We can not just provide service to a revolutionary movement. We must be part of it.

Footnotes:

- ¹See Mahbub ul Haq The Strategy of Economic Planning, and Gustav Papanek Pakistan's Development.
- ²See S.R. Bose, "Trend of Real Income of the Rural Poor in East Pakistan, 1949-66--An Indirect Estimate," Pakistan Development Review, 1968; and A.R. Khan, "What has been happening to real wages in Pakistan?" Pakistan Development Review, 1967.



The Asian Scholar and the American Crisis

Noam Chomsky

(Revision of a speech delivered at the CCAS Conference, March 29, 1969)

I don't know anything at all about the early backgrounds of American Asian scholarship, but I would guess that it grew to some extent out of the Missionary tradition. If that's true, I think the best advice for Asian scholars today is perhaps to go back to their roots, and become missionaries to the people that really can use it, and you know which ones I mean. If there was ever a society that needed to be civilized and brought the "values of Christianity," to have a cultural revolution carried out, this is it. I think it's very important that some of the speakers in this meeting have looked at problems of Asia as a reflection of, or at least in relation to domestic American problems. My own cursory acquaintance with the field of Asian scholarship indicates that that's something of a novelty. There is an obvious ideological element in the failure to view Asian problems in their interaction with domestic American issues. This relates to one aspect of what one might well call the American crisis, its ideological aspect, which in part involves a belief that our policy with respect to the rest of the world is purely reactive. We're the "guardian of the gates" where the gates tend to get farther and farther away every decade or so. We are protecting somebody from something - what it is changes from time to time. We are defending or extending what we represent, namely, liberty and justice and free opportunity for people who for one reason or another have not been able to acquire these benefits. This belief in American innocence combines with something else, namely a tremendous fear, often unfocused, but nevertheless a real fear of the third world, a fear which to some extent borders on paranoia,

and which now supports what has become a virtual declaration of war by the United States against the third world.

This combination of fear and belief in innocence is obviously very dangerous. It's easy to illustrate; I'm not going to try to document it at any great length. I think the fear has been perfectly well expressed by a man whom people tend to scoff at, although he really is in many ways a man of the people, namely Lyndon Johnson, in any number of very quotable statements which he's made over the years. When he said, years ago, that "without superior air power America is a bound and throttled giant; impotent and easy prey to any yellow dwarf with a pocket knife", and when he says that there are only 200,000,000 of us, and 3 billion of them and they're going to take what we have and so on and so forth - he's expressing feelings which are very widespread and deep-seated. It is wrong to laugh at such statements. It makes no more sense to laugh at that aspect of reality than it did to laugh at the fear of the people of Germany 30 years ago, that some Jewish-Bolshevik-Capitalist, etc. conspiracy was threatening to destroy the center of European civilization. When a great power with enormous resources is overcome by this kind of psychosis, it is no time to laugh, it's a time to do something else.

The belief in American innocence is equally easy to document... Well, let me just mention one example. In the last few days, I've been looking at some of the articles that were published right after the Second World War, one of them in particular by A.A. Berle, in which he describes what he thinks American policy toward Asia should be. He suggests that our policy should be one of unilateral American intervention to safeguard what he calls the rights of peo-

ples, this being a new era in world history. It used to be that nations were only concerned with the rights of nations, but now we've risen to a new level of civilization and we're concerned with the rights of peoples; and since obviously the UN isn't sophisticated enough and not advanced enough culturally to be able to deal with the rights of peoples, then the United States is going to have to do it unilaterally. He suggests two particular countries where we ought to do this, namely Greece and Iran. This was 1947, and of course we've been carefully looking after the rights of people in those two countries and many others ever since then.

This combination of fear and belief in innocence is hardly unique. It's the kind of sickness that can be dealt with and perhaps cured only by a very strong dose of reality, and the people who should administer it are people who know something about the matter; people like you, that is. In your capacity as Asian scholars, there is nothing more important that you can do than to administer this dose of reality. One's life as an Asian Scholar does not of course exhaust one's life - there are many other kinds of political activism that one ought to be engaged in these days. But in one's specific capacity as an Asian scholar, any kind of scholar, I think there is nothing more important than to do work that is serious, objective, and free from dogma, work that will therefore be more sympathetic, more radical, more fraternal in its relation to the strivings of masses of people throughout the world. And to do this work in a form which is on the one hand persuasive within the profession, and on the other hand meets the needs of people who don't want to bother with all the footnotes, but just want to know the main gist of things and to get a picture of what the world is really like -- even if various professors at Harvard feel that this understates the complexity of the situation. It is true that the world is more complex than any description of it. One need not, however, be paralyzed by this realization.

I think one shouldn't underemphasize the effect that serious academic scholarship might possibly have. It's interesting to think back over the impact of reinter-

pretations of the cold war over the last few years. There are really a very small number of people who have been involved in revisionist history. But within a brief space of time, this has become such a significant intellectual force that nobody can fail to pay attention to it, and I think almost any college student today would take for granted things which were regarded as rather scandalous just a few years ago. This understanding gradually extends into the mass media and into the schools. This change of attitude has come about in part because there is a student movement. If there hadn't been some political movement doing all sorts of things on the side, then the scholarly works of reinterpretation would have remained in the obscurity to which they were consigned in earlier years. Nevertheless there is an interplay, and these two factors - the development of a political movement and the development of serious work which, in a sense, gives a framework within which the political movement works - this interplay is very valuable and ought to continue. Neither can take place successfully without the other.

A second example which is even more pertinent today, I think, concerns the very interesting developments in the scientific community, beginning with technical matters like the ABM. I think the debate over the ABM has been a real awakening for a lot of scientists. It's been assumed for a long time that the government makes mistakes because it gets bad advice, and if only it got good advice, obviously it would do the right thing - because it's a government by the people, for the people, and so on. Now, the ABM is a very clear test case of this hypothesis. I've rarely seen a situation in which scientists were so unified on a technical issue - on the issue of whether the thing will work or whether it will defend you against anyone, or whether the computer system will function, and so on. Here is a group of people who can really test the proposition that the government is simply waiting for good advice, and you can see what's happening. I think there is an awareness developing that the ABM program is a case of a conclusion in search of an argument, and that the government and its corporate affiliates are

searching until they've got an argument that can be used to befuddle or obfuscate. All of this is leading to a good deal of cynicism, and that's important, I think. For example, the cynicism was revealed at an ABM rally the other day at MIT when one theoretical physicist made a rather constructive suggestion: he suggested that rather than using radioactive materials - which conceivably might be useful for something - in the nose cones, we should fill them with cheese so that we can deal with excess farm production while we're also giving a subsidy to the electronics industry. Now I think that this is having an effect in the scientific community. I think it's leading to a more accurate understanding of the way politics really works, of how important decisions are made, and that's important.

Now I think in the field of Asian Scholarship there are similar opportunities for Americans to understand what has been the impact of the United States on, let's say, the peasants of the Philippine Islands, and to understand what "danger" the peasants of the Philippine Islands pose to us. This is something that can be brought to people, and if done seriously and persuasively, it can perhaps affect the dual problem of fear of the third world and belief in American innocence.

I've been talking about an ideological component in the general system of repression and destruction and waste which is what the United States is coming to stand for in the world. Just to look back a little bit on recent history, the Second World War was very critical in the development of this system in a number of ways which, I think, are very relevant to our present situation. For one thing, every industrial power in the world was wiped out or seriously damaged by the Second World War, except for us. We came out with our industrial production quadrupled. We could not resist the temptation to use this fantastic power to construct and organize a world system of stable states (I think Mr. Huntington would call it), an American world empire as it might be called in more objective language. This meant that we extended our traditional domains - Latin-America, parts of the Pacific - to Southeast Asia, to the

Middle East, to any place that wasn't already preempted by our somewhat weaker and less imaginative colleagues in the Kremlin. Secondly, the World War taught a very important lesson in economics, which is having a great impact on domestic American society. Until the Second World War we had not really succeeded in escaping from the Depression - in 1939 there were 9 million unemployed. The Second World War showed that a highly mobilized society, with substantial government intervention in the economy to induce production, could succeed, at least for some space of time, in overcoming the very serious problems of the 1930's, and it taught this lesson to precisely the people who could benefit from it: the corporate executives, for example, who came to Washington and discovered that centralized social management was a pretty good thing; you could use it for your own interests.

I think that lesson has been well absorbed, and it's now taken for granted that there has to be substantial government intervention in the economy and a high degree of centralization and planning. Now any economist, any graduate student in economics, can design very useful ways in which the government might use public funds to improve the society: build a mass transportation system, low cost public housing and all sorts of things. But the trouble is that there are a few constraints within which this system has to function. For one thing, government-induced production has to be non-competitive with the private empires that fundamentally determine public policy. This excludes a number of possibilities. For example, it excludes a rational mass transportation system precisely because of its rationality, which would obviously very seriously damage the automobile and steel industry, the oil industry, and so on. And, secondly, the public subsidy has to be acceptable to the public; that is, people have to be willing to have a big chunk of their earnings taken away to subsidize some part of the industrial system. Now if you combine these conditions -- non-competitiveness, fast-wasting end products, rapid obsolescence as one condition, and acceptability to the public as a second condition -- there really aren't too many possibilities left that

meet these conditions. One thing that meets them, of course, is war expenditures. It's not competitive, there's always more and more of it, it's wasted very fast, it doesn't produce more capital and so on, and secondly it's acceptable to people as long as they live in fear, and believe that we need this vast expenditure in order to keep the Vietcong from stealing our television sets, or whatever it is.

Objective scholarship can strike at one pillar of this whole system, namely in the matter of acceptability. If you can eliminate the paranoid fear and the belief in the benevolence of our objectives and actions, then the psychological support for vast expenditures for arms disappears, and I think it might be very hard to sustain if this element disappears. Now if that expenditure for arms is hard to sustain, the effects on the economy and our society may be profound. But in any event, this is a way in which I think something as simple as objective scholarship might turn out to be, if you like, rather subversive - that is, it might affect the whole complex system of ideological controls and beliefs that maintains repression on an international scale.

There is a second respect in which I think objective scholarship can be extremely important politically and in a sense somewhat "subversive," and that is that it can serve to demystify the system. The Civics course that you study in the 8th grade tells you that the political institutions act the way the people tell them to, and that the economy is under the control of consumer sovereignty... you know, you pay your dollars which are your votes and that determines the way the system functions. This description is a kind of mystification. The political institutions are quite unresponsive to popular demands: in the area of foreign policy, almost totally so.

Furthermore, even if the economic institutions were responsive to consumer sovereignty, that wouldn't be much help in this stage of the development of an industrial system. There are basic needs that simply can't be expressed in market terms, like the collective need for a mass transportation system. You can't decide, in the market, whether to spend your \$3,000 on a

Chevrolet or a public transportation system. There are certain needs - and they happen to be the ones that are probably the most crucial ones for us today - that belong in another domain: they involve political organization; they involve collective expression of needs that don't fall into a market system, and that's a very serious part of the American crisis, no doubt. But I think that it is very hard to unlearn the lesson of the 8th grade civics course. It is easy to believe because most of the people who believe it are getting a good deal from the system, and are, or can hope to be participants in the culture and the economy of affluence.

But the things that are happening now are beginning to demystify the system, to show how political institutions actually function, and to reveal the inadequacies of the "model of affluence." For example I think there are many scientists who are more aware than they were a few weeks ago of the extent to which certain private interests determine public policy. Or consider the "credibility gap" - the exposure to which to a large extent we owe to people in the Asian scholarly field, for example Franz Schurmann's work on the work of politics of escalation. This again has served to show that far from it being the case that the government is the representative of the people, rather it's more accurate to say, in many respects, that the government is the enemy of the people - particularly the executive branch of the government which is definitely, in large areas of its functioning, simply an enemy of the American people as it's an enemy of the human race. You find recognition of this, incidentally, in the treatment that Congressmen have been giving to representatives of the Pentagon in the last few days, and in the general feeling of scepticism and cynicism that appear in very large parts of the population.

I think, as compared with a couple of years ago, the attitude of very large segments of the American people toward the government today is probably rather like that of a moderately sophisticated Russians to their government; that is, you assume that it's lying, you assume that it's doing something behind the scenes that it's not

telling you about, that it's probably acting counter to your interests, and also that there's not very much you can do about it. And to a large extent this is accurate. But I think that the fact that the perception has developed, and it was untrue a couple of years ago, again is a step forward.

Correlated with this - and again very relevant to the Asian field - is a kind of demystification of expertise. The most effective way in which intellectuals have helped to support our global system of repression is by giving it a certain immunity from criticism by investing policy with the aura of science. Here too, I think it's very important to point out what a thin coating all of this is, to expose what really is the relationship between policy decisions and anything that's known about international affairs or political structures or the particular societies that are being managed and controlled - "modernized", to use the technical euphemism. I think many people tend to assume that the government turns to the expert to find out what it ought to do. This is a natural assumption, yet when you look at the way things actually work, you get a different picture. There's a very small number of people who come from corporations, law firms, investment firms, foundations, and so on and so forth, who set policy and call upon experts to bolster it. Those who object to these policies stop being "experts."

Perhaps the most striking case is someone like George Kennan, who in 1947 participated in the writing of the famous Mr. X document, and at that point of course, he was a very hard-headed, realistic, tough-minded expert because he said we ought to contain the Soviet Union. When a few years later, Kennan started making speeches about how the Soviet Union isn't likely to attack the West, about how they share civilized values and exhibit certain human traits, etc., - well, you know how long George Kennan stayed in the State Department. In fact, when he started talking like that, he became an irresponsible mystic. Dean Acheson said that Mr. Kennan is a mystic who never really understood the realities of power. Well, he understood the realities of power in 1947 and he failed to understand

them in 1950, and I think this fall from grace is traceable to the difference in what he was proposing or at least was understood to be proposing at those two times.

Again, I think such demystification of expertise can really be carried out most effectively by the experts themselves. This can be a very important and a very effective way of bringing further insight into the functioning of our political system.

When one is talking about the American crisis, the things I've been mentioning are rather superficial - they are not the heart of the American crisis in any sense. I don't think there is any way to escape the fact that this is a crisis of Capitalism that is profound. The fact of the matter is that a system of production for profit, a system in which, as was described this morning, a human being is regarded as an instrument of production or is regarded as economic man who tries to maximize his own material self-interest independently of its effect on anyone else - such a system is a kind of barbarism. That particular kind of barbarism may have been useful for developing an industrial system a hundred years ago, but it just doesn't fit with the present day. Today it leads to acts of barbarism like the Vietnam war, like the ABM and the arms race and the ultimate catastrophe which will certainly come if we continue in this direction. This is a very deep crisis. It's not the kind of crisis that's going to be met by showing why George Kennan became an irresponsible mystic, or by explaining that the peasants in the Philippines don't threaten us. I think the crisis has to be met by very significant and far-reaching changes in our society, ultimately changes that succeed in bringing social institutions, political institutions, economic institutions, the whole commercial and industrial system under direct popular control. I think we have the level of technology, the level of technical skill and scientific culture to make that a very feasible prospect. At least one can think about it, and think of ways of moving towards it.

Now, Asian scholars are not going to carry out this change, and there's no point pretending that they are. Asian scholar-

ship is not going to bring the commercial and industrial system under popular control, but at least it can make a very serious contribution, not only in the direct ways that I've been talking about, but also by the side effects, by the fact that success in turning one area of thinking and involvement and action towards rationality and sympathy and fraternal understanding for human problems, can affect other areas. And in fact in almost every profession today there's something analogous to this. For example at MIT last Saturday, there was a meeting growing out of the March 4 Research Strike, in which over 100 scientists, quite a number of them senior faculty, came and undertook a commitment not only to come to meetings and pay their dues, but to work intensively on projects which are related to the question of how science is subverted by the demands of the arms race, and the demands of waste and destruction and repression in general. I think this is a parallel to development that have taken place here. Now if all of these developments in many fields can become organized, can become coordinated, can become unified; if they can, and this is even more Utopian, perhaps, if they can become part of an organized mass politics that goes well beyond the professions and the U-

niversities, and which - if in fact successful - will submerge these developments within it as ought to happen; if a vast cooperative enterprise of that kind can take place at many levels of action and thinking, then it may be conceivable that we will be able to face, in a serious way, those problems of our society which are profound and severe, problems that ultimately require a true social revolution which will significantly modify social relations, relations of production, human relations, the character of our culture. It's not ruled out that such a development might take place. I think it's fair to say that this is a very Utopian, unrealistic vision, but "realism" doesn't look very attractive at the moment. The "realistic" vision, I think, is one of barbarism at a cultural level, with the consequences that we see: turning Vietnam into a moonscape, and tomorrow the same thing in some other part of the world, and ultimately something parallel in the United States as well. In the face of these alternatives, the only sensible, the only realistic thing is to be a Utopian.



McCarran's Legacy: The Association for Asian Studies

Richard Kagan

(Revision of a speech delivered at the AAS Conference, March 29, 1969)

The McCarran Hearings in its attacks on the Institute of Pacific Relations (1951-52) destroyed the major professional organization concerned with contemporary Asian studies. The reaction to this event by the institutional successor to the I.P.R. - the Association for Asian Studies - has been to withdraw from any politically sensitive scholarship or action. Holden Furber, the 1968-69 president of the AAS, justifies this position by the questionable claim that: "To take up matters of political consideration would mean we would cease to be a scholarly organization, to say nothing of compromising our constitution and tax-exempt status."¹ The Association's conservative interpretation of the law and its educational policies definitely express a political point of view - one which clearly reflects the fears of the fifties rather than the needs of the seventies; one which identifies with and seeks protection from the most conservative elements in our society. Whenever one suggests that the Association poll its members on their Vietnam views, discuss the threats to academic freedom in Asia or in America, the Association's policy position is that it must stay neutral in order to forestall a loss of tax-exemption (The IPR supposedly lost its exempt status because of its "involvement" in issues). The AAS will not repeat the mistake. By raising the specter of the McCarran Hearings and their aftermath, the AAS has by default accepted McCarran's and Eastland's verdict against the IPR and has incorporated it into their own posture. Essentially, the AAS's interpretation of the IPR experience has created a timid political position which is maintained by

the assumption that any engagement in areas not purely scholarly will automatically result in a successful Internal Revenue Service attack.

The purpose of the following discussion is to initiate an investigation of the legacy of McCarthyism on our field. We will first give an example of another institution which was attacked at the same time but successfully fought back; a brief history of the tax-exempt ruling and its application; and an attempt to place our reactions within the larger scheme of American history.

When we examine the record, we immediately realize that the IPR's financial destruction was a fact. Before the McCarran Investigations in 1951, the Institute's average yearly income was approximately \$100,000. This was mainly derived from foundation grants. In 1951, during the first year of the Hearings, grants made up just \$30,000. In 1953, the year after the Hearings, no grants were forthcoming. The final blow occurred in 1955 when Senator Eastland requested T. Coleman Andrews, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to withdraw the Institute's tax-exempt status.² The principal consequences of this reclassification for the IPR were to curtail its resources and scope of activities. The institute was forced to sell parts of its library to handle court and other costs. In 1960, the American Council and the editorial staff of Pacific Affairs were transferred to Vancouver, British Columbia, where they are now under the supervision of Professor William Holland. All international activities were abandoned and have never been rehabilitated, such as conferences which "were devoted exclusively to the discussion of policy problems concerning the Pacific

Area."³

The AAS has concluded from all this that any foray into policy or political problems will bring down the axe, and thus it has withdrawn from public expressions on policy. However, the logic of the legacy of the IPR's troubles as argued by the Association can be challenged by historical analogy and legal precedent.

The history of the Fund for the Republic poses a constructive and possible alternative to take in face of Congressional attack. The Fund for the Republic was conceived and financed by the Ford Foundation. That Foundation in 1949 produced a study of how a tax-exempt organization could best act in the "volatile areas of civil rights and civil liberties." The report, entitled the Gathier Report, responded to the investigative activities of the House Un-American Activities Committee by recommending an examination of "certain aspects of 'un-American activities' investigation." The Report added, "A foundation may enter controversial areas boldly and with courage as long as it ... aids only those persons and agencies motivated by unselfish concern for the public good."⁴ One result was that the Ford Foundation established the Fund with resources of \$15,000,000, designed solely to be devoted toward the protection and maintenance of civil liberties. The Fund was incorporated in New York in December 1952, six months after the end of the McCarran Hearings.

The Fund's lawyers taking cognizance of the fate of the IPR, observed:

Applying the lessons of the above cases to the Fund for the Republic, Inc., we take it to be clear that the Fund is free to engage in partisan advocacy for the principles of the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Independence.⁵

Three years later, 1955, the same year that the IPR's tax-exemption was withdrawn, the IRS along with HUAC investigated the Fund for the Republic. As in the case of the IPR, the charges against the Fund involved "but a fraction of a per cent of the foundation's energies and appropriations."⁶ The Fund

launched an intensive counter-attack - stirring up affirmative public opinion, and political leaders. Men such as Senators John F. Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey were overwhelmingly affirmative in their response to the Fund. Today the Fund still exists and functions under the new name of Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. In the winter of 1969, it held a Conference on China to which Japanese and American political leaders and scholars were invited.

The AAS stand not only has turned its back on the lessons of the Fund thereby limiting its own actions, but by a confined interpretation of the law regarding tax-exempt groups has further placed itself into a politically uncritical position. The intent of the 1934 amendment to the tax code was to exempt groups which promoted the public interest. Only if the IRS could prove that selfish gain was the goal of an organization could it revoke tax-exemption. The amendment was "intended to encourage private groups to act as partners of government in solving public problems."⁷ In contradiction to the intent of the law, the IRS has become a political weapon in the hands of witch-hunting reactionaries and conservatives.

Since the AAS has accepted the Eastland interpretation of the law on tax-exemption, it has abdicated some of its integrity - educationally and morally. Whereas other professional scholarly groups at least allow their Executive Secretary to register as a lobbyist if and when desirable, this option is not even open for discussion in the AAS.⁸ Both professional and clearly conservative organizations such as the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the American Rifle Association, as well as groups dedicated to social change such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference which sponsored the Poor People's Campaign, engage in various forms of lobbying and public action without losing their tax exemption. Retention or revocation of this status is contingent not only upon the political climate of our nation, but equally upon the strength with which other tax-exempt groups exercise the original intent of the law.

How can we ensure our right to engage in action for the public interest and still remain tax-exempt? One way is to take an active interest in restoring the 1934 amendment to its original purpose. The lead has been taken by the Second Circuit Court of New York which has ruled that if lobbying "'was not intended for the aggrandizement of a particular group' and served 'no selfish purpose of the...profession,'" then the profession could retain its tax exemption.⁹ While other organizations (like the Sierra Club) are threatened by a loss of tax-exempt status, will the AAS stand up on behalf of the principle involved?: will it file friend-of-the-court briefs? write to the Treasury Department? inquire into the scope of activities which our profession can pursue? or will it remain in an immobilized silence generated by its response to McCarthy? What is needed is a thorough investigation of the nature and use of the Association - modeled perhaps on the Gathier Report - which would remove the aura of mystification from the IPR legacy and let us DECIDE to act or not to act in a courageous and well-thought out manner. We can make both history and law - we are not their defenseless victims.

The China field is not unique. American liberals and intellectuals in all disciplines have been severely affected by the period of the McCarran Hearings and the subsequent attacks by Mc Carthy. It is crucial, therefore, that we become more aware of our own American heritage, and how our field and research directly reflect the American experience. We must investigate our identities as American scholars concerned about Asia and the basis of our thinking and attitudes. I would here just like to suggest two reactions to the 1950's which have been shared by both liberals and many China scholars.

The first was to eschew involvement in public activities. The scholar's public service role was re-defined, re-oriented, from one of instruction at large to that of the expert and social technician. The professional's conscience, which formerly united social and professional concerns, was split apart: social or moral concerns too openly expressed reaped dangerous consequences and had to be excluded from professional activities. One indication of this withdrawal from public exposure can be seen in the

authorship of book reviews in popular newspapers before and after 1951. In the years 1945 through 1950, twenty-two reviews out of thirty contributed to the New York Times were by writers who had been attacked by the China Lobby. The number for the Herald Tribune in the same period was slightly higher. During 1952-1956 no reviews by any of the above writers were published by these papers.¹⁰ The scholars had withdrawn into the refuge of individual consultation with high government officials or into silence. Another more recent indication of the effects is in the area of high school textbooks. Of the ten major and most widely used school books on China, all of which were written since 1955, only one was written by a China scholar, two by Japan scholars, and the rest by professional writers. These books express the fears of the fifties, not the analysis of the sixties. They cater to the public image of China that was formed by the China Lobby and by our State Department.¹¹

The withdrawal of the scholars was an act of self-defense. The McCarran Hearings and McCarthy's attacks were aimed at the liberals who appeared able to influence both government policy and public opinion. Congressional investigations provided a tremendous supply of hearsay for right-wing and politically opportunistic groups to attack the scholars. Consequently in face of Congressional and pressure groups' attacks, the liberals and China scholars chose not to expose themselves any further to the public at large. In making this choice, however, the scholar abnegated a significant part of his educational role and succumbed to McCarran's prescription for him.

The second complementary strand of reaction to McCarthyism was the strengthening of the elitist characteristics of scholars by their withdrawal from public service. The intellectual's reaction to the McCarthy period has been brilliantly analyzed by Michael Paul Rogin in his study, The Intellectuals and McCarthy: the Radical Specter. One of his theses is that the liberals ventured into "conservative political theory" where stability was the key word, where the focus was on the role of rational responsible political leadership, and where the main fear was radicalism of the masses.

This view nourished an elitist outgrowth that has been shared by China scholars. The harvest has brought in a predilection for working with or for the government, expressing suspicion and antagonism to any movement from the bottom, and believing in the power of "institutions to check and control human beings." "The elitism which once glorified intellectuals as a revolutionary avant garde now glorifies them as experts and social technicians" committed to improving the status quo.¹² In sum, the McCarran-McCarthy legacy has been to increase a traditional orientation to elite politics.

How does this relate to us in terms of action?

At the very least we should re-consider our relation to the American public and our notion of what the public interest is. In brief, this could engage us in the following programs: We could keep the profession and the public informed on new State Department appointments and activities with regard to Asia. We could organize parts of our conventions around critical topics of current importance and invite Asian scholars including those from North Vietnam, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, China, etc. We could take a closer look at the welfare - physical, psychological, and political - of the Asian students in America. We could create a committee to investigate threats to academic freedom in the Asian field - at home and abroad. We could review all high school materials on Asia, and actively promote curriculum development. We might investigate how Asian studies is taught at our military academies and government schools. We could call for an investigation of politically sensitive issues like the opium trade in Asia, or the suppression of Ross Koen's book. And finally we could create forms of political and professional solidarity: to publicize and support cases where the political and civil rights of a professor are jeopardized.

Within the context of a more historical perspective of our own role as scholars, and a more thorough study of our legal rights within a tax-exempt framework, we can re-orient the AAS away from the heretofore unchallenged legacy of the McCarran Hearings and allow for a richer and more vital interpretation of our past and a challenging and dynamic future.


McCarthyism is not an alien force impinging on our work. The seeds of McCarthyism are within us. We must refuse to propagate and nourish them.

Footnotes

- ¹Quoted from an interview in Newsweek, April 14, 1969, p. 74. Professor Furber has expressed these opinions before, but admits that he neither knows the law involved or who gave the AAS such legal advice. One former president of the association told me that Jonathan Bingham, a New York lawyer and politician, had been the Associations' legal council. I have not yet been able to confirm this, and would appreciate any information regarding this.
- ²Many years later, the IPR won back its exemption, but the damage was already accomplished.
- ³Janet Wyzanski, "The IPR Hearings: A Case Study in McCarthyism," A.B. Thesis, Harvard University, March 15, 1962.
- ⁴Ford Foundation, Report of the Study for the Ford Foundation on Policy and Program (Detroit, 1949), p. 67.
- ⁵Thomas C. Reeves, "The Fund for the Republic and McCarthyism," a paper delivered at the Winter 1968 Convention of the American Historical Association. p.5. This paper is part of a larger work which will be published in the summer of 1969.
- ⁶Ibid., p. 13.
- ⁷Ronald S. Borod, "Tax Exemption: Lobbying for Conservation," The New Republic, December 7, 1968, p.15.
- ⁸"Association Notes," Journal of the American Historical Association, 73,4 (April, 1968) 1344.
- ⁹Ronald S. Borod, op. cit. p. 16.
- ¹⁰Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby (Macmillan Press, N.Y., 1960)
- ¹¹See my forthcoming article: "'Oh Say Can

You See? Ideological Blindness on Secondary School Units on China," in the anti-text series of Pantheon Press. This book will be on radical approaches to Asian Scholarship and will be edited by Mark Selden and Ed Friedman.

¹²Christopher Lasch, "The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom," Barton J. Bernstein, ed. Towards a New Past, (Pantheon, 1968) p. 338.



McCarthyism and our Asia Policy

O. Edmund Clubb

(Abridgment of a speech delivered at the AAS Conference, March 29, 1969)

Speaking in New York on March 20 of this year, Senator Javits referred to "the lingering pall of McCarthyism, which continues subtly to inhibit thought and debate in this country concerning China."¹ McCarthyism, by my thesis, played a significant role in molding both our China policy in particular and our Asia policy in general, and in keeping it in that form through the inhibition of the normal functioning of the government's policy-making apparatus.

McCarthyism was oriented naturally in large measure to the "China Question." After World War II ended, when civil war was beginning between the Nationalists and Communists in China, Patrick J. Hurley resigned as ambassador to China and advanced onto the American political stage with shotgun charges that "pro-Communists" and "pro-imperialists" in the State Department had undercut his policies. By equating differences of opinion and judgment with "pro-Communism" (or "pro-imperialism"), General Hurley sowed dragon's teeth for the McCarthyites' subsequent destructive crusade against the so-called "Communist conspiracy" in the State Department.

In 1949 the Chinese Communists overthrew the Nationalist regime. In January 1950 the Department of State issued a charge that the Soviet Union was establishing its domination over Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang. This naturally contributed to the popular malaise: "Shall a trumpet be blown in the city, and the people not be afraid?" On February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy made his famous Wheeling speech in which, re-wording

the Hurley allegations, he charged that 205 Communists were at work in the State Department "still working and shaping policy." In September 1950, Congress enacted, and promptly passed over President Truman's veto, the Internal Security Act (popularly known as the "McCarran Act"). The storm known as "McCarthyism" thereafter took on added force and assumed full shape. It was directed primarily at the State Department and Foreign Service personnel, but its scope duly widened, so that many other personalities and governmental organs became targets.²

It was during this period that the State Department's loyalty-security program moved into high gear. A sampling of the lines of inquiry pursued indicates attitudes newly deemed reprehensible and sufficient to bring the officer under suspicion as disloyal or a security risk.

It was assumed variously in hearings of Foreign Service Officers that to speak ill of Chiang Kai-shek, think that Chinese Communism was complex rather than simple, opine that the Sino-Soviet relationship was not monolithic, or estimate that picking up the lost French anti-Vietminh cause in Indo-China would be a grave error, were all signs of moral deviation and to be condemned. The new orthodoxy demanded that American officialdom, for safety's sake, should be pro-Nationalist, believe that Chinese Communism was Moscow's Marxism-Leninism and that the two Communist states were inseparable, and hold that where the French might have failed, the United States could and should have victory. Summed up, a new creed, best described as a simplistic anti-Communism aiming at the military containment of China, began to govern in the

field of American foreign policy. The whole position was buttressed by the alarms spread by defense specialists of dire eventualities that threatened, and by the public relations activities of various calculating Asian leaders who, learning quickly from the successful tactics employed by Chiang Kai-shek for the winning and maintenance of a profitable American support, became professional "anti-Communists."

The policy-making function itself became corrupted. The officers of the Foreign Service had reported the facts of complex situations as they saw them, and had ventured to interpret the significance of events. They had never borne the responsibility of determining policy: that was the function of the State Department, the Secretary of State, ultimately of the President. Now Foreign Service Officers were being struck down for their reporting and estimates. The situation as it developed was described by President Truman:

In such an atmosphere, key government employees tend to become mentally paralyzed. They are afraid to express honest judgments, as it is their duty to do, because later, under a changed atmosphere and different circumstances, they may be charged with disloyalty by those who disagree with them. Our nation cannot afford or permit such a mental blackout."³ (emphasis supplied)

If dissenting opinions and judgments were to be adduced in support of charges of disloyalty or security risk, how was the government to obtain objective views from its officers regarding the Soviet Union, China, Southeast Asia--or any area where Communism might be present?

The loyalty-security program became an integral part of the governmental structure. That there was persistence of the basic malady in the years that followed was disclosed in 1959 by a Senate Foreign Relations Committee study of U.S. foreign policy. The executive committee charged with the investigation invited a selected group of retired Foreign Service Officers, not identified, to submit their views on American foreign policy.

The answers were far-ranging. One of the strongest criticisms had reference to the impact of the loyalty-security program on the Foreign Service:

"Until recent years diplomatic and consular officers of all ranks in the field were encouraged to report objectively and to make recommendations in accordance with their best judgment...now all that is changed. It is common knowledge in the Department of State and in the Foreign Service that Foreign Service officers have been reprimanded and even heavily penalized for making reports or recommendations unpalatable to certain persons in the Department and that they have been ordered not to repeat the offense..."⁴

Let us look at the new Asia policy in the making. In the political hustings in the election years 1950 and 1952, one demagogic warcry was "Who lost China?", with the easy inference that China was "lost" to the United States by treason. As is well known, the Republicans won in 1952 and John Foster Dulles became the new Secretary of State.

Even before the presidential election, Dulles had voiced the basic principles on which the policy of the United States and its allies should be founded, the first being:

"The dynamic prevails over the static: the active over the passive. We were from the beginning a vigorous confident people born with a sense of destiny and mission..."⁵

In his first address to assembled State Department and Foreign Service personnel after his induction into his new post, Dulles demanded "positive loyalty" to the policies of the administration. Not even a technical margin for dissent remained.

Dulles made it entirely clear by his subsequent actions that he proposed to formulate the nation's foreign policy without reference to "area experts," who were placed in a state of what might be called psychic "preventive detention."

The reorientation of the United States' Asia policy, centered on the concept of the military containment of China, was pressed forward at a rapid pace by Dulles. In response to the French defeat in Indo-China, in September 1954, Dulles achieved the organization of SEATO.⁶

On December 2, 1954, the United States entered upon a treaty of military alliance with the Nationalists on Formosa, and the United States thus became aligned in stance and policy with one Chinese faction against another in an unfinished civil war. It seemed to be the cream of the jest that, on that same December 2, Senator McCarthy was condemned by the U.S. Senate for conduct tending "to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute, to obstruct the constitutional processes of the Senate, and to impair its dignity."⁷

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy died in May 1957, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in May 1959. By the latter date, our China policy had been fixed in an inflexible mold.

We find ourselves today immobilized in the position which we began to construct, by bipartisan effort, under the whiplash of McCarthyism, in 1950. The United States has constructed a semi-circle of military bases, garrisoned by American troops, reaching from South Korea to Thailand, for the containment of China. We have warred in Korea, the Formosa Strait, and in Vietnam, avowedly to the same end. Let us grant that the cause of our predicament is not to be found simply and exclusively in McCarthyism or the thinking of John Foster Dulles and Dean Rusk: many factors, and many men, have been involved in this development. But I submit that McCarthyism and the emotional, messianic patterns of thought induced by that demagogic phenomenon were at least major factors in bringing about the results we see before us.⁸

Has there been opposition in government to the American China policy? Practically none has been visible. As regards the Vietnam War, avowedly fought to contain Chinese Communism, there has of course been evidence of rather more Congressional restlessness, but remarkably little of dissent within the Executive branch. There

was interesting testimony to the existence of an intellectual malaise in a recent Reston column.⁹ He remarked that there were many high officials--and he named some of them--in the Administration who disagreed with President Johnson on the Vietnam policy, but that despite their opposition to the war they "didn't quite speak their minds to the President, let alone to the public..." They gave their loyalty to the President, said Reston, rather than to their country, and some "are now wondering in private life whether this was in the national interest," and are troubled. Well they might be. But note one aspect of the new situation: now there are no charges by Congressional committees or by the press that the nation has been led into error by subordinate members of the Foreign Service.

The China policy of today, the Asia policy of today, are not by any stretch of the imagination to be viewed as the handiwork of career Asian experts. Our China and Asia policies are the creation of men at the top of government alone. McNamara, in a speech of March 1964, observed obliquely that "five United States Presidents have acted to preserve free world strategic interests in the area." Now a sixth has fallen heir to Dulles' divine mission, based as it is on faulty first premises, incorporating vast fantasy. He has also inherited a State Department and Foreign Service apparatus which has had its true function gravely weakened. As the anonymous retired Foreign Service Officers warned a decade ago, in the quest for a total security with respect to individuals, the national security has been endangered.

For the introduction of McCarthyism into our foreign-policy making processes meant in essence the supplanting of realism in the realm of foreign affairs by policies based upon ideology--based upon quasi-religious concepts of Good and Evil, with the fervent conviction that Good and Evil must war to the death. The effects of McCarthyism remain embodied in our Asia policy to this day. It is essential that there be a fundamental, if agonizing, re-appraisal.

Footnotes:

¹ New York Times, March 21, 1969.

² See, for a description of targets, Chapter 2, "Senator McCarthy at Work": and for a treatment of methods, Chapter 3, "The Methods", in James Rorty & Moshe Decter, McCarthy and the Communists, Boston 1954; and Bert Andrews, Washington Witch Hunt, N. Y. 1948, particularly Part I, "The Hunters and the Hunted."

³ Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, N.Y. 1956, 2 vols., Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1952, 285. See in support of this estimate Eleanor Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program, Ithaca 1953, 151. For the President's condemnation of the demagogic exploitation of the security program "in an attempt to frighten and mislead the American people," see op. cit., 284-85.

⁴ Study of United States Foreign Policy, Summary of Views of Retired Foreign Service Officers Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Pursuant to The Provisions of S. Res. 31, 86th Congress, 1st Session, June 15, 1959. Washington 1959, 41.

⁵ Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 22, 1952.

⁶ He had endeavored to create such an organization earlier in the year, so that

it would serve for the effort at "saving" Indo-China, but had been blocked by the reluctance of other states to participate while the Indo-China war was in course.

⁷ Congressional Quarterly Service, China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1966, Washington 1967, 71.

⁸ See Study of United States Foreign Policy, Summary of Views of Retired Foreign Service Officers, cit., 11, for the comment of one anonymous critic:

"it seems to me that a serious illusion which has beclouded our appraisal of the Russian, Chinese and other developments has been in persuading ourselves that because democratic institutions, as we have conceived and developed them, are suited to our way of life they must be equally advantageous to peoples of an entirely different background. As a result we have been as insistent on democratizing the world or, in other words of making it over in our own image, as the Russians have in making it over in conformity with their own. This is a parochial view which fails to take into account the great diversity of mores and cultures in the world..."

⁹ James Reston, "The Doubts and Regrets of the Johnson Dissenters," New York Times, Mar. 9, 1969.



Two Postscripts to the McCarran Hearings

Ross Koen

(Paper delivered at the AAS Conference,
March 29, 1969)

Before I begin my remarks on the subject of this discussion, I should like to record two footnotes. The first is that I approach this panel with some trepidation because of an absence of almost six years from my study of the field and, therefore, I am not as familiar as I should like to be with some of the more recent events nor with current research in matters related to my subject. Second, my responsibilities with the Association of California State College Professors (not the California Teachers Association) have been far heavier than I anticipated when I agreed to appear here and, therefore, I have not been able to spend the time I had hoped to on this presentation.

With those caveats, I should like to begin by recounting briefly my own futile efforts to tell the American public a fuller story of what I hope to present here today. Those efforts of mine began with the presentation of a manuscript entitled The China Lobby in American Politics, to the Macmillan Company in the late summer of 1958. The manuscript, with agreed upon revisions, was accepted for publication by the Trade Department and a contract was signed in late December. The process of revision, checking proofs, securing permissions to quote, and preparing index and bibliography consumed all of 1959, but the publication date was finally set for March 21, 1960.

A number of pre-publication reviews appeared and Alfred Kohlberg, who had on occasion claimed to be the China lobby, offered to serve as "truth" editor on the book for Macmillan. When his offer was declined, he wrote a critical commentary in his customary style. The point here is that

a few weeks before publication date the book was brought to the attention of the top management and directors of the company. By the time that occurred, however, advance copies of the book had gone out to reviewers, advance order customers and some libraries, so that publication was all but a fait accompli.

Even so, one should never underestimate the resourcefulness of a determined publisher. On March 10, 1960, Mr. Bruce Brett, President at that time of the Macmillan Company, called me at home in Arcata, California, and told me that the New York Law firm for the Chinese Nationalist Embassy had threatened a suit against the publisher and me because of a statement in the preface of the book concerning allegations of illegal smuggling of narcotics into the United States. Brett insisted that even if my remarks could be fully documented--I had, purely for illustrative purposes, merely referred to such allegations--he would want them deleted before release of the book in order to prevent any possibility of a suit.

I, in turn, insisted that the Chinese were putting Brett on, that there was nothing in my statement on which a suit could be based, and that the book should be released forthwith. It had been thoroughly checked by two attorneys before going to press. I further argued that this was a tactic, typical of those consistently used by the Kuomintang in the United States, and that any delay in publication or any change in the content at such a late date would only provide ammunition for discrediting the entire work.

In fact, preparations for precisely that effort were already being undertaken by the Chinese. A photo copy of a letter,

addressed to the Ambassador of the Republic of China and signed by H.J. Anslinger, U.S. Commissioner of Narcotics in the Treasury Department, was sent to the Macmillan Company. The letter asserted that my statement concerning allegations of illegal smuggling of narcotics into the United States was "manufactured out of the whole cloth." My statement was, Anslinger said, "so fantastic that if it is any measuring rod as to the rest of the book, I assume it can be similarly classified."

Brett was impervious to my arguments and insisted that all copies of the book must be recalled and new language inserted to replace that which was in contention. On March 24, I capitulated and agreed to substitute language which made no reference to narcotics in return for the promise from the Editor of the Trade Department that, "we will go back to press immediately." In fact, in spite of my agreement, the Macmillan Company did not go back to press, then or later.

After a long silence, during which my letters and phone calls went unacknowledged, I was informed that the company had decided to send the book out to three readers for additional comment. I protested vehemently, to no avail. Eventually, the comments of the three readers were sent to me (one was nineteen pages in length) with the request that I make "appropriate changes" in the text where I concurred and offer "a persuasive argument" where I did not concur. The publisher had concluded, even before hearing my response, that the changes would be "sufficiently numerous to oblige us to scrap the entire edition which is now in print." He stated the intention, after receiving my changes and corrections, to "set the book up again from scratch--after, of course, a careful examination of the emendations involved."

I was thoroughly convinced at this point that no amount of work on my part, short of complete emasculation of my analysis, would ever persuade Macmillan to publish the book. Nevertheless, I decided to make one further effort to understand their point of view. I went to New York in early September for a personal conference with Brett. I asked him to state for me precisely what the problem was. His answer was, "I'm scared and you

should be too." My attempts to get a more detailed replay elicited only vague references to pressures from the departments of State and Treasury and from other governmental agencies (one, I learned later, was the CIA); heavy pressures from financial institutions holding large Chinese deposits; and the conviction that it is sometimes unwise to publish accounts of the activities of persons in public life until all the parties at interest have died. In short, Bruce Brett was not about to permit publication of The China Lobby in American Politics by the Macmillan Company.

At this point, I made a basic error. Without regard to the reasons, instead of taking legal measures to force Macmillan to honor its contract, I continued to negotiate for several months, even agreeing at one time to undertake some minor revisions. They were never made, in part because I became ever more convinced that publication would not result and that such efforts were therefore a waste of time.

After seven years, I attempted to regain all my rights to the work by requesting cancellation of the contract. The Macmillan Company refused to do so except under terms and conditions which would have prevented my relating this story here today. After more than a year of effort on the part of my attorney, the contract was finally cancelled a few months ago with the stipulation by Macmillan that they had never published the book.

These events, related to the book itself, were clearly foreshadowed by its content. The reason is that it relates in substantial detail the gradual silencing in the United States of the critics of the Kuomintang regime in China, the elimination of those critics from any substantial influence on the public policy of this nation, and the substitution, therefore, in positions of influence and control, of those who supported the myth that the Chiang Kai-shek regime is the government of China and that his loss of control over the mainland was caused by the American China specialists through their influence on United States policy.

The ultimate silencing of the critics

of the Kuomintang and their removal from positions of influence on public policy was accomplished by a long series of Congressional hearings and investigations. Without these hearings and the attendant publicity, all the efforts of the Kuomintang and its friends in the United States could not have produced the sharp shift in public opinion from one of almost no support for Chiang Kai-shek in 1945-46 to overwhelming sympathy for Chiang and condemnation of those who were alleged to have caused his downfall by 1952. For the most part, however, these hearings depended, for their basic approaches and conclusions, on information developed by Kuomintang officials and agents and supplied to Congressional sources through such American friends as William C. Bullitt, Alfred Kohlberg, John T. Flynn, Freda Utley, a string of ex-Communists, and numerous other propagandists and polemicists.

By the middle of 1951, the attacks on the State Department China Specialists had reached such intensity that several of them were suspended pending new security clearances although all had been cleared numerous times before. At the time of these suspensions, for example, John S. Service, one of the outstanding officers in the China service, and already under suspension, was undergoing his eighth loyalty hearing in six years, largely as a result of the attacks from the pro-Chiang factions. It was the McCarran Committee hearings which finally brought about the elimination of these China specialists from public service while also bringing about the destruction of the IPR.

Alan Barth, writing in 1955 on what he called "Government by Investigation," noted:

"So successful was the House Committee on Un-American Activities in its techniques of dismissal (of other government employees) by 'exposure' that in 1950 it won the accolade of imitation. The late Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, Chairman of the powerful Judiciary Committee, established himself as its chairman. The new group took the headlines away from its House counterpart with a systematic and successful effort to purge from the State Department all the Career Foreign Service officers who, in the 1940's, had warned that

the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek was a weak reed to rely on and that, as a condition of continued American aid, it should be required to broaden and democratize the base of its representationLoyalty to Chiang was made the test of suitability for service in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs."

A brief review of the case history of one of these officers will provide some indication of the trauma which all of them suffered to one degree or another. John Carter Vincent was a Career Foreign Service Officer and was one of those suspended on July 12, 1951. Vincent had long been under attack by pro-Chiang spokesmen. One of the bases for their attacks was the fact that he had been assigned to accompany Henry Wallace on his mission to China for Roosevelt in 1944. Late in 1946, Vincent aroused the ire of the Chinese and their friends with a speech to the American Foreign Trade Council in which he was alleged to have questioned the advisability of investing funds in China. A few months later he was nominated for promotion to the rank of career minister, a nomination which required approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Upon learning of this nomination, Senator Styles Bridges submitted a memorandum to Senator Vandenberg setting forth "a number of charges relative to the policies and record of...Vincent." Bridges did not reveal the source of the memorandum. The memorandum was sent to Secretary of State Acheson for response and he, in his reply, summarized the allegations into twelve categories. I shall not real all of them but merely indicate the general nature of them by a single example. (pp. 212-215)

It was alleged that "the actions, advice, and recommendations" of Vincent had been coordinated with the steps outlined in two official Communist documents, and "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-Colonies," from the 6th World Congress of 1928.

Acheson denied all the allegations in the Bridges memorandum, provided some explanation, and characterized most of them

as figments of an overworked imagination. His reply was accepted by the Republican dominated Foreign Relations Committee, and Vincent's promotion as well as his appointment as Minister to Switzerland was approved.

The Attacks on Vincent from the pro-Chiang forces continued and, in 1950, Senator McCarthy placed Vincent second on his list of "eighty-one cases". McCarthy characterized Vincent "as (1) a big Communist tremendously important to Russia, as (2) a part of an espionage ring in the State Department, and (3) as one who should not only be discharged but should be immediately prosecuted." The Tydings Subcommittee, which held hearings on the McCarthy charges reviewed Vincent's loyalty file and concluded that the charges were absurd. During those hearings Budenz refused to identify Vincent as a Communist.

The following year before the McCarran Committee, however, the attacks on Vincent became more shrill and this time Budenz testified that according to official reports, Vincent was a member of the Communist Party and that they were eager for him to advance in the State Department so that he could influence policy. Vincent denied the accusations and called Budenz a liar in testimony given under oath. He was never prosecuted for perjury. McCarran, however, told Vincent that,

"...it is not alone membership in the Communist Party that constitutes a threat to the internal security of this country; it is sympathy with the Communist movement that raises one of the gravest threats that we have."

Vincent also denied sympathy, but the subcommittee made determined efforts to prove otherwise. Their primary method was to attempt to show that the Communists--primarily writers for the Daily Worker--had, on occasion, shown approval of Vincent personally and had sometimes advocated policies for Asia which paralleled to some extent those supposedly approved by Vincent. The subcommittee concentrated heavily on the Bridges memorandum of 1947, and concluded by filing formal charges against Vincent before the Department of State Loyalty Security Board.

The hearings before the Board dealt with three major charges; viz., (1) that Vincent was "pro-Communist" (2) that he was a member of the Communist Party, and (3) that he had associated "with people about whom the Department had derogatory information." On February 19, 1952, the Loyalty Security Board cleared Vincent of all charges and restored him to duty. Later that year the Civil Service Loyalty Board took up Vincent's case on review and, on December 15, announced that it had found that there was a "reasonable doubt" of Vincent's loyalty and he was again suspended. Acheson appointed a committee of legal and diplomatic experts to review Vincent's case but, before they could complete the review and report, the new Secretary of State, Dulles, announced that he had personally cleared Vincent of all disloyalty charges and allowed him to retire from the federal service.

Other China specialists fared less well. John Service was dismissed after his ninth hearing and was cleared only after a six-year court battle. John Davies was dismissed after the criteria for loyalty clearance was changed during the Eisenhower administration.

More significant, although on a less personal basis, than the destruction of the influence of the China specialists has been the long range effect on policy of the acceptance of the arguments and theses of the pro-Chiang forces and the Congressional Committee investigations. By 1952, these arguments and theses had become so firmly frozen in the American political system that we have been unable to move beyond that point in our stance toward China.

I agree entirely with O. Edmund Clubb that the McCarthy-McCarran heritage continues today as a dominant factor in American policy toward China. There is unquestionably a direct relationship between the acceptance of the views of the pro-Chiang spokesmen in the early 1950's and the tragic presence of the United States in Vietnam today. Only a massive, determined campaign by the Asian scholars in the United States to eradicate the McCarthy-McCarran view of history, to banish from Capitol Hill the shadow of the dragon which continues to

haunt its corridors, will restore to the
Chinese and American peoples the opportunity

to resume an orderly relationship in their
lives.



Approaches to the Study of China

Jean Chesneaux

(Abridgement of a talk given at Harvard on April 22, 1969)

One of the first things that strikes me when I come to the United States is the sheer number of scholarly books being published. When I hear, for instance, that Harvard University Press is ready to publish on China, and modern China only, in only one year, twenty-four books, I am disturbed. Growth in book production is based upon a profound shift in the function of books, an alienation from the proper role of books as such. Writing a book should indicate first that one is sure enough of his thinking, his knowledge, and his ideas to put them down in a fixed form. Secondly it should indicate that one is interested in having his views circulated among a wide circle of friends and readers. This is the function of a book, and in principle nothing else. But books today are often written for completely different purposes, namely to prepare for a career, to bestow prestige, to confer academic qualification, even to make money. Furthermore, there seems to be a tendency to produce for production's sake, a disease of our industrial societies. Priority is given to the discovery of new materials and sources rather than to the activity of thinking. The value of scholarly activity allegedly lies in the ability to process this new material instead of the practice of going back to the old material, staying with it, getting something out of it, and finally reevaluating it. And so there is a wide discrepancy between the normal function of a book in the life of a scholar and the function of a book in our society today. I would like to plea for a ten-year truce so that we might have time to read and think.

I would also like to remark on the in-

creasing importance of non-productive activities in scholarship, a reflection again of the society at large. One could elaborate on what the French economists call the tertiary sector of the economy, meaning all "managerial" activities (administration, public and private, marketing, filing, registering, etc.) Well, these non-productive developments are increasingly important in the life of a scholar on China. Activities like compiling indexes and collating increasing numbers of reviews and bibliographies take up more and more of the scholar's time. In general, the huge emphasis upon production and compilation has had several results. First, books are written for increasingly smaller audiences. Secondly, a growing proportion of our intellectual energies and mental resources are absorbed by the problem of how to handle, how to treat this information which is pouring down on top of us.

Many of these trends are expressed in the growing specialization within the field. Technological alienation occurs when each man becomes an increasingly minor part of the whole. In the Chinese field, one is no longer able to talk on the T'ai-p'ing and Yenan and the Cultural Revolution. One must be a man of 1911 or a man of the T'ai-p'ing. Mobility - moving from one area to another - is supposed to be eccentric. If you leave the field of Chinese studies for ten years and study another field, well, it's bad for your career, or at least is in bad taste. Marx has written a great deal on this problem of "polytechnic" education, now so remote from both the Soviet and the Western industrial societies. Man must not be alienated by his work, but must be able to move freely.

And so what we need is to "change

gear". The radicals in the Asian field have to work out an alternative image. How are we to define radical scholarship? It goes without saying that radical scholarship involves being radical in one's politics, especially when one's field is directly related to present-day politics, as are China or Vietnam. It means disassociating one's research from the academic-military-industrial complex - as it were - from the China-watchers, from those Vietnamese experts who discovered Vietnam only after the Geneva Conference, from those political scientists who treat the Chinese people and the Vietnamese, I shouldn't say as cannon fodder, but as computer fodder.

But radical scholarship must go further than current politics. It must bring relevance to the study of history. History has both a meaning and a direction. To quote a Chinese phrase, history "leans to one side". Therefore scholarship must try to get at the roots of historical trends, to probe into history's 'meaning' and 'direction'.

This means, first of all, giving priority to the problems rather than to the sources. What counts is not the availability of handy documentation but the relevance of the problem to be studied. If the problem is really important, then we have to advance it. Maybe the material on the subject is scanty, contradictory, or incomplete; maybe the problem can be treated only or partly through secondary sources. But if the problem is really important, we must direct all our intellectual forces to it, regardless of technical considerations.

We must not be reluctant to use unconventional source materials. Take, for example, the memoirs of Han Su-yin which are not always to be found on basic reading lists. How can we know the humiliation endured by the Chinese during the Treaty Port era - and I think we can agree that humiliation is rather an important dimension in the history of the Treaty Ports - without confronting the kinds of views expressed in her book. Most Western studies relying on the viewpoints of foreigners have treated the "unequal treaties" as a body of regulations, laws, and privileges applied by Westerners to a docile China. The "unequal treaties" have scarcely been studied as a

framework within which the social, political, and economic life of China developed, and against which the Chinese reacted in clearly definable ways. And so in the recollections of Han Su-yin, we find dozens of pages essential to our understanding of the psychological situation under the "unequal treaties". The book may not be the work of a scholar - it is not a conventional source - but it still is basic.

We must be just as bold in our selection of subjects for research. To cite an example: rural handicraft in pre-1949 China. This is a subject generally overlooked apart from a few articles in the early 1930's. The Chinese in Peking have, however, issued a collection of source materials on the subject - perhaps unconventional by American standards - the four-volume work, Chung-kuo chin-tai shou-kung-yeh shih tzu-liao (1840-1949). The association of the peasant with non-agricultural production has a long history in China. Today's commune is an attempt to give another solution to the problem of relating the peasant to industrial needs. Therefore a study of rural handicrafts from the 19th century down to the commune is absolutely essential for an understanding of the present direction and meaning of history (namely the Chinese answer to the problem of the relation between town and countryside.) It will probably not suit the usual criteria for conventional scholarship: information will be collected from missionary accounts, from letters, from second-hand sources, from recollections of peasants and so forth. It will not be quantified (a basic criteria for conventional economics.) But it is essential because it is an essential problem.

Radical scholars must not believe that they should deal only with general issues. The question of general versus minute scholarship is a false issue. Even minute scholarship can be valuable if related to a general problem. For instance, research on some member of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce in 1925 can be of wide interest in enabling one to understand the nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie, the comprador element, the modern merchant element, etc. in Republican China. To cite another example, the close philological study of a short Chinese expression like "pu p'ing

teng t'iao yueh" - "the unequal treaties" - and the way in which it was used by the Chinese can be of great value. It is not irrelevant, for it enables us to understand how the Chinese reacted at large to the foreign domination in China.

Another key point to be kept in mind by the radical historian is that he must concern himself with the people, and in the broadest sense must 'serve the people'. History is a mirror, a mirror too often reflecting the lives and opinions of those who write it. To take an idea from Balazs, Chinese history is the history of bureaucrats written by bureaucrats for bureaucrats. And so a key aim of radical scholars should be to go to the other side of the mirror, to study those who were not part of the establishment looking into it. The book Fan Shen by William Hinton is one of those few books that looks behind the mirror and deals with the life of the people. And so we must do the same kind of research with regard to the labor movement and the workers in the factories and the poor peasants and the bandits in the countryside. In recent years, Western scholars have emphasized leaders, elites, warlords, prominent intellectuals. A friend of mine at Harvard told me, "you know, in this country we care very much for elites. We like to know who to buy and who to kill." I think that's a good statement on the tendency of American sociology and political science regarding the Third World. And it is a tendency we as radicals have a duty to challenge.

Of course this does not mean a complete disassociation from research on ruling groups. We still have to consider such areas as intellectual history, diplomatic history, and political history - but primarily in relation to the people. This is what I call "mass line" scholarship. Even when we study diplomatic or intellectual history, it must be in relation to the large strata of society.

Intellectual history first. I have no objection to intellectual history as such, but it must be related to the masses of the people. I have just finished reading Crozier's book on Chinese medicine. Here is a

most fascinating subject, but one which should normally involve the question of modern medicine as it was introduced from the West and known to the treaty-port "modernized" communities versus traditional Chinese medicine as it was known to the people at large mainly in the countryside. But the book completely neglects the social side of the problem. It does not deal with the social basis (both for doctors and patients) of Chinese medicine. As long as intellectual history is limited to the intellectual community alone, to individual thinking as an isolated phenomenon, to controversy among literary journals or intellectual circles in the university, then I must say I'm positively in disagreement with it.

Secondly, diplomatic or international history. In the same way as mentioned above, one must approach international history from the inside, from the point of view of the Chinese people. When Owen Lattimore gave his introductory lecture at Leeds University, he called it "From China Looking Outward," which represents a much needed approach. I mentioned earlier the need to study the "unequal treaties" from the Chinese side; that is to say, not only the way in which the Chinese reacted to them, but the way in which the treaties actually affected Chinese life. And the same goes for foreign spheres of influence in China. Much has been written in the West on the detailed negotiations which enabled the French to get this sphere of influence in the Southwest, or England another sphere of influence in the Yangtze Valley, and so forth. But little has been written on the actual role and function, the working out of the spheres of influence. What did the French actually get out of this sphere of influence? There is much more to imperialism than negotiations and the making of agreements.

One can make some of the same generalizations about political and economic history. One must continue to ask how China - its institutions and particularly the lives of the mass of its people - were affected by certain types of phenomena, like the kind already mentioned.

In general, radical scholarship leans

to one side. Radical scholarship serves the people but only - it should be remarked - in a long-term relationship. There is no short-term mechanical relationship between radical scholarship and politics. This of course does not mean that a radical scholar should refuse to involve himself in short-term po-

litical activity. This is a part of his life. But scholarship has also a value of its own. The relevance of our work is a global one; we have to "lean to one side", but basically through the intellectual long-term effects of our work, even when short-term relevance is not apparent.



