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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts
One of the neglected stories of World War II is Japan's use of Germ Warfare against China and the Soviet Union. For years the Japanese and American governments have succeeded in suppressing this chapter in history. Japan's reason for wanting to hide its attempt to practice "public health in reverse"—a criminally irresponsible undertaking which was potentially capable of setting off wide-ranging epidemics endangering the lives of millions of people—is understandable. The American government's participation in illegally concealing evidence of these war crimes, it is now revealed, stemmed chiefly from Washington's desire to secure exclusive possession of what it considered to be "extremely valuable" military information.

In few other instances was Washington's double standard revealed so clearly. An "insidious" weapon in enemy hands, biological warfare (BW) was transformed into an acceptable and valuable military tool when added to the American arsenal. Some of our military leaders became almost lyrical when describing its possibilities. It became "humane" because it offered a short cut to victory which, it was claimed, would save lives—particularly American lives. It was also described as a money-saver in comparison with conventional weapons and had the further advantage of not destroying property.

Japan's Germ Warfare:
The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime
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Letters

To the Editors:

A major statewide conference on Asian immigration issues will be held December 12 and 13 at the Davidson Conference Center of the University of Southern California (USC).

Entitled, “Asian Immigration to the United States: Historical and Contemporary Issues,” the conference will be sponsored by the Asian American Public Policy Program (AAPPP) and the California Council for the Humanities in Public Policy.

Major keynote addresses will be given by Prof. Ron Takaki, U.C. Berkeley, author of the widely-acclaimed book, Iron Cages; attorney Ellen Ma Lee, executive director, One-Stop Immigration Center, Los Angeles; journalist Alex Esclamado, publisher, Philippine News, San Francisco; and Kyung Won Lee, editor, Koreatown News, Los Angeles.

Twelve specialized panels will deal with such topics as the impact of U.S. immigration and refugee laws on Asian immigration, the psychological adjustment of recent Asian immigrants and refugees to American society, Asian immigrant literature, the demographics of Asian immigration, Asian immigrants and labor, Asian immigrants and bilingual/bicultural education, the nature of the relationship between the INS and the Asian American community, and the impact of Asian immigration on race relations in California and American society.

Organizers of the panel include Prof. Ling-Chi Wang, University of California, Berkeley; attorney Dick Osumi, People’s Law College Legal Center; Russell Leong, Anerasian Journal; Prof. Bill Hing, Golden Gate College of Law; Dr. Judy Chu, UCLA; Prof. Chungsoo Lee, USC; Prof. Yuji Ichioha, UCLA; and Prof. Lloyd Inui, California State University, Long Beach.

The co-sponsoring AAPPP is a consortium of the Asian American Studies Center at UCLA, the Asian American Studies Department at USC, and the Asian American Studies Program at California State University, Long Beach. Information is available from the Asian Immigration Conference Planning Committee, Asian American Studies Center, 3232 Campbell Hall, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024; or call (213) 825-2974.
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Japan's Germ Warfare:
The U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime

by John W. Powell

One of the neglected stories of World War II is Japan's use of Germ Warfare against China and the Soviet Union. For years the Japanese and American governments have succeeded in suppressing this chapter in history. Japan's reason for wanting to hide its attempt to practice "public health in reverse"—a criminally irresponsible undertaking which was potentially capable of setting off wide-ranging epidemics endangering the lives of millions of people—is understandable. The American government's participation in illegally concealing evidence of these war crimes, it is now revealed, stemmed chiefly from Washington's desire to secure exclusive possession of what it considered to be "extremely valuable" military information.

In few other instances was Washington's double standard revealed so clearly. An "insidious" weapon in enemy hands, biological warfare (BW) was transformed into an acceptable and valuable military tool when added to the American arsenal. Some of our military leaders became almost lyrical when describing its possibilities. It became "humane" because it offered a short cut to victory which, it was claimed, would save lives—particularly American lives. It was also described as a money-saver in comparison with conventional weapons and had the further advantage of not destroying property.

In retrospect it is perhaps not surprising that it has taken so long for the story to come out. Over the years fragments occasionally surfaced, but each time were met with official denials, usually accompanied by seemingly authoritative refutations. During the Korean War when the Chinese accused the United States of employing up-dated versions of Japan's earlier biological warfare tactics, not only were the charges denied but it was also claimed that there was no proof of the earlier Japanese actions. Characteristic of the response was an article in the November 1952 issue of Air Force Magazine by Col. John J. Driscoll, which dismissed the allegation thusly:

INTRODUCTION

Do not fail to read this essay.
John W. Powell has written on a subject of vital importance to us all, no matter what our specialized work or general interests might be. If the title of this journal means anything, it surely refers to the concern of every one of us that we take up the responsibility for breaking the habitual, guilty silence of our profession on dangerous subjects like this.

Powell's essay sets an example by revealing the U.S. decision to cover up Japanese war crimes after World War II for the purpose of maintaining secrecy about its own efforts to expand its biological-warfare capabilities. Clearly, U.S. policy-makers thought that showing a deep interest in the human experiments and biological warfare conducted by General Ishii and his cohorts would be difficult to explain to American and world opinion.

Despite the cover-up, "water-purification unit" will now belatedly join terms like "strategic hamlet" and "free-fire zone" with which imperialist powers clothe the horrors they are visiting upon people. Building upon the work of the "water-purification units," the United States did indeed add biological agents to its terrifying arsenal of chemical and atomic weapons.

The record of the United States in its Asian wars does not permit us to view lightly the issues raised by Powell. The U.S. has shown an appalling readiness to use such weapons to break the popular will to resist—as in the atomic bombing of Japanese cities and the chemical poisoning of immense areas of Vietnam. It is conceivable, as some have charged, that biological weapons have already been used as well. We must find out and make it more difficult for them to be used in future wars.

The Editors
The pattern had begun to take shape as far back as December 1949, when a Soviet military tribunal, sitting at Khabarovsk, Siberia, placed on trial twelve former members of the Japanese armed forces. The charges—"preparing and employing the bacteriological weapon"—in World War II. As long ago as August 1940 the Japanese biological warfare experimental program had been categorized as a "dead issue" by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, a body on which the Soviets were represented. Nevertheless, within six months of the Communist invasion of South Korea, the Reds revived the abandoned case.

The true story is quite different. It wasn't a "dead issue," it was a "buried issue." By the late 1930s Japan's BW program was sufficiently advanced for testing. It was employed with moderate success against Chinese troops and civilians and with unknown results against the Russians. By 1945 Japan had a huge arsenal of stockpiled germs, vectors and delivery equipment unmatched by any other nation.

Japan had gained this undisputed lead primarily because its scientists made deadly germ tests on people as well as on laboratory animals. These human guinea pigs were mostly Chinese prisoners, some Russians and, as one Japanese participant put it, some miscellaneous "half-breeds." It is estimated that at least three thousand people were killed in these experiments, either by succumbing to disease or by execution when they had become physical wrecks and were no longer fit for further experiments. This much of the story has been available—although denied by Tokyo and Washington—for several years.

What has not been known until now is that among the human guinea pigs were an unknown number of American soldiers, captured during the early part of the war and confined in prisoner-of-war camps in Manchuria not far from the experimental laboratories. Until recently we also lacked proof that the U.S. Government had known of these war crimes but that it had suppressed the evidence because it desired to secure exclusive possession of Japanese technology. Retribution for the torture and murder of captured American soldiers was forepromised in the interests of "national security."

Long "top secret" U.S. documents which I have obtained under the Freedom of Information Act reveal the details and call into question the basic morality of numerous highly placed American officials of the time. Even members of the U.S. medical profession were involved in the cover up of inhumanities which made a mockery of the physician's oath.

The story begins in 1931 shortly after the Manchurian Incident when Japan occupied China's Northeast provinces and when a Japanese Army surgeon named Ishii Shiro persuaded his superiors of the feasibility of BW as an inexpensive weapon potentially capable of producing enormous casualties. Ishii, who finally rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General, eventually built a large, self-contained installation with sophisticated germ and insect breeding facilities, a prison for the human experimental subjects, testing grounds, an arsenal for making germ bombs, an airfield, its own special planes and a crematorium for the final disposal of its human victims.

It is possible that some of Gen. Ishii's BW attacks went undetected, either because they were failures or because the resulting outbreaks of disease were attributed to natural causes by the victims. However, some were recognized by the Chinese. Official archives of the People's Republic give the number of cities subjected to Japanese BW attacks as eleven, while the number of victims of artificially disseminated plague alone is placed at approximately 700 between 1940 and 1944. The Soviet Union has given no details, only stating that it was the victim of BW attacks.

Two particular incidents were noted by the press at the time. The Chinese Nationalists claimed that on Oct. 27, 1940, the Japanese dropped plague on Ningbo, a city in east China near Shanghai. The incident was not proved in an acceptable scientific manner, but the observed facts were highly suspicious. Something was seen to come out of a Japanese plane circling the city. Later, there was a heavy infestation of fleas and 99 people came down with plague, with all but one dying. The rats in the city did not have plague, although traditionally outbreaks of plague in the human population always follow an epidemic in the rat population.

On the morning of November 4, 1941, a Japanese plane circled low over Changle, a city in Hunan Province. Instead of bombs, the plane dropped grains of wheat and rice, pieces of paper and cotton wadding, which fell mainly in two streets in the city's East Gate District. During the next three weeks six people living on the two streets died, all with symptoms similar to those of plague. Dr. Chen Wen-kwei, one of China's leading physicians who had previously served with the League of Nations in India as a plague expert, arrived at the head of a team of public health doctors just as the last victim died. He performed the autopsy, found symptoms of plague which were confirmed by culture and animal tests. Again, there was no plague outbreak in the rat population.

When Soviet tanks crossed the Siberian-Manchurian border at midnight on August 8, 1945, Japan was less than a week away from unconditional surrender. However, in those few days of grace, the Japanese destroyed their BW installations in China, killing the remaining human guinea pigs ("It took 30 hours to lay them in ashes"), and shipped out most of their personnel and some of the more valuable equipment to South Korea.

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of gross depravity were revealed and evidence was produced confirming the Nationalist Chinese BW charges.\(^9\) Military orders, railroad waybills for shipment of BW supplies and numerous other incriminating Japanese documents were introduced in evidence.\(^{10}\)

Describing the operation of Ishii’s main BW factory, code named Unit 731, the transcript summary states:

> Experts have calculated . . . that (it) was capable of breeding, in the course of one production cycle, lasting only a few days, no less than 30,000,000 billion microbes . . . . That explains why . . . bacteria quantities (are given) in kilograms, thus referring to the weight of the thick, creamy bacteria mass skimmed directly from the surface of the culture medium.\(^{11}\)

Total bacteria production capacity at this one installation was *eight tons* per month.\(^{12}\)

Euphemistically called a “water purification unit,” Gen. Ishii’s organization also worked on non-BW medical projects. (He did develop effective water purification equipment.) In the Asian countries it overran, the Japanese Army conscripted local young women to “entertain” the troops. The medical difficulties resulting from this practice, in which entire platoons were lined up as each man waited his turn at the “comfort stations,” became acute. In an effort to solve this problem, Chinese women confined in the detachment’s prison “were infected with syphilis with the object of investigating preventive means against this disease.”\(^{13}\)

Another experiment revealed at the Khabarovsky trial was the “freezing project.” \(^{14}\)

Prisoners were led outdoors “‘at times of great frost, with temperatures below −20 degrees [F] (about 4 degrees [C] below zero). Their arms were bared and made to freeze with the help of an artificial current of air. This was done until their frozen arms, when struck with a short stick, emitted a sound resembling that which a board gives out when it is struck.”\(^{14}\)

Once back inside, various procedures for thawing were tried. One account of 731’s prison, adjacent to the laboratories, described men and women with rotting hands from which the bones protruded—victims of the freezing tests. Documentary films were made of some of the more interesting of these experiments.

Up to this point the evidence is from Nationalist Chinese, People’s Republic of China and Soviet sources, the last including testimony by Japanese prisoners-of-war who might have spoken under some pressure. However, some of the participants who escaped to Japan subsequently broke their vows of silence which were taken at the time the unit was disbanded. Among the hundreds of war-time recollections published by Japanese ex-servicemen are a few by former members of Unit 731. Hiroshi Akiyama told his story in two magazine articles;\(^{15}\) Bumpei Kimura, a former captain, has published his memoirs,\(^{16}\) while Sakaki Ryohei, a former major, has described how plague was spread by air-dropping rats and voles (mice-like rodents) and has given details of the flea “nurseries” developed by Ishii for rapid production of millions of fleas.\(^{17}\)

But the most dramatic confirmation of the role of Ishii’s unit was an hour-long Japanese television documentary produced by Yoshinaga Haruko and shown by the Tokyo Broadcasting Company. A *Washington Post* dispatch on November 19, 1976, reported that

> in the little-publicized television documentary of the germ warfare unit, Yoshinaga laid bare secrets closely held in Japan during and since the war. (She) traveled throughout Japan to track down 20 former members of the wartime unit . . . Four of the men finally agreed to help, and the reporter found their testimony dovetailed with reports of war crime trials held in the Soviet Union . . .

Some of those interviewed by Yoshinaga claimed that they had told their stories to Gen. MacArthur’s headquarters. Eguchi stated that he “‘was the second to be ordered to G.H.Q.’” and “they took a record” of his testimony. Takahashi, an ex-surgeon and Army major stated: “I went to the G.H.Q. twice in 1947. Investigators made me write reports on the condition that they will protect me from the Soviets.” Kumamoto, an ex-flight engineer, stated that after the war Gen. Ishii went to America and “‘took his research data and begged for remission for us all.’”\(^{18}\)

The *Post* tried to check these allegations and reported:

> “Press officers at the U.S. Defense and Justice Department said that they had no information on the charges but would investigate.” Two years later I wrote to both departments, asking if their investigations had been completed. The Justice Department replied that the matter did not fall within its jurisdiction and consequently knew nothing about it. The Defense Department initially replied that it could not find the *Post* article. After more correspondence my inquiry was referred to the department’s “audio-visual” section which said that it had no such film in its library.*
Once the fact had been established that Ishii had used Chinese and others as laboratory test subjects, it seemed a fair assumption that he also might have used American prisoners, possibly British, and perhaps even Japanese. In some instances there are—probably due to a people's history of exposure to certain diseases, and other unknown factors—variations in different populations' reactions to the same pathogen. Until recently the only hints were two brief references buried in the 1949 Soviet trial summary, one of which noted: "As early as 1943, Minata, a researcher belonging to Detachment 731, was sent to prisoner-of-war camps to test the properties of the blood and immunity to contagious diseases of American soldiers." 19

For some inexplicable reason the Soviet prosecutors let this and a few other fascinating leads slip by. However, the performance of American prosecutors at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials also frequently left something to be desired. Not only did they appear loath to pursue similar reports about the fate of these American prisoners but they showed a distinct lack of interest in the entire BW issue.

When the Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] government returned to its capital at Nanjing at the end of the war, it found evidence of still another Japanese BW installation, the TAMA Detachment. Established in Nanjing as a sub-unit of 731 in 1939, it grew into a large independent organization with 12 branches and 1500 personnel and had equipment for growing and harvesting bacteria, raising vectors, etc. 20 It, too, performed medical experiments on prisoners. The Chinese procurator at Nanjing sent a report on the TAMA Detachment's activities to the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, asking that it be included in the war crimes charges against the Japanese. At the insistence of China, the issue was finally brought up. The official transcript for August 29, 1946, records an exchange between the Court and David N. Sutton, one of the American prosecuting attorneys:

Mr. Sutton: The enemy's TAMA Detachment carried off their civilian captives to the medical laboratory, where the reactions to poisonous serum were tested. This detachment was one of the most secret organizations. The number of persons slaughtered by this detachment cannot be ascertained. The President: Are you going to give us any further evidence of these alleged laboratory tests for reactions to poisonous sera? This is something entirely new, we haven't heard before. Are you going to leave it at that?

Mr. Sutton: We do not at this time anticipate introducing additional evidence on that subject.

One of the defense attorneys objected that Sutton had not introduced sufficient evidence for his charge and suggested that the whole thing might have been a vaccination program carried out by the Japanese for the benefit of the Chinese populace. The court agreed and ruled the Nanjing BW evidence inadmissible. 21 It was later claimed that the Chinese Nationalists had not carried out a proper investigation. However, it does seem strange that the prosecution did not pursue this rather sensational lead and undertake its own investigation. Even the judge was startled, calling it "something entirely new" and asking Sutton if he was just "going to leave it at that?" Sutton had a stick of dynamite in his hand, and even though the judge seemed to be trying to push him along, he apparently could not—or perhaps would not—recognize it.

If some branches of the American Government exhibited an inability and/or reluctance to investigate the many available BW leads, other agencies quietly pursued them and learned quite a bit about the Japanese program, even before the end of World War II. Now declassified is a January 28, 1944 memorandum for the Joint Intelligence Staff from the Chief of Naval Operations: "It was reported on 21 December 1943 by a reliable source that the Japanese Army maintained a bacteriological warfare laboratory in Kyoto. . . ." The memo also mentioned some of the earlier Chinese reports and noted that another unsubstantiated document stated "that early in 1941 fishing operations near Otaru in the Island of Hokkaido were suspended (because) cultures of bubonic plague bacteria had been inadvertently dumped into the sea as a result of flood damage to the laboratories at the University of Otaru."
Among recently released documents from U.S. intelligence files is a report from U.S. Army G-2 in China in which a Japanese captive stated that when

Japanese troops overran an area in which a BW attack had been made during the Chekiang campaign in 1942, [Japanese] casualties upward from 10,000 resulted within a very brief . . . time. Diseases were particularly cholera, but also dysentery and [plague]. Victims were rushed to hospitals in rear . . . but cholera victims, usually being treated too late, mostly died. Statistics which POW saw at Water Supply and Purification Dept. Hq. at Nanking [TAMA Detachment headquarters] showed more than 1700 dead. . . . POW believes that actual deaths were considerably higher, "it being a common practice to pare down unpleasant figures."

The report concludes by describing the captured informant, who, with the Nanjing and Jiujiang [Kuikiang] BW installations, as "very intelligent and sincere. . . . It is felt that his information can be accepted as reliable." 22

Writing nearly ten years after the end of the war, Maj. Gen. William Creasy, chief chemical officer of the U.S. Army, revealed that the Army had long been concerned about Japan’s BW activities. Saying that he had initially feared that the Japanese paper balloon bombs which fell on the United States during the war might have been germ carriers, he added: "It was known that the Japanese had, since 1932, been actively interested in its [BW’s] possibilities. By 1937 they were operating research and testing facilities. . . ."

Documents at the Truman Library reveal that the United States began investigating Japan’s BW activities in the immediate post-war period. Shortly after the surrender President Truman sent a scientific survey party to Japan headed by Dr. Karl Compton, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. On Oct. 3, less than two months after the surrender, Compton was back in Washington to give Truman a personal briefing on the survey’s initial findings. On the following day he sent Truman a six-page summary. 24

The entire document is quite informative, but the analysis of the Japanese BW effort is of particular interest:

In these early conversations Ishii revealed himself as an astute observer of his American interrogators. He played upon their fears by ascribing to Communists, both Chinese and Russian, a ruthlessness and disregard for human life which was an exact portrait of himself.

In only one field, bacteriology, had our mission uncovered any Japanese scientific work which added anything to our own state of knowledge or art. . . . Our medical and bacteriological members in close cooperation with the Chief Surgeon’s Office are intensively continuing their study of these developments. It appears that Japan has made some vigorous preparation against biological warfare. Thus far they have denied any intention of inaugurating or preparing for offensive bacteriological warfare, but we doubt this denial and are pursuing the subject further.

From available information it appears that the investigation dragged on for several months. Some of the top BW people were eventually located. Gen. Ishii maintained that all work had been defensive, that his was basically a water purification effort because the Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists, were inveterate well-poisoners and because he had reason to believe that the Soviets were planning to attack Japanese forces with germs. 25

In these early conversations Ishii revealed himself as an astute observer of his American interrogators. He played upon their fears by ascribing to Communists, both Chinese and Russian, a ruthlessness and disregard for human life which was an exact portrait of himself. He also appeared to be laying the ground for self-justification in the event that his activities were finally exposed. Later, when the secret did come out, Ishii maintained that his work was in reaction to known earlier Communist efforts in the field. "They" were doing it so Japan had to get to work to prevent being put at a military disadvantage.

But in the initial interviews, all dissembled. Gen. Kitano Masaji, who headed Unit 731 during a lengthy absence by Ishii, also would not give any worthwhile information. It was the same with Gen. Wakamatsu Yujuro, who had been in charge of another major BW installation, Unit 100, that dealt mainly with animal diseases. (It, however, also used people, seeing what livestock diseases would infect humans.) 26 All records had been destroyed, they claimed, and the personnel scattered.

It is one of the ironies of history that the United States investigation might have been inconclusive had it not been for the Soviets and the Chinese Nationalists. These strange bedfellows tried to force a showdown with the United States. Both revealed the incriminating evidence they had gathered. The Soviets produced copies of their interrogations of two of the most knowledgeable BW personnel they had captured. The transcripts described laboratory work, breeding of vectors; the prisoners admitted to human experiments and described Ishii’s solution of the problem of delivery via special bombs. 27
Ishii Shiro, the founder of Unit 731 and the leading figure in Japan's BW program. Ishii eventually rose to the rank of Lt. Gen. and in the post-war years, in exchange for immunity to war crimes charges, directed the transfer to Fort Detrick of the Japanese scientific data on biological warfare.

At this point there is some uncertainty as to how this information was transmitted. U.S. documents seem to indicate that the information went to MacArthur's headquarters and that only later did the International Prosecution Section (IPS) get wind of it. However, the Soviets give a different version. According to them, after the War Crimes Tribunal refused to admit the Chinese evidence against the TAMA Detachment, the Soviet prosecution team "handed Joseph B. Keenan, the Chief American prosecutor, the written evidence of Kawashima and Karasawa."

If the Soviet version is correct, it is difficult to understand why Keenan and his prosecution staff did not immediately launch their own full-scale investigation of Japanese BW activities. In any event, it is clear that this information quickly got into intelligence and high level channels where the decision was made to conceal all BW information.

Armed with this Soviet-supplied material, MacArthur's staff re-interviewed Ishii and all other known BW personnel. Their denials started coming apart. There then began an exchange of urgent secret messages between Tokyo and Washington. On February 10, 1947, CINCFE (Commander in Chief, Far East) advised the War Department that the Soviets were pushing for permission to interview Ishii and all others. He stated that he didn't believe they could learn anything from such interviews that the United States didn't already know but he thought that some new leads might be picked up by analyzing the Russian line of questioning.

Washington replied that the Soviet Union had no legal basis for such a request since the Japanese had allegedly used BW against China and it was thus none of Russia's business. However, it might be granted as an "amicable gesture," provided certain precautions were taken. First, the Japanese were once again to be re-interviewed by the most competent U.S. personnel available. If such interviews brought out any new or significant information, the Japanese were to be instructed not to reveal that information to the Soviet questioners. And last, the Japanese were to be told to make no mention to the Soviet authorities that they had ever been interviewed by the U.S. investigators.

Three months later—after an American BW expert had been sent from Washington to direct the re-interviewing—the investigation was hitting pay dirt. On May 6, 1947, Tokyo cabled Washington:

 Statements obtained from Japanese here confirm statements of USSR prisoners. . . . Experiments on humans were known to and described by three Japanese and confirmed tacitly by Ishii; field trials against Chinese took place. . . . scope of program indicated by report . . . that 400 kilograms [880 pounds] of dried anthrax organisms destroyed [at 731] in August 1945. . . . Reluctant statements by Ishii indicate he had superiors (possibly general staff) who knew and authorized the program. Ishii states that if guaranteed immunity from "war crimes" in documentary form for himself, superiors and subordinates, he can describe program in detail. Ishii claims to have extensive theoretical high-level application.
C. Carpenter of SCAP's (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) BW personnel had already been named or were marked for naming as war criminals. Tokyo's response was by Col. Alva in a top secret priority cable asking if Ishii or any other Japanese China, all the while doling out a few tidbits, shrewdly hinting that he knew how to use germs in "cold climates" (Siberia?). or that they be turned over to the Soviets for trial in the Soviet Union. MacArthur's staff, while temporizing with the USSR representatives, demanded that Ishii tell all, and Ishii stalled, asking for immunity against prosecution for his crimes against China, all the while doling out a few tidbits, shrewdly hinting that he knew how to use germs in "cold climates" (Siberia?). From then on, there was barely a mention of the Chinese Nationalists and their desire for retribution against Ishii and his colleagues. If Washington thought that it was none of the Soviet Union's business, it apparently also thought that it was none of China's business. It had become entirely America's business.

Washington replied to MacArthur's foregoing revelation in a top secret priority cable asking if Ishii or any other Japanese BW personnel had already been named or were marked for naming as war criminals. Tokyo's response was by Col. Alva C. Carpenter of SCAP's (Supreme Commander Allied Powers) Legal Section, who "coordinated" his reply with the IPS, which was working on the war criminal prosecutions. In view of the flurry of activity and the knowledge MacArthur and Washington already had of Japan's BW activities, Col. Carpenter's cable of June 7, 1947, makes interesting reading:

The reports and files of the Legal Section in [sic] Ishii and his coworkers are based on anonymous letters, hearsay affidavits and rumors. The Legal Section interrogations, to date, of the numerous persons concerned with the BW project in China, do not reveal sufficient evidence to support war crime charges. The alleged victims are of unknown identity. Unconfirmed allegations are to the effect that criminals, farmers, women and children were used for BW experimental purposes. The Japanese Communist party alleges that "Ishi BKA" (Bacterial War Army) conducted experiments on captured Americans in Mukden* and that simultaneously, research on similar lines was conducted in Tokyo and Kyoto. None of Ishii's subordinates are charged or held as war crimes suspects, nor is there sufficient evidence on file against them. . . .

Three weeks later, on June 27, Col. Carpenter again cabled Washington, stating that there is now "strong circumstantial evidence" of Japanese use of BW. After setting forth the allegations, he added: "IPS of the opinion that foregoing information warrants conclusion that Japanese PW [sic] group headed by Ishii did violate rules of land warfare, but this expression of opinion is not a recommendation that group be charged and tried for such." Col. Carpenter then explained that more evidence was needed, plus collaboration and "testing for trustworthiness by a thorough investigation." He concluded with an involved lawyer-like statement of the difficulties of making a case, the problems of the rules of evidence set down by the tribunal and so on.

Carpenter apparently gave Washington what it wanted because sections of his prose—"anonymous," "hearsay," "rumors," "unconfirmed," "not . . . sufficient evidence," "not a recommendation that group be charged"—appear in later official position papers recommending immunity for Ishii's group.**

Space does not allow review of numerous other documents and cables which reveal even more. There are indications that Japan's BW program may have been much larger than even U.S. investigators at the time suspected. U.S. medical intelligence officers in the Pacific noted with interest the fact that Japanese military units frequently had quite sophisticated "water purification" units whose equipment included ingenious portable laboratories. U.S. military doctors could not understand the purpose of some of the equipment, such as germ-proof suits. Reports of unusual outbreaks of disease along the Central China front in the 1940s, appear more suggestive today than at the time. 36

* The emphasized portion was underlined on the Pentagon's copy of the cable released by the National Archives.

** Col. Carpenter later achieved prominence as one of the leading witch hunters of the 1950s when he served as chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee (Jenner Committee) which conducted well-publicized investigations of Americans holding political beliefs which it considered disloyal or subversive.

Fig. 1. Front page in Sakaki Ryohei's article, "Bacteriological Warfare". This and the illustrations of pages 9 and 10 are taken from the "Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China," published in Beijing in 1952, between pages 286 & 287.

knowledge including strategic and tactical use of BW on defense and offense, backed by some research on best BW agents to employ by geographical areas of Far East, and the use of BW in cold climates. 31

At this point the jockeying had become three-cornered and intense. The Soviets were demanding either that BW be made an issue at the war crimes trial and that Ishii et al. be put in the dock or that they be turned over to the Soviets for trial in the Soviet Union. MacArthur's staff, while temporizing with the USSR representatives, demanded that Ishii tell all, and Ishii stalled, asking for immunity against prosecution for his crimes against China, all the while doling out a few tidbits, shrewdly hinting that he knew how to use germs in "cold climates" (Siberia?). From then on, there was barely a mention of the Chinese Nationalists and their desire for retribution against Ishii and his colleagues. If Washington thought that it was none of the Soviet Union's business, it apparently also thought that it was none of China's business. It had become entirely America's business.
However, a memo prepared by Dr. Edward Wetter and Mr. H.I. Stubblefield on July 1, 1947, for restricted circulation to a handful of military and State Department officials is unusual in its frankness.

They reported that Ishii and his colleagues were cooperating fully, had prepared and were preparing voluminous reports and had agreed to supply photographs of "selected examples of 8,000 slides of tissues from autopsies of humans and animals subjected to BW experiments." Human experiments, they pointed out, were better than animal experiments. They also stated that the USSR was believed to be in possession of "only a small portion of this technical information" and that since "any 'war crimes' trial would completely reveal such data to all nations, it is felt that such publicity must be avoided in the interests of defense and national security of the U.S." They emphasized that the knowledge gained by the Japanese from their experiments "will be of great value to the U.S. BW research program" and added: "The value to U.S. of Japanese BW data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes prosecution."

A July 15 response to the Wetter-Stubblefield memo by Mr. Cecil F. Hubbert, a member of SWNCC (State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee), agreed but warned that there may be some problems ahead because "experiments on human beings similar to those conducted by the Ishii group have been condemned as war crimes by the International Military Tribunal" in Germany. Hubbert added that the United States "is at present prosecuting leading German scientists and medical doctors at Nuremberg for offenses which included experiments on human beings which resulted in the suffering and death of most of those experimented upon."

Hubbert also warned that the whole thing might leak out if the Soviets were to bring it up in cross examining major Japanese war criminals and warned of a potential bombshell:

*It should be kept in mind that there is a remote possibility that independent investigation conducted by the Soviets in the Mukden area may have disclosed evidence that American prisoners of war were used for experimental purposes of a BW nature and that they lost their lives as a result of these experiments.*

Despite these risks, Hubbert agreed with Wetter and Stubblefield and recommended that the matter be kept secret and that the Japanese BW personnel be given immunity from prosecution as war criminals. His memo included a number of recommended changes for the final position paper, including the following casuistry: "The data on hand . . . does not appear sufficient at this time to constitute a basis for sustaining a war crimes charge against Ishii and/or his associates."

A number of medical doctors were put to work evaluating the Japanese material. One of the first of Washington's BW experts to conduct an on-the-spot investigation was Dr. Norbert H. Fell, who went to Japan in early April 1947. By the end of June Dr. Fell was back in Washington. One message from Tokyo says its "pertinent" cables should be shown to Dr. Fell as "he is expert investigator with latest local information." A report by Dr. Edwin V. Hill, M.D., Chief, Basic Sciences, Camp Detrick, Maryland, reveals a portion of the technical data secured from Ishii and his colleagues during a trip to Japan by Hill and Dr. Joseph Victor. Acknowledging the "wholehearted cooperation of Brig. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby," MacArthur's intelligence chief, Dr. Hill wrote that the objectives were to obtain additional material clarifying reports already submitted by the Japanese, "to examine human pathological material which had been transferred to Japan from B.W. installations, and "to obtain protocols necessary for understanding the significance of the pathological material."

Drs. Hill and Victor interviewed 19 Japanese BW experts and checked out the results of individual experiments with a

*Webster defines "protocols," used in this sense, as "the notes or records relating to a case, an experiment, or an autopsy."*
score of human and animal diseases, plus their work with plant diseases. They also investigated Ishii’s decontamination procedures and his system for spreading disease via bacteria-laden aerosol sprayed from planes. Dr. Ota Kiyoshi described his anthrax experiments, including the number of people infected and the number who died. Ishii told the doctors about his experiments with botulism and brucellosis. Drs. Hayakawa Kiyoshi and Yamanouchi Yujiro also provided Hill and Victor with results of other brucellosis experiments, including the number of the human experimentees who died.

Dr. Hill concluded his report by pointing out that the material was a financial bargain, was obtainable nowhere else, and he ended with a plea on behalf of Ishii and his colleagues:

Evidence gathered in this investigation has greatly supplemented and amplified previous aspects of this field. It represents data which have been obtained by Japanese scientists at the expenditure of many millions of dollars and years of work. Information has accrued with respect to human susceptibility to those diseases as indicated by specific infectious doses of bacteria. Such information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because of scruples attached to human experimentation. These data were secured with a total outlay of $250,000 to date, a mere pittance by comparison with the actual cost of the studies.

Furthermore, the pathological material which has been collected constitutes the only material evidence of the nature of these experiments. It is hoped that individuals who voluntarily contributed this information will be spared embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be taken to prevent this information from falling into other hands.

The Japanese BW experts whom Dr. Hill hoped would “be spared embarrassment,” not only infected their human guinea pigs with diseases to see how many would die, but on occasion—in their pursuit of exact scientific information—made certain that they did not survive. A group would be brought down with a disease and, as the infection developed, individuals would be selected out of the group and killed and autopsied so that the ravages of the disease could be ascertained at various time intervals.

Gen. Kitano Masaji and Dr. Kasahara Shiro revealed this practice when discussing their work on Songo (hemorrhagic) fever: “Subsequent cases were produced either by blood or blood-free extracts of liver, spleen or kidney derived from individuals sacrificed at various times during the course of the disease. Morphine was employed for this purpose.”41 Kitano and Kasahara also described the “sacrificing” of a human experimentee when he apparently was recovering from an attack of tick encephalitis. “Mouse brain suspension . . . was injected . . . and produced symptoms after an incubation period of 7 days. Highest temperature was 39.8°C [104°F]. This subject was sacrificed when fever was subsiding, about the 12th day.”

Obviously our BW doctors at Detrick learned a great deal from their Japanese counterparts. While we do not yet know just how much this information advanced the American program, we have the doctors’ own testimony that it was “invaluable.” In a few instances it is known that later U.S. BW weapons were at least similar to ones developed earlier by the Japanese.

Infected feathers with spore diseases was one of Ishii’s ideas and feather bombs later became a standard weapon in America’s BW arsenal.42 The late Dr. Theodor Rosebury noted the uncertainties of projecting human disease patterns from work on laboratory animals and said that “if we are to learn anything of the potency of BW agents for man, we must get our information from man directly.”43 He further pointed out that accidental infections of laboratory workers were very important to BW work. Certainly Ishii’s thousands of controlled experiments on human guinea pigs constituted a treasure trove of scientific information unmatched in the history of medicine.

Available documents do not reveal whether anyone knows even the names of the Chinese, Russians, “half-breeds” and Americans whose lives were prematurely ended by massive doses of plague, typhus, dysentery, gas gangrene, hemorrhagic fever, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, tularemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and glanders, or by such grotesqueries as being pumped full of horse blood or having their livers destroyed by prolonged exposure to X-rays, or those subjected to vivisection.

We do know, however, that because of the “national security” interests of the United States, Gen. Ishii and many of the top members of unit 731 lived out their full lives, suffering
NIXON RENOUNCES GERM WEAPONS, ORDERS DESTRUCTION OF STOCKS; RESTRICTS USE OF CHEMICAL ARMS


only the natural diseases and afflictions of old age. A few, such as Gen. Kitano, enjoyed exceptional good health and at the time of writing were living in quiet retirement.

On Nov. 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of BW, declaring:

*Biological weapons have massive unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. I have therefore decided that the U.S. shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare.*

Within hours officials in Washington began qualifying the President’s statement. On the same day Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told Sen. Charles Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.) that “there will be no major impact on . . . basic research in defense systems. . . .”

Nearly a year later Seymour Hersh reported in the Washington Post that the programs the army wanted to continue “under defensive research included a significant effort to develop and produce virulent strains of new biological agents, then develop defenses against them. ‘This sounds very much like what we were doing before,’ one official noted caustically. . . .”

In the ensuing years there have been numerous indications of a continuing strong Pentagon interest in BW. In an article in Science Samuel Goldhaber noted that the U.S. planned to maintain a sizeable “defensive” BW research effort and that although the White House had stated that this work would be completely unclassified, the Army later declared that it would remain secret. This was to be accomplished by transferring 240 civilian and 190 military personnel from the Fort Detrick BW center, which was slated for closing, to the Army’s Dugway (Utah) Proving Grounds where the defensive BW effort would be centered and remain classified.

A number of observers viewed the decision to keep BW work classified with apprehension. Two American Nobel laureates expressed concern over the dangers inherent in secret BW research.* Matthew W. Meselson, Harvard professor of biology, said that secret research might permit the biological warfare establishment to linger quietly until public opinion lets it flourish once again. James D. Watson, director of the Cold Spring Harbor laboratories and also a Harvard biologist, stated: “I can’t really imagine anything they would have to do that would have to be classified. I think that the whole apparatus should be dismantled except for people continuously studying plague on an open basis.”

Initially the Army announced that Fort Detrick would either be declared surplus and closed or converted to ordinary medical research. Despite a number of suggested uses, such as turning it into a center for cancer studies, the Army apparently could not find a tenant willing to assume the financial burden of operating the installation.

The problem was eventually solved when the Army changed its mind and decided to maintain a small “biodefensive” research program at Detrick and lease some of its facilities to other government agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, which agreed to establish a unit there for the study of plant diseases. At the time some critics charged that the Agriculture Department was not establishing a “new” unit, but was simply taking over the Army’s already functioning plant pathogen program.

In early August 1972 the Soviet Minister of Health, Boris V. Petrovsky, was taken on a tour of Detrick and allowed to inspect the areas formerly devoted to top secret BW work. Reporters accompanying him had their attention called to the fact that the “guard post at the entrance now stands empty.”

In November 1977 I visited Fort Detrick and found the guard post manned. At the end of two days spent looking at some of the declassified files relating to the early history of Detrick, I was asked to drop in on the civilian chief of the section who questioned me closely about the nature of my interest in BW. It was very much a “permitted” visit and the areas open to me and two accompanying researchers were clearly limited. A directory posted on the wall of one office listed the installation’s “tenants,” most of whom were military medical research units, with some identified as belonging to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), which became the official custodian of Fort Detrick following the BW ban. At that time USAMRIID’s commanding officer was Col. Dan Crozier. *51

*In February 1963 Col. Crozier, who was then commanding officer of the U.S. Army Medical Unit stationed at Fort Detrick when it was openly the chief U.S. BW installation, co-authored an article in Military Medicine describing some of the latest techniques for killing target populations, including tandem disease doses designed to confuse medical workers. “Some of those becoming ill would exhibit the signs and symptoms produced by one organism, some, those of the second agent, while still others might present some of the features of each. A viral agent showing no response to specific therapy in combination with a bacterial agent which produces a disease with a high mortality rate if untreated, and with an incubation period which would allow the onset of symptoms to correspond to the beginning of the recovery phase of the viral disease, could result in considerable delay in the institution of proper therapy for the second disease.”*
In 1978 USAMRIID became involved in a controversy over its insistence upon maintaining a seed culture of smallpox virus. In anticipation of an official declaration of the eradication of the disease, the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) asked that all laboratories keeping smallpox cultures either destroy them or turn them over to one of four UN designated repositories: the U.S. Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, the Laboratory for Smallpox Prophylaxis in Moscow, St. Mary’s Hospital Medical College in London and the National Institute for Health in Tokyo.

Military medical sources told Nicholas Wade that USAMRIID’s desire to keep its smallpox culture was well founded. It was argued that because of the effectiveness of vaccination, smallpox was not now a chosen BW weapon. However, if it were to be eradicated, vaccination would be discontinued, thus leaving future populations lacking an immunity. At that point smallpox would become an excellent BW weapon and terrorists or a foreign power might use it to attack the United States.

The Army, it was argued, would then need its culture for diagnostic purposes. The military informants stated that USAMRIID was reluctant to rely on the Center For Disease Control’s (CDC) official sample of the virus because with the passage of time CDC might inadvertently destroy its stock. USAMRIID’s concern seems excessive since a known sample of smallpox virus itself is not essential for serologic testing, nor is it needed for production of vaccine.

There was a second holdout which did not wish to accede to the WHO request that it give up its smallpox virus sample. This was the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) in Rockville, Maryland. ATCC said that it wished to maintain its culture for archival purposes and as a hedge against the possibility that CDC might somehow lose its sample.

It does seem strange that USAMRIID and ATCC both felt that the United States required three smallpox cultures when most nations voluntarily gave up their samples. And, as we shall see, it is possible that there is still another smallpox culture being maintained in the United States—this time secretly.

It has now been revealed that for years the CIA maintained a supply of toxins and bacterial and viral agents, most in small quantities, but kept in ready-to-use form. Those which deteriorated were constantly replenished, and it also developed its own arsenal of sophisticated delivery weapons. The stockpiled biologicals were: anthrax, tularemia, encephalitis, valley fever, two forms of brucellosis, tuberculosis, two forms of salmonella, (one of which was chlorine resistant and thus suitable for overcoming public water purification systems) and, finally, the ubiquitous smallpox.

In early 1970, following President Nixon’s order for the destruction of biological agents, the CIA inventoried its stocks held “in support of operational plans.” An August 23, 1975, memo by Thomas N. Karamessines, deputy director for Plans, reveals that the stockpile still existed, nearly six years after the destruction order. Karamessines is worried about the future of the agency’s biologicals and states that even though the CIA’s stocks are for research and development and are “unlisted,” it is possible that the Defense Department might order their destruction. It was apparently felt that the stockpile was vulnerable, even though officially unlisted, because it was maintained by the agency’s Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick.

Karamessines’ memo for the CIA director, William E. Colby, suggests a way to save the agency’s toxin and germ supply. He states that if the director desires to maintain the “special (BW) capability,” the stockpile could be disposed of by transferring it to the “Huntingdon Research Center, Becton-Dickinson Company, Baltimore, Maryland.” He adds that he has already made contingency arrangements for such a move and that Becton-Dickinson has agreed to “store and maintain” the agency’s biologicals and toxins for $75,000 per year.

There is obviously something strange about this smallpox story. Army medical informants told Nicholas Wade that it was not a chosen weapon now but might be in the future. They argued, erroneously, that a smallpox culture would be needed if the United States were subjected to a future attack. Meanwhile, smallpox appears to have been one of the CIA’s chosen BW weapons and apparently was considered of such value that it illegally kept its culture for nearly six years after all biologicals were banned. Further, in 1975 it was making contingency plans to continue to hide and preserve its sample. It is worth noting that the CIA’s smallpox and other offensive biologicals were being stored and kept in readiness at Fort Detrick as late as 1975, some years after Detrick’s offensive role was officially brought to an end. All of this might make more sense if the Army and the CIA knew something about smallpox that the rest of us, including the civilian medical profession, doesn’t know. Is it possible that our BW experts have discovered or developed a variant or mutant form of smallpox which they believe has potential as a BW weapon despite the widespread immunization against the disease?*

*In the spring of 1951 reports of a severe plague (Black Death) epidemic in North Korea sparked a clandestine behind-the-lines raid by a U.S. medical team to ascertain the true nature of the illness. Documents released to me under the Privacy Act reveal that the team discovered the disease to be an unusual outbreak of black or hemorrhagic smallpox, a virulent fulminating type of the disease usually causing death within a few days. Personnel manning the U.S. “germ watch” on North Korea had mistaken black smallpox for Black Death because agents reported that the victims turned black.
When the Army began transferring people from Detrick because the facility was seemingly slated for mothballs, many of the civilian scientists began moving to new jobs. Newsday reporter Drew Fetherston tracked down some of these former BW personnel in their new civilian or federal positions and asked them what they were doing. Some became upset when they telephoned and refused to talk. One became angry and declared that he was not going to tell him even the color of the pencil on his desk, or if, in fact, there was a pencil on his desk. From others the reporter got the impression that they were still working on BW.55

Even when fully functional Detrick regularly farmed out research projects to various public institutions and private firms. The Senate Human Resources Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research revealed in March 1977 that 277 outside contractors had been used on 740 research projects between 1950 and 1970.56 The list included numerous universities and major private firms. There may be grounds for suspecting that the move to cut down work at Detrick was accompanied by initiating ties to lesser known—or even specially created—research companies.

Certainly this has long been a CIA device for hiding its unconventional warfare projects.57 In the case of the CIA the linkage can sometimes be traced through personnel. While such ties by themselves do not necessarily provide proof of a connection, it is nevertheless worth following, as did Fetherston, the new careers of some of the key personnel who left Detrick when it was ostensibly slated for closing.

A number of the laboratories mentioned so far as having ties with Detrick or of being involved in biological research are located in Maryland, not far from the former BW center. ATCC, which did not wish to give up its smallpox sample, is in Rockville, Maryland. The Huntingdon Research Center, which expressed willingness to maintain the CIA's illegal stockpile of smallpox and other biological agents, is in Baltimore, while USAMRIID, of course, is using the old BW labs at Detrick. Science reported that Riley Housewright, former scientific director at Detrick and former president of the American Society for Microbiology (which served as one of Detrick's outside scientific advisory bodies), had become "vice-president and scientific director of Microbiological Associates, Inc., a private firm in Bethesda, Maryland."58

Attempts to trace BW activities through the expenditure of funds can be both frustrating and rewarding. Like the CIA, which has traditionally hidden some of its expenses in the budgets of other government agencies, Fort Detrick's financial arrangements were always murky. At times statements by some of the principals have given a clearer picture than have official figures. In 1959 Navy Capt. Cecil Coggins, described as America's first biological warfare officer and as a man who had "for many years been engaged in the field of mass casualty producing weapons," estimated that "33,000 scientists' years and nearly one-half billion dollars (had) been spent on biological warfare research problems."

On one occasion Army spokesmen were unable to tell even Congress how much was being spent. It was explained that expenditures were higher than the official appropriation because Detrick was engaged in contract work for other government agencies which paid for such projects out of their own budgets. If any of the Agriculture Department's plant disease work at its Detrick laboratory turns out to have a BW connection, the cost will show up only as part of Agriculture's yearly research expenses.

On January 26, 1955, an unidentified CIA representative "signed out" a sample of whooping cough bacteria (Hemophilus pertussis) from Detrick. Internal CIA vouchers show that an unidentified doctor was subsequently reimbursed a few dollars for the specimen, while other expenses were listed for contaminated clothing, vehicles and lumber, plus charges for dead animals, long distance phone calls and railroad tickets.60

The CIA is reported to have conducted other BW experiments, such as the successful introduction of swine disease into Cuba.61

As we have seen it also kept toxins and biologicals at its Detrick depository long after President Nixon's order for their destruction. Shellfish toxin and cobra venom were still maintained in 1975, six years after the ban, according to testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.62 Such CIA expenses, as well as the BW-connected expenditures of other government agencies, properly belong in the total biological warfare budget.

In the first half of fiscal 1975 the government officially spent approximately six and a half million dollars on BW, all of it said to be on defensive efforts.63 If, as some critics believe, the program to develop new biological weapons has not been

*Although a medical officer, Dr. Coggins spent much of his naval career in intelligence and biological warfare activities. He developed an intelligence network in the Japanese community in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor and subsequently became a champion of the west coast Japanese-Americans, protesting their war-time internment. During the latter portion of World War II he was in China as a member of SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization), a Navy counterpart of the OSS which worked closely with Jiang Jieshi's secret police. In those days Coggins wore a Chinese Nationalist Army uniform and was known as Col. Kuh. He was one of the U.S. intelligence officers who learned about at least a portion of Japan's BW activities even before the end of the war. He knew about Japan's BW installation in Nanjing, the TAMA Detachment, and discovered that the program was directed by Gen. Ishii and that it operated under the guise of a water purification plant. After the war he was stationed in Paris as a NATO staff officer in charge of atomic, biological and chemical warfare. Following his retirement as an admiral in 1959, Dr. Coggins became medical chief of civil defense in California.

CIA Linked to 1971 Swine Virus in Cuba

abandoned but has been concealed through the farming out technique, then the real expenses must be in excess of the official budget.

Such suspicions are strengthened by reports that some of the work has been moved abroad and has continued in the years since the 1969 ban. In 1974 the London New Scientist reported that the U.S. Defense Department had been paying two British doctors for research into genetically-related susceptibilities and intolerances of peoples in Africa and Asia.64

Discussing the work of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), which was described as "an elite group of civilian scientists conducting high rank research and development of a revolutionary nature in areas where defense technology in the U.S. appears to be falling behind, or in areas where [it] cannot afford the risk of falling behind," the New Scientist claimed that "within ARPA is Project Agile, a counter-insurgency research program responsible for 'opening up' limited warfare technologies. With this in mind, and knowing that American herbicide weapons began as ARPA-financed 'food technology' research, we might look again at Pentagon interest in blood groups."

As we have seen, it was Gen. Ishii's concern over possible blood and genetic differences between Chinese and Americans which led to the fatal experiments on American prisoners during World War II.

In 1975 a public controversy broke out in India when it was discovered that a study involving mosquitoes, malaria, dengue fever, yellow fever and migratory birds being conducted by the United Nation's World Health Organization was secretly funded by the United States Government. The Bombay magazine Science Today stated that there was "serious concern" in Indian scientific quarters because of the fear that the project endangered public health and was, "in fact, a camouflage for conducting research on biological warfare."

Indian scientists were also alarmed over some of the technical aspects of the research, such as the chemical sterilization of mosquitoes which, they claimed, was not a totally effective method and might result in dangerous mutations. They were further worried that the experiments might upset the disease balance in India, leading to possibly disastrous changes. Tempers and suspicions were heightened when WHO could not produce for Indian scientists' inspection its report on the project because it "had been sent to the U.S. Army's MAPS (Migratory Animals Pathological Survey) office at Bangkok."

Some years earlier a piece of the story had come out when former Pennsylvania Sen. Joseph S. Clark charged that a Smithsonian Institution study of Pacific island migratory bird habits was connected with an Army biological warfare experiment.65 It was said that the Smithsonian was helping the Army find a suitable island in the Pacific for a bird-germ test.

Eight years later a special study of Smithsonian operations criticized its director, S. Dillon Ripley, a biologist, for creating a one million dollar special fund which he used for pet projects and unexpected expenses, one of which was a migratory bird research project in India. On September 27, 1977, the board of regents relieved Ripley of day-to-day management responsibilities and appointed an assistant director for internal administration.67 The Smithsonian refused to release the minutes of this meeting but assured me that it was a routine affair, just filling the post of under-secretary which had been vacant for the previous two years.

However, it was a little late for Smithsonian officials to lock the barn door. Sen. Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research had already named the Smithsonian as one of the outside contractors providing cover for germ warfare experiments.68 Even more startling was the subcommittee's revelation that the National Academy of Sciences, America's most prestigious scientific association, also led a Jekyll and Hyde existence.69 It, too, was a secret contractor aiding Fort Detrick's biological warfare work. Some disclosures raise questions about the personal morality of some of our leading scientists.

While most members of the Smithsonian, the Agriculture Department, the U.S. Public Health Service (which provided the original shellfish toxin sample which Fort Detrick used to develop a new poison for the CIA)70 and the National Academy of Sciences were doubtless unaware of their organizations' secret ties with the BW effort, those in positions of leadership knew. Some, who were renowned scientists who had devoted their public lives to disease control, were clandestinely working on "public health in reverse," using their considerable talents to devise ways and means to sicken and kill their fellow man.

One of the difficulties, or advantages—depending upon how one looks at it—is that biological warfare preparations are so easily camouflaged as legitimate medical research. Gen. Ishii successfully hid his anti-science under the cloak of "water purification" and "vaccine production." Even BW attacks sometimes can be, and no doubt have been, passed off as "natural" outbreaks of disease.

Denials and disclaimers concealed Japan's BW atrocities for nearly 50 years. For more than 30 years the United States has played the same game, covering up Japan's activities and dissembling about its own. How much longer will it be before we know the full story of American development—and use—of biological warfare?
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Notes

*This article is taken from a chapter in a book on biological warfare under preparation by the author. In the 1950s Mr. Powell, his wife, and Julian Schuman were charged with sedition and, subsequently, treason by the United States Government because of their critical reports of U.S. actions in the Korean Conflict. The sedition indictment ended in a mistrial and was eventually dismissed at the request of the Justice Department, while the U.S. Commissioner in San Francisco dismissed the treason charge after the grand jury failed to vote an indictment.

1. When first news of the Khabarovsk trial reached Tokyo, U.S. spokesmen expressed doubts as to the validity of the reports. On December 29, 1949, the Nippon Times reported that William J. Sebald, MacArthur's diplomatic chief, said it might be nothing more than fiction: "We have no way of knowing whether or not there really is a trial going on . . . " Sebald also said that the extensive Russian propaganda on the germ warfare trial was "retaliatory" and had been launched as a "smoke screen" to divert attention from U.S. demands that they account for Japanese prisoners-of-war. Other official American sources, who declined to be identified, charged that the 300,000 missing Japanese PWs may already be dead.

On July 20, 1956, the New York Times stated in its obituary of Gen. Yamada Otozo, last commander of the Kwantung Army and one of those tried at Khabarovsk, that "the United States . . . never agreed that there had been evidence that the Japanese had resorted to germ warfare. The trial was viewed in some quarters as the Russians way of countering American demands for the release of Japanese prisoners."

In a telephone conversation on February 12, 1979, Dr. Mortimer A. Rothenberg, Scientific Director of the U.S. Army's biological warfare proving ground at Dugway, Utah, told me that the 535 page Soviet summary of the Khabarovsk trial was "a lot of baloney" and "just propaganda."

Although the Government's files have since 1947 contained thousands of pages of documents attesting to Japanese use of BW, U.S. spokesmen have dissembled and misled the press and the public for more than 30 years by insisting that there "was no evidence" of Japanese BW.


3. Although most U.S. documents and the Soviet trial summary (2, pp. 105–107) give Ishii full credit for originating and developing the BW program, this may not be fully correct. It is possible that he was merely the chosen instrument to carry out the program. There are references indicating interest in BW at much higher levels. The "staff officer" of the Operations Division of Unit 731 (the main BW factory) was Lt. Col. Miyata who in real life was Prince Takeda (2, p. 40). David Bergamini says that Empress Nagako's father, Prince Kuni, "communicated to Hirohito a lasting enthusiasm for airplanes, tanks, and biological warfare." ("Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy," William Morrow, New York, 1971, caption in photo section between pp. 80 & 81, also pp. 400–401).

Ishii's friend at court was Gen. Nagata Tetsuzou, long Japan's top military man (2, p. 106 & 295), while the orders establishing the original two BW units were reputedly issued by the Emperor (2, p. 10 & 103).


5. Ibid., pp. 195–204. Also, on March 31, 1942, Dr. Wang Shih-chieng, then Nationalist Chinese Minister of Information, reviewed this same report by Dr. Robert K.S. Lim, Director of the Chinese National Red Cross Society, and Dr. R. Pollitzer, epidemiologist of the (Chinese) National Health Administration and formerly of the League of Nations Anti-Epidemic Commission, had confirmed Dr. Chen's findings.
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U.S. Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss cautioned against either a yes or no decision in an April 11, 1942 cable to the State Department. He doubted if the chief non-Chinese eyewitness, Mrs. EJ. Bannon, really saw anything come out of the plane because it was 5:00 a.m. on a "misty morning." He quotes both pro and con views and concludes that the evidence "is not entirely conclusive." Ambassador Gauss, Dr. Theodor Rosebury, the well-known American bacteriologist, and other cautious observers felt that failure to produce plague bacilli from cultures of the material dropped from the plane weakened the Chinese case. Unfortunately, the full report, in which Dr. Chen reasoned that it was the fleas which were infected rather than the accompanying material, was not made readily available by the Nationalist Government.


7. See Note 2, pp. 25 & 31.


9. I am grateful to Lt. Gen. Teng Shu-wei, of the Nationalist Defense Ministry's Medical Bureau, who searched the records still available in the Taiwan archives. His report is in substantial agreement with the records of the People's Republic in Peking, although less complete.

10. See Note 2, pp. 23-24.

11. Ibid., p. 357.

12. Ibid., p. 266-67.

13. Ibid., p. 357.


18. See Note 8.


20. Ibid., pp. 73-74, 307-14, 459.


24. Letter and report from Karl Compton to President Truman, October 4, 1945. (Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Secretary's File, Subject File), Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

25. An undated 48 page secret report described as being the result of an investigation in Japan from January 11 to March 11, 1944, and said to be in response to a December 26, 1945, order by Arvo T. Thompson of the Adjutant General's office in Washington.

26. See Note 2, pp. 20-21.

27. Copies of the Soviet interrogation of Kasawara and Kawashima, which were given to the United States by the Soviet prosecutors, were stamped "top secret" by the U.S. Army and remained in this classification for some 30 years. On July 8, 1977, the classification was downgraded and they were subsequently declassified and released to me by the National Archives.

28. See Note 2, p. 443.

29. I have not obtained a copy of the original in cable form but possess a February 11, 1947, directive from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to one of its subordinate committees requesting that it reply to the Tokyo message, and to which is appended a presumably correct clear language copy of the cable.

30. SWNCC 351/1 message to SCAP.

31. This "top secret" cable also reveals that the first of a group of BW experts eventually be dispatched from Washington to Japan to direct the gathering of technical data from Ishii and others had already arrived, referring to "Dr. [Norbert H.] Fell's letters via air courier to Gen. [Alden C.] Wait," who was then chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. Also see Note 39.

32. On March 27, 1947, Gen. Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, noted in a memo to the Chief of Staff: 1. This has to do with Russian request for transfer of the former Japanese expert in BW.

2. The U.S. has primary interest, has already interrogated this man and his information is held by the U.S. Chemical Corps classified as TOP SECRET.

3. The Russian has made several attempts to get at this man. We have stalled. He now hopes to make his point by suddenly claiming the Japanese expert as a war criminal.

On March 30, Gen. Willoughby returned to the subject in a memo to Col. Ackton, titled "Russ interrogation": . . . W.D. interrogated Japs last year. Their product is "Top Secret" . . . We were warned not to let the Russians in on this. They have been at us for months. We stalled. Failing in this, the Russ now approaches this via the War Crimes Theory. This is a clear-cut fake; a trumped-up method to get their hands on these people and take them away. They were in the war five days . . . .

On April 10, Col. John B. Cooley wrote to Lt. Gen. K. Dereyanko, USSR member of the Allied Council for Japan, saying in part: Reference paragraph 3 of your Memorandum No. 1087, former Japanese General Ishii and Colonel Ota cannot be turned over to USSR as there appears to be no clear-cut war crimes interest by the Soviets in acts allegedly committed by the Japanese on Chinese or Manchurians.

33. It is not clear who was the actual author of this cable as it has three names on it: E.F. Lyons, Jr., of the War Crimes Branch, C.F. Hubert and Maj. T.M. Carrington. The Tokyo copy of this cable has an over-typed notation that Col. Carpenter is to "coordinate his reply with the IPS [International Prosecution Section] because of the possibility that some of those involved may be under consideration as major Japanese war criminals."
34. Carpenter also states that “none of our allies to date have filed war crimes charges against Ishii or any of his associates,” which is not surprising since apparently only the Soviets at this point had much knowledge of the BW issue or were aware of Ishii’s identity. Carpenter then states that he has received the Kawashima and Karazawa affidavits from the Soviets and describes them in fairly innocuous terms, and further says that he has a statement from Dr. Peter Z. King (Nationalist China) describing four Japanese BW attacks which resulted in plague outbreaks.

35. In this cable Carpenter says that at the time he sent the June 7 cable he had only Soviet summaries of the Kawashima and Karazawa affidavits, but now has full translations and recites in some detail the evidence of BW attacks upon China. He explains that IPS decided not to include BW charges in the war crimes trials because “at the time of closing case” there was no way of connecting the principals with the work of the Ishii group. However, he warns that it is possible that the Soviets may try to introduce the issue during cross examination.

36. Beginning in 1944, U.S. intelligence documents from the Pacific and from China, based on interrogation of captured Japanese soldiers and on inspection of medical equipment and documents, reveal a surprising amount of information about Japanese BW work. Many prisoners-of-war mentioned Ishii and other leading BW figures, although most knew of him only because of his reputation as a water purification expert. A surprising number, however, said that on the basis of second-hand information, they thought he was also working on BW. They found such information, U.S. intelligence officers report, in notebooks and sketches of the “Ishii germ bomb” and maps showing the location of a few of the suspicious water purification installations. It can only be presumed that it took several years to sort out and index this material as there is no indication that it was available to MacArthur’s headquarters at war’s end. Otherwise, the investigation begun by the Compton Mission presumably would have proceeded much faster.

37. This memo also lists some of the material already obtained, including a “‘60 page report’ covering BW experiments on humans written by ‘19 Japanese BW experts’” and says that other data confirms, supplements and complements U.S. research and “may suggest new fields for future research.”

38. Hubbert’s memo suggests a number of revisions for the War Crimes Branch position paper, many of which emphasize Col. Carpenter’s negative approach to the idea of charging Ishii and his colleagues with war crimes. He points out that some of the accusations come from the Japanese Communist Party, that investigation in Tokyo “does not reveal sufficient evidence,” that much of the evidence is hearsay or rumors or from anonymous letters. In introducing a summary of one of the Japanese affidavits, he quotes Carpenter’s opinion that it would need checking for trustworthiness by an exhaustive investigation, noting further that it was given by a Japanese prisoner to Russian interrogators. He fails to mention that the Soviets had offered to bring both Kawashima and Karazawa to Japan to be interrogated by U.S. prosecutors.

39. Cable from Washington to Tokyo April 2, 1947, stating that Dr. Fell will leave for Japan on April 15, and a cable from Tokyo to the War Department June 30, 1947, warning that an “aggressive prosecution will adversely affect U.S. interests” and urging that Fell be shown previously cables because he is an expert and can appreciate the value of the Japanese BW material.


A possibly significant note has been overtyped on a page in one of the appendices Dr. Hill attached to his report. It appears opposite a list of eleven outbreaks of the disease reported he discussed the problem with former Japanese Army doctors. Japan­


42. “Feathers as Carriers of Biological Warfare Agents,” Biological Department, Chemical Corps So and C Divisions, Camp Detrick, December 15, 1950.

43. The American Civil War (1965) p. 17.


46. Ibid., September 20, 1970.


48. Ibid.


53. Ibid.


59. Arizona Medicine, December 1959.


64. New Scientist, August 8, 1974.

65. Science Today (India), June and July 1975.


67. UPI dispatch San Francisco Chronicle, September 29, 1977. The same UPI story, printed in Japan, included an additional paragraph stating that Ripley used “$100,000 in Smithsonian funds for a migratory bird research project he led in India.” A February 5, 1969, New York Times story said the Army admitted sponsoring a “$2 million Smithsonian study into the migratory habits of Pacific Island birds,” but denied that the study was connected with BW. However, the same story quoted Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, professor of zoology at the University of Montana, as stating that he had evidence that the purpose of the project was to find a remote Pacific island where pathogens could be tested without fear of their being spread to other areas by migratory birds. From the evidence, it would appear, the bird-germ study was made up of several separate projects stretching over a number of years.


69. Ibid.


Available documents do not reveal whether anyone knows even the names of the Chinese, Russians, “half-breeds” and Americans whose lives were prematurely ended by massive doses of plague, typhus, dysentery, gas gangrene, hemorrhagic fever, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, tularemia, smallpox, tsutsugamushi and glanders, or by such grotesqueries as being pumped full of horse blood or having their lives destroyed by prolonged exposure to X-rays, or those subjected to vivisection.

We do know, however, that because of the “national security” interests of the United States, Gen. Ishii and many of the top members of unit 731 lived out their full lives, suffering only the natural diseases and afflictions of old age.
On March 9, 1945, a day when by coincidence one of the biggest air raids took place, the sky over Gumma prefecture was clear. An airplane, which might have taken off from Ota, flew along with the north wind.

Taking the road from Nashiki in the morning, I (a certain intellectual-turned-farmer) came down from Mount Akagi, where the snow in the valleys of the mountain was as hard as ice. From Kamikambara I took the Ashino-line train to Kiryu, transferred to the Ryoge-line and got off at Takasaki. I was to transfer again to the Shingo-line to go to Ueno.

It was around four-thirty in the afternoon. Although the sky was still so light as to appear white, the dusty roofs of this machinery-producing town and the spaces among the leaves of the evergreen tokiwa trees were getting dark. The waiting room on the platform was dark and crowded with people who had large bamboo trunks or packages of vegetables on their shoulders or beside them on the floor. It reverberated with noise and commotion.

After taking a look at the large clock hanging in front of me, I was about to leave the waiting room. Just at that moment, a group of policemen with straps around their chins crossed a bridge of the station and came down to the platform. Among them were the police chief and his subordinate, carrying iron helmets on their backs and wearing white gloves. The subordinate was talking about something with the station clerk who accompanied them, but it seemed that the word of the police chief, who interrupted their talk, decided the matter. The clerk crossed the bridge and then returned from the office with a piece of white chalk in his hand. Pushing people aside, he started drawing a white line on the platform.

I was standing in front of the stairway with one leg bent; I had sprained it when someone dropped a bag of nails in the crowded Ryoge-line train. The clerk came up to me, pushed me back aggressively and drew a white line. As was usual in those days, the train was delayed considerably. The passengers, quite used to the arrogance of the clerks, stepped aside without much resistance and, to pass time, watched what was happening with curiosity.

After glimpsing the pleasant and elegant atmosphere in the well-cleaned car with blue cushions, I found myself reacting with a particularly strong feeling of disgust to the dirtiness and confusion of this car. Shattered window glass, the door with a rough board nailed to it instead of glass, a crying child, an old woman sitting on her baggage, a chest of drawers wrapped in a large furoshiki cloth, an unwrapped broom—a military policeman appeared, shouting that there was still more space left in the middle of the car, but no one responded to his urging.

I gave up trying to get into this car and ran to the last car. There were no passengers standing there. A soldier, possibly a lower-ranking officer, was counting with slight movements of his head the number of the plain soldiers in white clothes who were coming out of the car. An unbearable smell arose from the line of the soldiers who, carrying blankets across their shoulders, had layers of filth on their skin—filth which one could easily have scraped off.

I was looking up at the doorway wondering what this could mean; then my legs began trembling with horror and disgust. Looking at them carefully, I could see that all of these soldiers were blind; each one stretched a trembling hand forward to touch the back of the soldier ahead. They looked extremely tired and pale; from their blinking eyes tears were falling and their hair had grown long. It was hard to tell how old
they were, but I thought they must be between thirty-five and fifty years old. On further examination, I observed that there was one normal person for every five blind men. The normal ones wore military uniforms which, although of the same color as Japanese uniforms, were slightly different from them. They held sticks in their hands.

Judging from the way they scolded the blind soldiers or watched how the line was moving, I guessed they must be caretakers or managers of the blind soldiers.

"Kuai ku-ai-de! Kuai ku-ai-de! (Quickly, quickly)," a soldier with a stick shouted, poking the soldier in front of him. I realized then that all of the soldiers in this group were Chinese. I understood why, even aside from the feeling evoked by their extreme dirtiness, they looked strange and different.

All of the soldiers who were led out of the car were left standing on the platform. There were about five hundred of them. I doubted my own eyes and looked at them again carefully. All of them half-closed their eyes as if it were too bright, and tears were dripping from every eye. It was certain that every one of them was blind.

The supervising soldiers who were not blind saluted suddenly and a Japanese officer with a sabre at his waist appeared from one of the cars.

"What about the others?" he asked, passing by a soldier who was busy counting the number of blind soldiers.

"They will come later sir, on such and such a train," the lower officer answered.

"What on earth is all this about?" the sympathetic yet suspicious expressions of the passengers seemed to ask. A middle-aged woman even started crying, holding her handtowel to her eyes. It was obvious that both the commander and the lower officer wanted to hide the blind soldiers from the passengers, but it took a long time to get the rest off the train, and the number of onlookers gathering behind the fence gradually increased.

At last those at the head of the line began climbing up the stairs of the station, while the train started moving slowly. I was standing on the steps of the car in front of the one which had just been emptied and was holding on with all my might. I could see the policemen who were guarding the soldiers whispering to each other.

"I guess they were used for a poison gas experiment or they are the victims of some sort of explosion," said a man with an iron helmet on his back, standing four or five persons ahead of me.

"They don't have to carry out poison gas experiments in the motherland," a man who appeared to be his companion objected. Following up the companion's comment, I asked a woman of about forty who was standing next to me,

"When did those soldiers get on the train?"

"Let's see, I think at around Shimo-oi." 

"Then they must have come from around the Nagoya area," I said to myself, although it did not give me a clue to understand anything.

Soon the passengers forgot about it and began to converse.

"I came from Echigo. I am on my way to Chiba with my daughter." The woman whom I had just come to know started talking in a friendly manner. She told me that she was bringing her daughter to report for duty in the women's volunteer army and that her departure had been delayed for a week because her daughter had had an ugly growth on her neck. Since they could not get through tickets to Chiba, they would go as far as they could, then stay in the place they had reached, standing in line until they could buy tickets to continue their journey. They had come this far, she said, but the hardships they had been through were beyond description.

I had been offended a moment ago by the unconcerned way in which this woman had answered my question about the Chinese soldiers, but I now thought I could understand it. The Japanese were too involved in their own affairs to be moved by such an incident.

When the train left a station some time later, I went into the car which had been occupied by the Chinese soldiers, hoping to sit down and rest. I returned soon, however, because the smell there was intolerable.

The conductor came from the end of the train, announcing "Jimbobara next, Jimbobara next," as he passed among the passengers. By that time, the windows on the west side were burning with the rays of the setting sun, and the huge red sun was setting with the sanctity of the apocalypse. I realized that the car occupied by the Chinese had been taken away and that my car had become the last of the train.

Yes, there was the Prince, still in the car ahead of us, I remembered. But I was too tired to tell anyone.

After the war was over, I asked the merchants who had their shops in front of the Takasaki station whether they had seen the group of Chinese soldiers boarding the train again. They all said they had never seen them again. Perhaps they never returned from that place.

by Noriko Mizuta Lippit

Precocious and talented, Hirabayashi Taiko had been determined to be a writer since she was very young and had gone through strenuous struggles of the kind shared by contemporary women writers Hayashi Fumiko and Miyamoto Yuriko. From her early days she was exposed to and influenced by anarchism and socialism and her first and major works reflect her ideological perspective and commitment. Although she herself was not active in the socialist or anti-Pacific War movements, she had been in close touch with them through three marriages, twice to anarchists and once to the activist proletarian writer Kobori Jinji. She had also been arrested. After the war, her writings moved away from the proletarian genre to an exploration of the experiences of women. Her major work, Kōtu onna (A Woman Like This), one of five in a series of autobiographical works and the recipient of the first Nihon Jyoryū Bungakusha-kai Shō (Japanese Women Writers Association Prize), describes Hirabayashi's wartime life under emergency rule, her illness, the arrests of her husband and of herself, and her commitment to live despite these difficulties. "Blind Chinese Soldiers," a very short work, depicts common people thrown into confusion at the end of the war, too preoccupied by their struggle for survival to pay attention to Japanese atrocities against Chinese. Yet her clear perspective, which regards both ordinary Japanese and the Chinese as victims of the Japanese war effort, makes this short story a most articulate and moving anti-war story.

19
“Never Again!”
Women Hibakusha in Osaka

by Janet Bruin and Stephen Salaff

History of the Hibakusha

In August 1945, the United States attacked the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the most catastrophic weapon in history: atomic bombs that caused more than 210,000 deaths by the end of 1945 (35 percent of the Hiroshima population and 25 percent in Nagasaki), and severe suffering for a large number of the more than 370,000 survivors.

Although the two cities contained military bases and factories, most of their residents in 1945 were women, children and old persons who were not a direct part of the Imperial war machine. Victims of the bombings, over one-half of whom are women, are known by the Japanese term “hibakusha,” literally “A-bomb received persons.” During the thirty-five years in which the war wounds of the rest of the world have gradually been healing, the hibakusha have been consigned to a vicious cycle of painful and terrifying disease, deep psychic wounds, social discrimination and poverty. A myriad of debilitating and deforming illnesses, often of permanent duration, followed in the wake of the bombs. Leukemia, cancer, tumors, anemia and blood degeneration, keloid scarring, goiter, cataracts, embedding of glass and other solid particles deep in body tissues, “atomic bomb weakness symptoms,” and sudden death from infection are still prevalent among the hibakusha. Invisible scars from traumatic loss of loved ones during and after the bombings even today cause constant pain. Fears for the safety and survival of humanity, intensified by the upward nuclear arms spiral, constantly beset the sufferers.

Hibakusha in all of Japan’s prefectures have organized A-bomb victims associations to grapple with and redress some of their medical, emotional and economic problems, but women survivors have not always been able fully to participate in these groups. A legacy of feudalistic thought, customs and social structures, with all its modern variants, has limited women to supporting roles in Japanese social, political and religious organizations. In addition, the medical, emotional and social difficulties of female hibakusha have been difficult for men to understand. The women could not communicate freely about the diseases of the uterus and breasts common among them, or about their difficulties, as bomb victims, in deciding whether or not to marry in a country where pressure on women to marry and raise children has been severe. Nor could they speak openly about finding mates once the decision to marry was taken. Women widowed by the bombs or abandoned by their husbands after their beauty was marred could not readily discuss their solitary existence at the edge of economic survival. And perhaps most difficult to share have been their intense anxieties over the health and well-being of the “Nisei Hibakusha,” the second generation of A-bomb victims.

During the decade after the bombing, when many of the victims were beginning to bear children, questions about the effects of radiation on the fetus and on the second generation were inadequately formulated. Even today, information on radiation effects is spotty, although the evidence is gradually becoming clearer. Most of the hibakusha who were pregnant at the time of the bombings lost their babies. Of the few children who survived the uteruses some were born microcephalic and retarded. Many of the women who conceived within five years after the bombing had miscarriages or stillbirths. The number of twin births among women who had children later on seems to be higher than usual. Of the children born to women hibakusha, the incidence of leukemia, anemia, retardation, soft and fragile bones, and a number of other ailments is higher than among the rest of the population. Even those mothers whose offspring seemed to be in good health were never free from the fear that their children could be stricken with a fatal or debilitating disease as a result of their exposure to radiation.

Consequently, most of the women who survived the bombings worry about whether they made the right decision to bear life. Thirty-five years later, hibakusha mothers admit that they feel guilty when their children are stricken with diseases that might be attributable to radiation or other A-bomb effects.
Shizuko and Kazue’s eventful meeting.

Shizuko Takagi is a native of Osaka who went to college in Hiroshima in July 1945. Kazue Miura, who was born and raised in Hiroshima, joined her two sisters in Osaka after the rest of her family perished in the bombing. Shizuko and Kazue were marginally affiliated with the largely male Osaka Association of A-bomb Victims, but the two had borne their physical and emotional troubles separately and silently until a young woman activist in the peace movement brought them together in 1967. Soon the two women poured out their long dormant emotions of loss, shame, anger, guilt and fear.

Shizuko and Kazue felt extraordinarily relieved, and long hours and many tears later they decided that it was time to put an end to the years of silent suffering. There were perhaps 1,600 women hibakusha in Osaka carrying the same oppressive burdens who needed help, even if it were just someone to talk with, and Shizuko and Kazue began planning how best to find them. With the aid of peace organizations and informal contacts, Shizuko and Kazue secured a list of officially registered bomb victims in Osaka. They began visiting women in hospitals and at home and successfully attracted many of them to their early gatherings, where long-suppressed sentiments flowed into “rivers of tears.” After much trial and error and hard work, the Women’s Section, Osaka Association of A-bomb Victims, was born in September 1967.

Help for the Hibakusha

News of the love, understanding, support and tangible assistance offered by the Women’s Section spread, and the demand for its services increased. Recognizing the need for these services, the City of Osaka in 1969 made available a consultation room in the Municipal Social Welfare Hall, and awarded the Women’s Section a modest annual grant to pay nominal wages to the consultants, all survivors themselves. The consultation room, partitioned into a business office and an inner roomlet, furnished in traditional style, represented a great victory for the hibakusha, and signified that the Osaka Municipality, the second largest in Japan, was at last willing to recognize publicly the plight of the hibakusha after so many years of keeping them in the shadows.

Hibakusha—male as well as female—come to the Women’s Section for personal counselling and for information about the complex web of medical, social and financial benefits available to them. Governmental insensitivity has compounded the wounds of the hibakusha, and survivors assistance was instituted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare only after protracted mass struggles. But even now, information about hibakusha relief measures is often withheld and the benefits themselves frequently denied, so the Women’s Section has had to wage numerous legal battles on behalf of its clients.

In addition to consultation room activities and advocacy, Women’s Section members have taken on a memoir-writing project. The life histories of these women serve as historical documentation on the damages and after-effects of the atomic bombings and enable world audiences to see this solemn problem from a more personal perspective. After several dozen Osaka women had written and published their stories, they found it easier to stand on public platforms to demand their rights and give firsthand reports of the dangers the world faces if nuclear weapons are not banned.

“We hibakusha are the only living proof of the disastrous effects of nuclear weapons,” declares Toyoko Fujikawa, Chairperson of the Women’s Section, “and we are not getting any younger or healthier. The Japanese government has not yet taken responsibility for fully compensating us for the pain we have suffered, and no one has guaranteed us and our children the peaceful life we believe we deserve. Our anger is focused not so much on what happened to us thirty-five years ago as it is on the continued existence and development of weapons which could make victims of the rest of humanity. So even though it is painful for us to recount our stories of misery, it is the least we can do to warn people about the grave threat to world survival which is being intensified by the arms race and the dire consequences of diverting the planet’s precious resources to destructive ends. Our suffering will not have been in vain if it can help eliminate the threat of annihilation. There must never again be victims like ourselves.’’

Another major activity of the Women’s Section has been the collection of data on the victims of the bombings. Research on approximately 700 hibakusha annually has provided valuable information for the campaign in Japan to enact a comprehensive A-bomb Victims’ Relief Measures Law. Their findings, published in research reports and at local, national and international symposia, have important implications as well for people everywhere in an age threatened by the dangers of nuclear war and nuclear radiation.

An international appeal

Until the mid-1970s the work of the Osaka women was carried out for the most part locally. Section members participated strongly in the campaign against the location of a Nike missile base in Osaka Prefecture, and came to institutionalize activities for hibakusha rights and nuclear disarmament by collecting signatures in the streets on the 6th and 9th days of each month. The Women’s Section was moved to broaden its scope by a tragic event which occurred on August 6, 1975, when Sumiko Mine lost her 17-year-old son, Kenichi, from leukemia after several months of a heroic struggle for life. Sumiko had never suspected that her body was contaminated by radioactive isotopes of the bomb’s fallout. Her grief at having lost both children would probably have ended in suicide had it not been for the attention and support of other hibakusha. Kenichi’s was the eighth leukemia death among Osaka Nisei hibakusha since the women had begun collecting statistics.

To Shizuko Takagi no case could be more shocking because her own son was also 17 and a soccer player like Kenichi. Shizuko and the Women’s Section resolved to bring information to people all over the world about the death of this child, born in a time of peace and killed by a weapon used long before his birth in a time of war. Armed with petitions filled with signatures
calling for "No More Hiroshimas! No More Nagasakis!," Shizuko, elected to represent the Women’s Section on the first all-Japan delegation to the United Nations, met with UN Secretary-General Waldheim on December 8, 1975. In the name of the dead, the survivors, the world’s children, and the generations yet to be born, she pleaded for a binding international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons.

Hibakusha looked forward to the UN Special Session on Disarmament of May-June 1978 with great hopes, since it marked the beginning of a new phase of UN involvement in the disarmament process. Although the Special Session did not lead directly to concrete disarmament measures, they were heartened by UN member states’ recognition that “mankind must stop the arms race or face annihilation.” This time, Shizuko’s son, Nobuhiko, journeyed to New York as the youngest member of the 500-strong Japanese Non-Governmental Organization delegation. He helped to deliver 20 million Japanese signatures calling for the outlawing of the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity, the convening of a World Disarmament Conference, and dissemination of information about the horrors of the atomic bombing and the suffering of its victims. Women’s Section members take great pride in their children’s activities on behalf of peace, and it was with joy that they watched a television broadcast from New York as Nobuhiko addressed a crowd of many thousands saying: “I have come from Japan to declare that nuclear weapons must be banned.”

Political, economic, military and technological developments since the Special Session, however, have dampened their hopes and caused hibakusha great alarm. During the International Year of the Child in 1979, they intensified their efforts by publishing more data and memoirs, holding more meetings, and reaching out to groups around the world. Meeting with representatives of the Women’s International League of Peace and Freedom, Women Strike for Peace, and Voice of Women, they learned of the North American peace movement’s role in bringing to an end the war in Vietnam. They are hopeful that such groups will contribute to the development of a mass mobilization to prevent a Third World War and the brutal destruction it would cause.

As bearers and protectors of life, women traditionally have been advocates for peace, and Women’s Section members are acting on the belief that they have a great responsibility for this advocacy. During this, the UN Decade for Women, they have appealed to women all over the world to demand an immediate end to the arms race and diversion of the more than $400 billion spent annually on armaments to the health, education and welfare of the world’s people. They urge North American women in particular to exert pressure on the US government to recognize the necessity of disarmament through international negotiations and the United Nations.

NOTES
1. Caused by heat rays burned into the skin, keloid tissue leaves heavy, deforming scars.
2. “The hibakusha vividly remember the shocking sights and horrors of the bombing. They remember the deaths of family members and relatives, and being forced to desert their kin in trying to escape the flames. They are still tormented by the memories of those experiences, images that return at every mention of nuclear weapons and tests.”
3. Ladles Auxiliaries (Fujin Bu) are attached to many traditional and modern Japanese organizations. Members propagate common objectives among women at large, and help within the group, but do not as a rule share leadership. When a younger woman is able to gain an executive position, she may be expected to vacate her post by around age 25 dutifully to raise a family.
5. Despite the need for more exact empirical data on the biological effects of radiation, and the efforts now being made to collect such information, it will be impossible to recover much of the past hibakusha childbearing experience. The information contained in the remainder of this paragraph is from Kazue Miura, Survival at 500 Miles in Hiroshima (Osaka: Women’s Section, Osaka Association of A-bomb Victims, December 1979) p. 19.
6. “The Japanese Government, under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, surrendered the right to demand reparations for the A-bombings from the United States. Japan therefore bears the responsibility of instituting a hibakusha aid law providing for full state compensation.” No More Hiroshimas!, Japan Council Against A- and H-bombs, Tokyo, March 1979, p. 8. The Diet promulgated in 1957 the Law for Health Protection and Medical Care for A-bomb Victims, which provides for biannual governmental medical examination and treatment. The 1968 Law for Special Measures for A-bomb Victims went somewhat beyond the primarily medical benefits of the 1957 law, and reflected the hibakusha demand for livelihood security. A total of approximately 370,000 hibakusha have secured the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Health Notebook for A-bomb Victims, becoming eligible thereby for certain forms of medical treatment and financial compensation under these two laws. However, several tens of thousands of survivors have not yet obtained Health Notebooks, and second and third generation victims are not entitled to receive them.
7. The Declaration of the Second Mothers Congress of Japan, Tokyo, August 29, 1956 affirms that “As bearers of life, mothers have the right to help bring up and protect all life.” The First Mothers Congress on June 9, 1955 resolved:

Let us call the world’s attention to the real conditions of the atomic bomb victims and join the forces working to protect these victims; let us further expand the movement opposing the preparations for atomic war.

Life Histories

The following excerpts from Women's Section life histories point to some of the difficulties which the Osaka atomic bomb victims have faced in their struggle to survive and live with dignity and purpose. The more extended case studies now becoming available further reveal the deep and terrible physical and psychic wounds of the sufferers, and provide compassionate literary documentation on the damage and after-effects of nuclear weapons. The construction of these self-portraits was in each case a significant step in overcoming the obstacles to social activism which faced the women of Osaka. The occupation given for each woman is that in August 1945, followed by her location at the time of bombing and her age.

(H.S.)

Kazue Miura

Switchboard operator, Hiroshima Central Telephone Exchange, age 18

When I finished school in 1941, I began to work as an operator in the Central Telephone Exchange. December eighth of that year was an especially busy day, on which Japan declared war against the Allies. As the war grew in intensity, the Telephone Exchange was staffed almost entirely by women, mobilized high school girls among them.

The Telephone Exchange was located within 500 meters of the hypocenter of the A-bomb explosion, and I was one of the few people who survived in this innermost zone. I was hurled to the floor by the fierce blast, and felt warm blood spurting from my nose and mouth. After a momentary silence, the shrill voices of my workmates rose to a mournful chorus. At one of the second floor exits, I found a girl who was thrown through a window and whose face, full of glass, was bleeding profusely. I held her in my arms, and led her out of the building.

Beautiful Hiroshima was now a wasteland of debris. I desperately wanted to make my way home, 400 meters from the hypocenter, but the heat from the burning houses was too intense. I decided instead to go with my companion to her home in the north of the city. She was in such fear that she would not part her hands from mine, even for a moment. Stunned, expressionless, monsterlike people, young and old, cried out for their mothers and begged for water. When I tried to comfort children, words would not come, only tears.

The next morning I was able to return to the place where my house had stood so sturdily. It looked as if the house had been melted and coagulated. My father, mother, little brother and sister were nowhere to be seen, and I learned later that they had all perished during or soon after the bombing. There was nothing I could do but write "Kazue, Alive!" on the wall of the water tank, now completely dry. I walked back and forth between what had been my home and my place of work, ignorant of the terrible effects of residual radioactivity, looking desperately for my family and friends.

I was suffering intensely from diarrhea. I got weaker and thinner and felt like a ghost. At the hospital the doctors were sure I would die from the terrible, mysterious symptoms which had already claimed so many lives. But through the kindness of a family friend, who took me to his quiet home by the sea and fed me fresh fish and oranges, I miraculously began to recover.

In November, although I was still weak, I went to my two sisters in Osaka, carrying the ashes of our parents in an urn wrapped in cloth hanging from my neck. My sisters nursed me back to health. They introduced me to a good man, and we married in 1948.

My first baby was stillborn, as was the case with one of my older sisters who was A-bombed in Hiroshima. I was hesitant to have another, but we wanted children very badly. In 1950 I gave birth to a boy, and in 1953 I had a

Sumiko Mine

Nagasaki, age 10

I walked with my mother from our home in a village outside Nagasaki into the ruined city on August 11 to search for my older brother, who had not returned from work there. For two days we searched the neighborhood of what proved later to be the hypocenter of the bomb explosion, until at last we found my brother, still alive. After we returned home, I developed diarrhea and began vomiting.

Although weakened by radiation sickness, I was persuaded by family and friends in 1956 to marry, and I gave birth to a son in 1958 and a daughter the next year. We moved to Osaka in 1964, where my husband took up work. But he died of a shipyard injury in 1967. Then my 12 year old daughter Junko perished of leukemia in 1972. I was left with Kenichi, in whom I was completely invested emotionally.

In November 1974 Ken developed symptoms which were diagnosed by our neighborhood doctor as rheumatic fever. It was not until Ken's teacher of English visited him in hospital in December, when he learned of my early years in Nagasaki and Junko's death from leukemia, that a closer examination was made at the teacher's urging. Ken had leukemia, and not much time was left. Despite encouragement given by his classmates, who presented him with one thousand folded paper cranes donated by his friends, and despite my constant attention to his condition and his own fierce determination to stay alive, Kenichi died on August 6, 1975. His was the eighth leukemia death among the Nisei Hibakusha of Osaka since 1967.

My lonely struggle with grief and guilt was for a time unbearable. Never suspecting that my body was contaminated by radioactivity, questions such as: "Why did I marry, and give birth to these children? Why should I continue to live?" plagued me. Fortunately, the Women's Section, as it has done with numerous sadly depressed victims, gave me a reason for living and helped pull me out of my suicidal depths.

(H.S.)

23
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Toshiko Nakamura
Housewife, mother of six, Nagasaki

I was cleaning our family's tiny underground air raid shelter on a hillside near our two story home in Hamaguchi-cho, when I saw a sudden flash and felt something pressed hard against my cheeks. The rest was sheer darkness. When I pushed my way out of the shelter, I saw a blaze envelop the whole neighborhood, including our home, where several of my six children were playing. The dwelling was crushed under the neighboring house, which in turn had fallen beneath the next house.

I could not even approach home, and so I fled, alongside a few other ghostlike, tottering forms which had emerged from the flames, into a sweet potato field, where I had to spend the night. The next morning, I returned to the site of my house, but whatever objects I moved only raised clouds of hot ashes. I went to the home of relatives, who told me that my face was scorched black and covered with scabs. As awful as that was, it didn't seem as important as being without my children.

On the third day, a friend of my husband came to help me salvage the debris of my home. We discovered a white, round object. An elderly passing soldier told us that it was the skull of a man in his thirties or forties. This must be my husband's, I realized. Dazed we dug up six more skulls, and my children's butterfly badges with them.

How often I thought of killing myself! Livid spots appeared all over my body, and I frequently felt very sick. My hair fell out. But I had to begin earning a living, and so I became a seamstress. In 1948, when I had still not absorbed all the effects of the atomic catastrophe, I married a man who initially promised to help me. After I realized that I could not trust him, we separated, but I was already pregnant. I decided to have the child, a baby girl who was a living image of my departed second daughter. The rest of my life will be for this girl, I resolved.

Sewing, however, became unbearable because the beautiful clothes I was making brought painful memories of my children who were no more.

I moved from city to city with my daughter, from Fukuoka to Sasebo and back to Nagasaki, working as a poorly paid hotel domestic, trying to keep her from going hungry while I was periodically hospitalized for A-bomb illness.

My first-born daughter, a high school girl in 1945, had been put to work by the Imperial Government, and this qualified me for a pension under the Relief Measures Law for the Wounded, Diseased or Bereaved in War of 1952. But neither the City of Nagasaki nor the Ministry of Health and Welfare notified me of my rights, and if it had not been for the consultation program of the Women's Section, I would have remained ignorant of this benefit.

In time, moreover, A Health Notebook for A-bomb Victims became obtainable by persons identified as Hibakusha, which qualifies for limited compensation under Hibakusha legislation. I went to the Nagasaki City Office to secure my Notebook, and the official in charge said to

Kazue Miura died on 25 April 1980 of stomach cancer.)
me sarcastically: "We envy you Hibakusha. Your Notebooks will provide you with everything you need, won't they?" That made me very angry I threw down the Notebook crying 'This Book will not restore my family. Give me back my husband and my six children!'"

People called me stubborn, and as such I fought my way through. My daughter completed high school and took courses in Cosmetology. She left Nagasaki to work in Osaka in late 1965. I wanted to accompany her, but had to undergo long hospitalizations after blood appeared in my phlegm. It was not until 1968 that I was well enough to come to Osaka. Here, my doctor tells me that there is a tumor in my gullet. But I won't give way to this disease so soon. How could I, after my miraculous survival through the holocaust of the bomb?

My daughter and I are managing now, but she says thoughtfully: "I feel kind of guilty when I think of my happy life with you, mother, while all my sisters and brothers were killed by the A-bomb." I am worried by her weak health, and am determined not to die until she opens a beauty shop of her own, and meets a good young man to provide for her continued happiness.

The gatherings of the Women's Section have given me the opportunity to come across my dear old Nagasaki dialect, and to give full expression to the feelings I had had ever since that fatal day. When I made up my mind to publish my life story in Unvanquished, We March, the magazine of the Women's Section, my daughter at first tried to stop me, because she was afraid that it would renew my sorrow. But when she saw my insistent look, she agreed.

My memories are inexhaustible. I am determined that the cruelty of war never be repeated. Nobody will ever cheat me into believing the the glory of war.

Fumiko Nonaka

Labor team, Hiroshima, age 24

I was working in downtown Hiroshima a little after 8 am, when a woman near me cried: "Here comes a B-29 bomber!" The instant I looked up at the sky, my face was pierced by an intense flash of light and I felt my whole body shrink. My skin was all of a sudden shredded and hanging like dried squid roasted on a fire. But at least my jacket and underwear saved my inner organs.

I lost consciousness. I don't know how much time passed before I returned to my senses. Someone must have helped me to reach a temporary first aid station. My face was swollen beyond recognition, the burnt flesh of my arms, hands and fingers was hanging out of my sleeves and drooping down my fingertips, and I was temporarily blind.

My husband searched for me in all the makeshift aid stations, and fortunately, when at last on August 9 he saw my misshapen figure, he spotted my wedding ring. To my joy he shouted in my ear "Are you Fumiko?"

I was later taken on a truck to a naval hospital in the nearby port of Kure. There, when the doctor removed the tightly sticking bandages from my face, the pain was so severe that it made my eyes water. My husband later told me that while I was in the hospital he was often tempted to kill me because he could not stand to see me suffering so much pain.

My parents, brother and sister, and several other relatives came to the hospital with two urns of firewood, prepared for my death and cremation. But instead they carried me back on a stretcher and tenderly cared for me at home. I could open my mouth only wide enough to swallow three grains of rice at a time, and my mother patiently sat at my bedside feeding me the nourishment I needed to stay alive. My brother-in-law carefully removed the darkened skin with tweezers from my face and limbs, washed my skin with salt water, and coated it with cooking oil.

When I could finally move my body, I returned to the dwelling of my husband. It was then that he found it difficult to live with such an ugly, feeble woman. Some of his friends suggested that he divorce me. He did go off with another woman, who bore him a son in 1946, but their relationship did not last, and he brought the child to me. I raised the boy with all my might, as if he were my own. However in 1950 my husband again abandoned me for another woman, taking the child with him.

Left alone, I joined a government program for the poor as a laborer for less than 400 yen ($1) per day in Niigata. There were many days when I could hardly stand up under the load, but I was at least fortunate to have the heartwarming encouragement of my fellow union members, who offered me the blood I needed for anemia transfusions. I still had to undergo scar removal, mouth widening and skin graft operations, some without anesthesia.

My husband came home again, unemployed, and my wages now had to support the child. But again my husband left me and went this time to Hiroshima. He died there in the A-bomb Hospital around 1960, a victim probably of the radiation he absorbed while searching for me in the ruins.

I moved to Osaka, originally to get away from where my husband was, and to find a more suitable climate for my convalescence. Through the Women's Section, a doctor of the Osaka Red Cross Hospital supported my application for medical compensation, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare awarded me a modest allowance. This was partly for what the doctor called "ugly looks caused by serious burn scarring." Although I am relieved by this pension, my blood boils in anger whenever untaoored children gazing at me say "Hey, look at that woman's face!"

Taking part in the meetings of the Women's Section has come to be the main purpose of my life. I am glad to be alive to work for peace. How great was my joy when for the first time I spoke on the Section's behalf in public!
In his memoirs former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru identified a group within the American occupation bureaucracy as "radical elements—what might be called 'New Dealers'—who sought to utilize occupied Japan as an experimental ground for testing out their theories of progress and reform." He claimed that such "mistakes of the Occupation" as the decentralization of the police, passage of the Labor Standards Law, the purge, the anti-monopoly program, and so on resulted from the literal and overzealous interpretation of Washington directives by the "'New Dealers.'" Government Section of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), the Prime Minister recalled, housed more than its share of officials who had little understanding of actual conditions in postwar Japan or the practical needs of government. Thomas Arthur Bisson, "an enthusiastic New Dealer with advanced views regarding ways and means of democratizing our financial world," for example, had helped draft a purge plan for Japanese business which, had it been enforced, "would have played havoc with our national economy." Working with the "realists" in SCAP, Yoshida boasted he "never lost an opportunity to demand the revision and readjustment" of key Occupation-sponsored reforms and had been able "to temper the, at times, rigorous demands made by the Government Section."¹

That Yoshida singled out Bisson for special criticism reflected not only Bisson's prominence as a SCAP "'New Dealer'" but his subsequent importance as a left-wing critic of the "'New Japan.'" From April 1947, when he left Japan, until 1954, when his publishing career came to an abrupt end, Bisson authored two books and numerous articles which emphasized the failure of the Occupation to achieve the announced democratic aims of its initial post-surrender policy toward Japan. By the late 1940s that interpretation of the Occupation undercut efforts of American and Japanese policy-makers to have Japan serve as a model of stable capitalist development for an Asia in revolution. It also clashed with the dominant historiography on Japan emerging in the United States which, not surprisingly, was congruent with the outlook of American policy-makers. Without using Bisson's name but having him prominently in mind, Edwin O. Reischauer, the Mt. Fuji of American historians of Japan, was among the very first to take issue with "those of leftist sympathies" who argued during and after the Occupation that the "reform of Japan must be thoroughgoing—even ruthless if necessary." For Reischauer, the "'pessimistic' left-wing view that the Occupation failed to achieve democracy in Japan rested on the misconception that "everything about pre-surrender Japan was bad." The "'slight readjustment of the rules and temporary weighing of the scales in favor of the peaceful and democratic forces over the militaristic and authoritarian forces," accomplished by the Americans during the Occupation, Reischauer concluded, was all that was necessary for "reversing the history of the 1930s" and restoring a democratic polity in Japan.²

Today Bisson's career and writings are either forgotten or clouded by the inaccurate and politically inspired stereotypes that developed during the early Cold War in Japan and the United States. What follows is a brief sketch of Bisson's career prior to the Occupation, his critique of Occupation planning by Japan Crowd officials in the State Department, his role in the Occupation, and an analysis of his major books on the Occupation. Bisson's encounter with the McCarran Committee in 1952 and its tragic aftermath are touched on in the conclusion. In a small way, this essay seeks to correct the prevailing distortions about Bisson's life, introduce his work to a new generation of Asia scholars, and emphasize his positive contribution to an understanding of the roots of contemporary American and Japanese imperialism in Asia.

²6
The Making of a Concerned Scholar

When he joined SCAP in 1946, T.A. Bisson, as he gener­ally signed his publications, was 45 years old and recognized as one of the leading American authorities on East Asia. His interest in the region had been sparked by four years in China as a Presbyterian missionary. Escaping the chaos and repression of the Nationalist Revolution under General Jiang Jieshi, Bisson returned to the United States in 1928, nearly finished a Ph.D. in Chinese Studies at Columbia University, and then joined the prestigious Foreign Policy Association (FPA) in 1929 as Research Associate on the Far East. 3

In more than a decade with the FPA, Bisson wrote over a hundred scholarly and popular articles and two books on contemporary developments in China and Japan. His writings rested on a foundation of careful study of newspapers, government documents, as well as first-hand observations made during 1937 in Japan, Korea, and China (including four days of meet­ings with Chinese Communist leaders in Yenan). Though often suffering from an excessive empiricism, Bisson’s scholarship in the 1930s was of the highest standard and usually won him praise from scholars and statesmen alike, even those who dis­agreed with his evident commitment to the success of the Chinese revolution against Western and Japanese imperialism. 4

Primarily out of his personal experience of and profes­sional interest in East Asia, Bisson became actively associated with the American Left during the 1930s. The founding of the American Friends of the Chinese People (AFCP) appears to have provided him with the initial focus for his growing radicalism. Although the AFCP embraced participants of any political stripe who subscribed to its program of support for “the Chinese People’s fight for national liberation [and] resistance to Japanese invasion,” it was probably controlled by the United States Communist Party (CP). Phillip J. Jaffe, managing editor of the AFCP’s official organ, China Today, and a self-described “very close fellow traveler,” invited Bisson to serve on the magazine’s editorial board. 5 Using the pseudonym Frederick Spencer from 1934 to 1937 for his articles in China Today, Bisson lambasted the Nanjing government, lauded the courageous leadership of the Chinese Communists, and demanded that Japan and the United States surrender their imperialist privileges in China. 6

The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war and the formation of a united front government in China prompted Bisson, Jaffe, and others in the AFCP to launch a less “partisan” and more academically respectable journal than China Today. As an editor and contributor to Amerasia from 1937 until 1941 Bisson muted criticism of Jian Jieshi, favored American aid to the united front government of China, worked to cut off trade in war materials to Japan from the United States, and pushed for collective security of all the Powers against Japanese imperialism. While these ideas appeared in Bisson’s FPA publications and his two books, they were perhaps most pronounced in Amerasia and the continuing China Today. 7

As with thousands of other Americans, United States entry into World War II changed Bisson’s life. His scholarly interest shifted from China to Japan. By the end of January 1942 Bisson was en­coun­tered in the Washington offices of the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW) headed by Vice President Henry Wallace. Drawing on his research skills and vast knowledge acquired at the FPA, Bisson plunged into a major study on the most effective strategy for blocking the flow of essential war supplies to Japan and disrupting the Japanese economy. When the BEW succumbed in 1943 to intense bureaucratic wrangling and charges by Representative Martin Dies of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) that 35 employees, including Bisson, were members of fellow-traveler organizations, Bisson returned to his home in New York. 8

A two year stint at the end of the war as an associate editor of Pacific Affairs, the prestigious journal of the Institute for Pacific Relations (IPR), placed Bisson at the center of the controversies raging over post-war American plans for Asia. Bisson recognized that the war had shattered the hold of the old order, fanned revolutionary fires, and left the United States alone as the dominant outside power in the region. In the outpouring of reviews, articles, and books from Bisson’s pen while at IPR, one theme predominated, namely that American policy-makers, through a combination of ignorance and malevolence, would thwart the legitimate aspirations for self-determination of Asian peoples.

The Japan Crowd Gadfly

The principal target of Bisson’s wrath during the closing phase of the war in the Pacific was former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew. Scion of a wealthy New England family and cousin of J.P. Morgan, Grew led the powerful, ultra-conservative Japan Crowd in the State Department and served as Acting Secretary of State for three critical months in the spring of 1945. Grew, Eugene Dooman, and others engaged in the wartime planning for the Occupation of Japan were pessimistic about the Nationalist cause in China and thought Secretary of State Cordell Hull and some Old China Hands were foolish to attempt to anchor post-war American policy in Asia on a China rent by civil war. Rather, Grew and the Japan Crowd favored the re-integration of Japan as a Cold War ally of the United States and the dominant capitalist and anti-revolutionary power in Asia. Grew anticipated a brief Occupation in which the militarists and extremists would be purged and the so-called moderates under a refurbished Emperor institution would rule.  

Bisson was not the most renowned challenger of the Japan Crowd’s plans for the Occupation or their reading of Japanese history that served to buttress those plans. (The work of Owen Lattimore and Andrew Roth were much better known. But Bisson offered perhaps the most sophisticated and thoroughly documented critique of the Japan Crowd’s views. It began with what he considered their simplistic notion that Japanese imperialism was the result of a militarist takeover of the Japanese state beginning in 1931. Drawing heavily from the work of his friend, E. Herbert Norman, Bisson traced the authoritarian and imperialist Japanese state system back to the Meiji Restoration of 1868. That state system embraced continuing shifts in power of the business interests, party leaders, the military, bureaucrats, and the landlords. “Neither the absolute supremacy nor the final liquidation” of any of these groups was tolerated, Bisson wrote in *Pacific Affairs* in 1944. Instead, the coalition strove as a whole to “buttress its dictatorship at home,” primarily through the theology surrounding the Emperor, and by pressing “Japan’s ‘manifest destiny’ overseas.” Consequently, for Bisson, no one of these groups was inherently moderate or extremist. When Japan moved to fascism and imperialist aggression in the 1930s, Bisson argued, “the decisive elements in all of the groups [were] in agreement on the program and . . . the steps to be taken.” Grew and the Japan Crowd were fostering, perhaps willfully Bisson suggested, the delusion that the United States had “allies within the gates of the Japanese regime amongst the ‘moderates’ when in fact these moderates were, in their foreign policy, cautious imperialists willing to move [their] pins forward on the map when additional territory had been occupied.”

One of the principal tenets of the Japan Crowd’s thesis was the need to preserve the Emperor system. For Bisson, however, the Emperor was the staunchest bulwark of the ruling coalition’s dictatorship, supplying the master race ideology for Japan’s aggression and sanctioning full-blooded repression at home. That Grew would pass off the Emperor as a neutral who could be used by the Allies, “as a puppet without political responsibility of any kind,” was a gross misunderstanding of history.

The sharpest difference between Bisson and the Japan Crowd was over their reading of the role of the zaibatsu in Japan’s ruling coalition. From research for his FPA Reports and for the BEW Bisson became convinced that even at the height of the influence of the military, Japanese Cabinets were largely under the control of the zaibatsu and that the industrial capitalists bore primary responsibility for leading Japan down the road to war. In his third book, *Japan’s War Economy*, published in 1945 Bisson carefully documented the increasing size and ways zaibatsu leaders used state power to dominate all facets of Japanese economic and political life. He let loose with the most biting sarcasm he could muster against the Japan Crowd’s “ludicrous mythological growth” and “strange tales” of zaibatsu executives as men of peace, mortal enemies of the militarists, and friends of the United States in the preface. To look to the zaibatsu to rule Japan in a peaceful, democratic manner for American benefit was, for Bisson, a “grand delusion.”

The epitome of modern Japan is not the “militarists,” but the Zaibatsu. If the latter is permitted to control the restoration of Japan’s economy, his buddy, the “militarist,” will be found trotting at his heels again when the job is finished.  

Bisson wanted a new and democratic Japan after surrender. That meant a “totally new set of government organs, manned by totally new personnel, encouraged to develop by the United Nations if the ‘revolutionary overthrow’ of the old system was not carried through by the Japanese people first,” Bisson wrote in *Pacific Affairs* in 1944. To effect real and lasting results, Occupation policy would have to exclude the “moderates” so favored by the Japan Crowd because by definition they were cautious supporters of the Old Japan. Instead the United Nations must seek authentic “liberals” with a history of total opposition to the old regime or at least non-cooperation. The new leaders, Bisson wrote, must be men and women in Japan “who led
political parties, trade unions, or peasant organizations that were suppressed prior to 1941; [who] have spoken publicly and unequivocally against the war, and have perhaps languished in jail for their temerity.” After listing a few distinguished names—Kanju Kato, Yukio Ozaki, Nosaka Sanzo, Baroness Ishimoto (among them several Communists)—Bisson concluded that only such Japanese could establish a political order in Japan “based on the will of the people and dedicated to democracy and peace.”

The immediate aftermath of the end of the war in the Pacific fed Bisson’s worst fears regarding American policy in Asia, particularly Japan. Occupation authorities seemed to be carrying out the Japan Crowd’s program of preserving the Imperial system, defining war criminals so narrowly as to absolve the zaibatsu and civilian bureaucrats, and in general placing more emphasis on stability and order than democratic reform. But in an October 1945 article in the New Republic Bisson suggested that the departure of Grew and other Japan Crowd figures at the end of the war had prompted the State Department to make a “tardy revision” of Occupation policy which, if implemented, could secure real democracy for Japan. The Basic Directive of the Occupation sent to General Douglas MacArthur in September included not only limiting Japanese sovereignty to the main islands and the destruction of Japan’s military establishment, but promotion of policies which would encourage the wider distribution of income and wealth, the development of labor unions, the revamping of the educational system, the purge of economic and political leaders associated with militaristic policies, and so on. Above all, the Basic Directive seemed to leave open the possibility, in Bisson’s view, for reversal of the most serious mistake of the Occupation, namely the attempt to carry out reform through the Emperor and his bureaucracy. “Only Hirohito’s enforced abdication and trial will be sufficient to drive home to the Japanese people,” Bisson wrote, “the realization of defeat which is so patently absent.” And once Hirohito was off the scene, Bisson insisted, the more difficult task of uprooting the Emperor system would have to follow. Without that the democratic forces in Japan would not survive the withdrawal of occupation troops. In short, American Occupation policy was still in flux. Much depended on who was in Japan and how they interpreted their somewhat vague directives.

**Occupationnaire**

Whatever his reservations about American policy towards Japan, Bisson left the IPR in October 1945 and spent the better part of the next two years—first as a member of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey mission and then as the top economic analyst for Government Section of SCAP—attempting to realize his vision of a new and democratic Japan.

Bisson’s first months in Japan in the fall of 1945 for the Bombing Survey provided him with insight into the scramble of the Old Guard of Japan to maintain power, the political awakening of the Japanese people, and the increasingly reactionary role of Occupation officials in the sharpening struggle between the Old Guard and the people. In interviews with several of the zaibatsu leaders about whom he had written in *Japan’s War Economy*, Bisson observed their repeated attempts to blame the military for the war, their raising of the specter of communism, and their parrying of questions linking them to the Emperor and control of Japan’s war economy. Outside his Tokyo office, Bisson witnessed the intense popular reaction against the Old Guard and its policies. Nothing was being done for the thousands of students and the unemployed who were marching in the streets demanding government food relief. Bisson wrote home to his wife, “yet billions of yen [were] being shoveled out to Zaibatsu concerns in contract cancellation payment—and MacArthur [is] refusing to recognize it as a problem.” The air was electric with strikes, demonstrations for food, and protests against the government, and wittingly or not, Bisson saw Occupation authorities siding with the Old Guard. “The Konoye-Kido clique, [the Emperor’s close aides] is getting in soft at HQ,” he wrote.

Before returning to the United States with the Bombing Survey team to celebrate Christmas with his family and complete the draft of his report, Bisson agreed to join SCAP’s powerful Government Section (GS). On March 1 he rejoined friends in Tokyo for what he thought was a three month assignment but which eventually lengthened to fifteen months. During his hectic tenure with GS, Bisson was primarily involved in three major reform areas—the zaibatsu dissolution program, engineering the passage of the “MacArthur Constitution” through the Diet, and an abortive plan to get SCAP to enforce a workable, anti-inflationary economic stabilization plan.

The political and bureaucratic context in which he had to work on these reforms became distressingly clear to Bisson in his first weeks back in Tokyo. The old line political parties, as he had predicted, had swept the first general election and an ultra-conservative Cabinet, including many whom Bisson regarded as war criminals, was established under Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Even worse, in Bisson’s opinion, indirect rather than direct rule by the Occupation gave enormous leverage to the bureaucrats in the Japanese Government ministries to...
resist or ignore the whole reform program. In addition, since the administration and enforcement of the American-sponsored legislation was in the hands of the Japanese, unless the Americans had a rigorous surveillance system, even those measures that passed the Diet intact could easily be subverted. In charge of surveillance, however, was Major-General Charles Willoughby, head of G-2, an admirer of fascist General Francisco Franco, and more concerned about left-wing infiltration of the Occupation by people like Bisson than in eliminating the reactionaries of Japan. Not surprisingly, the most "indelible impression" Bisson had of the Occupation was the day-in and day-out non-cooperation he met by the Japanese and their allies within SCAP. 18

Given his recognized expertise in the machinations of the zaibatsu, Bisson's first assignment was to devise an economic purge directive, a key part of the broader program for breaking up concentrations of economic power known as zaibatsu dissolution. Bisson immediately became embroiled in a squabble with Economic Scientific Section (ESS) which had been initially assigned the job of writing the "economic purge," but had not proceeded on the grounds that a purge of Japan's most experienced business personnel would delay vital economic recovery. For Bisson, however, the reason for ESS delay was that its staff had too many representatives from American big business with close ties to the financial and industrial elite of Japan. 19 In any case, under pressure from the GS initiative, ESS worked up its own economic purge proposal that was considerably less sweeping than Bisson's. At first Bisson was encouraged by what he thought was the strong support he received both from his Chief, General Courtney Whitney, and from MacArthur for the GS economic purge. But as spring passed into summer without any action, Bisson realized that the real problem was less with ESS and more with MacArthur. MacArthur, he believed, knew that to approve any economic purge would lead to a fight with the Yoshida Cabinet and that would delay passage of SCAP's pet project, the new Constitution, then winding its way through the Diet. "The job here is sort of stymied now," Bisson wrote to his wife on July 3, 1946, "with most of the real things crying to be done stalled until the Constitution gets through and lest we upset the reactionary Yoshida Cabinet." 20

The Constitution question, which increasingly occupied Bisson in the summer and fall, fully reinforced Bisson's longstanding suspicions of the Japanese Old Guard. He had mistakenly thought that the GS draft of the Japanese Constitution imposed on the Shidehara Cabinet in February had settled the matter. But careful study by GS language officers of the phrasings of the Japanese text indicated considerable deviation from the intent of the Americans. Bisson was appalled by the effrontery of the Japanese Cabinet negotiators. For example, in the preamble to the Constitution and in the first article defining the status of the Emperor were several references in the English language text to the "sovereignty of the people's will." The Japanese had translated people as "kokumin." In a lengthy memo to General Whitney in mid-July, Bisson and two other GS staffers argued that the proper translation of people in that context was "jinmin," for "kokumin" meant in English "nation" rather than people and carried with it the connotation that the Emperor's will was melted into the will of the people. To Bisson the concept of democracy required that the people have a separate will from the Emperor's will. He could not imagine the use of the word "kokumin" in the Constitution being acceptable to SCAP.

Similarly, the Japanese had translated the English word "sovereignty" to a Japanese word meaning "supremacy." By these two seemingly inconsequential changes (people into nation and sovereignty into supremacy), Bisson explained, "sovereignty is not located in the people as the basis of the state, but has been shifted to kokumin comprising the people, the Emperor and the government." That paved the way, he feared, for
the Emperor to exercise a part of the sovereign power rather than exist, as intended by GS, as merely a symbol of state carrying out ceremonial functions. The final compromise accepted by GS did not please Bisson: though people remained kokumin, supremacy was changed back to the original sovereignty. In fact, the whole struggle over the Constitution — there were some 30 similar word changes or amendments by the Japanese to the American draft — was an illustration for Bisson of the continuing stranglehold over the machinery of government which the predominantly reactionary bureaucrats exercised. And even the largely successful defense of the American draft of the Constitution did not end Bisson’s doubts. The Constitution, he told his wife, was “blemished” from the outset by its permanent entrenchment of the Tenno [Emperor] system, even though modified in some respects.

By October 1946 with the Constitution finally passed by the Diet, Bisson thought he would be able to devote his full efforts to pushing through the long-delayed economic purge, and other aspects of the zaibatsu dissolution program. It was not to be. The inflationary crisis in the economy overshadowed everything. In a remarkable memorandum to General Whitney at the end of October, he argued that monthly inflation rates of 70 and 80 percent were the result of conscious and deliberate policies of the zaibatsu and government leaders.

Whenever possible the Japanese authorities . . . are attempting to maximize government outgo. Virtually every section in SCAP . . . can produce examples of padded budgetary allotments for which approval has been sought. These authorities are at the same time attempting to minimize income. [For example] permitting normal taxes to be paid from relatively worthless restricted deposits. Price rises for commodities are not only permitted by the Japanese authorities whenever possible but are actually fostered by them. The most recent example is the case of rice . . . .

Finally and despite expressed policy, the Japanese government was sharing scarce raw materials among all users rather than channeling supplies to plants which were essential. As a result, the favored companies were seeking larger profits by remaining idle, speculating in raw materials, and concentrating on rehabilitating their plants to build up their equity. Although there were SCAP directives and Japanese laws and ordinances prohibiting all of these corrupt and inflationary practices, none of them were enforced.

Bisson linked the government’s deliberate inflationary policies to a campaign by the Old Guard to sabotage the democratic objectives of the Occupation. Unless SCAP acted quickly, he warned, one of the first casualties of the inflation would be the zaibatsu dissolution program. The various tax levies and indemnities against the big stockholders in the zaibatsu companies that were part of the dissolution program had become practically meaningless as businessmen simply pad the government in increasingly devalued yen. Holders of these zaibatsu stock were also reaping additional gain by the upward evaluation of their assets as the inflation progressed. And economic conditions in general were causing the liquidation or absorption of numerous small firms. “In the aftermath of an inflationary bout,” Bisson concluded, “the largest and strongest” firms, namely the zaibatsu combines, would emerge as powerful as they ever were, SCAP dissolution program or not.

Other SCAP reform efforts were also being undermined by the inflation, Bisson felt. “For the wage and salary earner, the effects of the present inflation are already serious: they would be disastrous if it became a runaway inflation.” He accurately predicted a wave of labor disputes and strikes. In short, as inflation weakened labor and generated unrest while strengthening the economic power of the old ruling elements, it was necessarily thwarting the proclaimed SCAP objective of establishing a stable and popularly controlled government.

Although Bisson gained the support of many within SCAP
for a detailed and carefully integrated economic stabilization program with provisions for adequate enforcement, a month of meetings and discussion with General Courtney Whitney and MacArthur proved fruitless. SCAP recognized the seriousness of the inflationary problem, Whitney wrote in a curt statement, but it was "thought that the Japanese government should have exclusive responsibility for the necessary stabilization measures." 26

Just as Bisson had predicted, the inflationary crisis quickly grew worse and spilled over into the most serious political confrontation of the Occupation. A broad coalition of labor unionists, socialists, and communists—5 million strong—called for a general strike to be held on February 1, 1947, as the culmination of a campaign against the Yoshida Cabinet and its economic policies. On his own initiative, Bisson argued within SCAP "in favor or permitting the general strike," recalled Chief of Labor Division Theodore Cohen. Cohen resented the advice. "I told him [Bisson] he was crazy. It was impossible to have a general strike and still have a continuing government." 27 At the eleventh hour, MacArthur intervened to forbid the strike, defending his action on the economic grounds that the strike would have damaged the economy. But such an argument, Bisson felt, "blankly ignored the more basic fact that the source of the economy's trouble lay primarily in the Yoshida Cabinet's reckless spending policies." 28

One of the fallouts of the aborted general strike was MacArthur's announcement that there would be another national election in April. For Bisson that would be his last remaining hope for a government committed to democratizing Japan. "With luck," he wrote home, the effects of the purge laws and the unpopularity of the Yoshida Cabinet, "could produce a liberal Diet and in turn a decently progressive Cabinet. This is the sine qua non. If the present Cabinet, or one like it continues to hang on, most of our reforms will be vitiated. If a liberal Cabinet comes in, much may yet be salvaged." By "liberal" Bisson meant the election of the Social Democrats, the only moderately left-wing party with enough popular strength to win power. A combination of factors seemed to give the Social Democrats an edge in the forthcoming election. Popular resentment against the conservatives was still strong, the Old Guard parties were split into two competing parties, and the Social Democrats under Tetsu Katayama were united. 29 But SCAP actions two weeks before the election, Bisson argued at the time and later, had the net effect of staving off the worst for the old-line political leaders. Incredibly, MacArthur granted Yoshida permission to revise the very election law SCAP had earlier sponsored in a way that allowed for a small constituency single-ballot voting in which rich party coffers had the maximum effect. SCAP officials were fully aware of the consequences for the upcoming election of Yoshida's proposal, noting that it was "in comparison to the existing system, definitely advantageous to the parties now in power, and unfavorable to minority representation and to women." According to Japanese newsmen, the revision of the election law alone cost the Social Democrats an estimated 50 seats in the lower House of the Diet and meant that they lost the possibility of forming their own Cabinet. 30 In the final outcome, Socialist Prime Minister Tetsu Katayama led a weak and squabbling coalition Cabinet for eight months, wrestling throughout with the worst phase of the inflationary spiral, and surrendering to the return of uninterrupted conservative rule in Japan to this day.

Even before the April election which he observed in Kawasaki, the birthplace of his wife, Bisson was personally and politically anxious to leave Japan. The solid friendships he had developed with Canadian diplomat and Japan scholar E. Herbert Norman and others no longer compensated for the increasing frustration of his work and the long and unanticipated separation from his family. Though not mentioned in his letters, there was also another factor. Bisson and the so-called "New Dealers" in the Occupation were being increasingly hounded by G-2 men.

The longstanding conflict within GHQ between G-2 and GS broke out into virtual civil war after General Willoughby circulated the results of his staff investigations on "left-wing penetration of GHQ." The G-2 reports, dated January 15, 1947, focused primarily on GS personnel, including Bisson. Drawing on the findings of the Dies Committee investigation of the Board of Economic Warfare, FBI information on Amerasia, and early China Lobby charges against the IPR, G-2 concluded that prior to coming to Japan Bisson was "at least a sympathizer" if not a member of the Communist Party. Since he was hired by GS, "Bisson has worked hard to lower confidence in the Yoshida Cabinet and evidence can be cited to prove the fact that he is the main person who formed the left-wing group within GS." G-2 found Bisson to have had contact with the "left-wing cell" in the Tokyo Press Club which included Mark Gayn (Chicago Sun-Times) and Gordon Walker (Christian Science Monitor). "Moreover Bisson also had a very close relationship with Andrew Jonah Grazhdantsev [Grad] who is . . . well known as having extreme left-wing views." Bisson and Grad, the report claimed, were members of the leftist IPR and held their GS positions on the recommendation of Edward C. Carter, "well-known as a communist sympathizer." Finally G-2 charged Bisson with leaking secret information to his closest Japanese friend, Harvard-trained economist Shigeto Tsuru, who "had been arrested before the war by the Japanese police by reason of liaison activities with the Japanese Communist Party." Ignoring the enraged protests of GS personnel, Willoughby defended the report on Bisson and others for presenting facts that were "irreversibly true. I insist there are subversive elements in this headquarters. We are exposed to the danger of international spy activity and its regional strategy [in Japan]." 31

Occupation Critic

From this poisoned atmosphere of SCAP Bisson finally escaped in April 1947. He had been in regular correspondence with William Holland, research director of IPR, about both reorganizing a Japanese Council of IPR and research and academic opportunities in the United States. Through Holland's good offices Bisson obtained a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation during 1947 and a position as a visiting lecturer at the University of California at Berkeley, Department of Political Science, beginning in the fall of 1948. 32 For six years
after his return from Japan Bisson continued to write numerous articles and reviews and finished two books—outgrowths of his Occupation experience and probably his most important writings. 

Prospects for Democracy in Japan, published in 1949 under IPR auspices, was a deft, hard-hitting critique of U.S. Occupation policy up until mid-1948. In the welter of self-congratulatory, "success story" literature by American students of the Occupation, Bisson’s Prospects stood as one of the few significant works until the late 1960s to question seriously American policy and the meaning of Japanese democracy. Based on his first-hand observations in Japan, Bisson concluded that the United States

failed to achieve the announced democratic aims of its initial post-surrender policy toward Japan, primarily because those aims could not be achieved through the instrumentality of Japan’s old guard. With the economic machinery of Japan left in the hands of Japanese bent on sabotaging industrial recovery, there was a continued financial drain on the United States... This situation gave American Army and banking interests a plausible excuse to deplore the heavy financial burden... Instead of urging that SCAP cease to rely on the old regime and endeavor to develop a genuinely new and democratically-minded leadership in both government and industry, the [American] military-industrial interests rep-

resented by the [mission of General William Draper, a vice-

president of the Wall Street firm Dillon, Read] took a very different stand. Their proposed solution of the problem was to restore Japan to what was, in essence, her pre-World War II industrial status, with one notable difference, Japan’s economic life would continue to be ruled by the Zaibatsu... but henceforth American capital would be a partner of the Zaibatsu in prewar-style international cartels, or would simply take over certain key Japanese industries by means of large direct investments.

Although American capital would never play quite the dominant role in Japan which Bisson predicted, clearly he did not think that prospects for real democracy in Japan after 1949 were very good. It was self-evident that the United States bore major responsibility for the fact.

The American-Japanese

'Co-Prosperity Sphere'

Volume 6, No. 1, January-March 1974

by T. A. Bisson
The last and best known of Bisson’s books, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan*, was also the most scholarly and politically cautious. Published in 1954, it is a *tour de force* of economic and political analysis replete with tables and statistics carefully illustrating each argument. Following a historical survey of the growth and political influence of the zaibatsu up to surrender, Bisson emphasized the inherent social and political weaknesses of the Occupation-sponsored dissolution program and hence the relative ease with which zaibatsu executives and their allies evaded its most significant aspects. Though seeking to rid Japan of the despotic power of a small privileged group over economic life, the dissolution program rested on concepts of free enterprise and individualism that had no popular roots in Japan. Not a single political party during the occupation supported it. The conservative Liberal and Democratic parties that dominated post-war Japanese politics paid only lip service to free enterprise ideology and the principle of dissolution; they were historically the parties of the zaibatsu combines and wedded by habit and self-interest to a monopolistic business order. The Communists and the Social Democrats, the two other major parties, also opposed the free-enterprise program. The Social Democrats (the “only real democrats in Japan, as the occupation defined the term”) who had the potential for gaining and holding control of the government favored dealing with the zaibatsu combines through a program of public ownership. In choosing to dissolve rather than nationalize the zaibatsu combines American policy makers destroyed the SocialDemocrats *raison d’etre* and played into the hands of the leaders of the Liberals and Democrats who believed that the combines stood the best chance of survival under a dissolution program.15

The core of *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* is a detailed analysis of how conservative business and government leaders in Japan, aided after 1947 by their counterparts in the United States, effectively emasculated the original dissolution program. The Occupation did score heavily in cutting away the monopolistic power of the ten leading zaibatsu families and the holding companies at the apex of the Japanese corporate pyramid. But the net effect of even these most thoroughly carried out phases of the larger reform was far less drastic than appeared. By 1952, “the old networks had emerged in recognizable form [and] new concentration of economic power had taken the place of the old.” A look at the extensive redistribution of the shares of the holding companies and some of their subsidiaries, for example, showed that, early SCAP efforts at dispersal notwithstanding, there was an increasing trend toward concentration of stock ownership as the Occupation ended. In 1951, eight per cent of stockholders held 68 per cent of all shares.36 Management control, Bisson also concluded, rested in the hands of these large stockholders. The Occupation effort to purge top business executives had been only partially successful. It never touched on the influence which purged business leaders, working behind the scenes, continued to exert on the policies of their successors. When the depurging began in 1949, these men “returned with greater rather than less prestige” to their old positions and began publicly attacking the whole dissolution program.37

If ownership and management had not changed much by the end of the Occupation, neither had the most important part of the corporate structure, the large operating subsidiaries just below the holding companies. Prewar American investors in Japan, backed by an alarmed group of former Wall Street bankers in key policy-making positions in Washington, undercut the implementation of the 1947 law for the break up of “excessive concentrations of economic power.” The old zaibatsu banks managed to escape deconcentration entirely. Though the big commercial banks were divorced from the industrial and commercial units of their old combines and renamed, Bisson accurately predicted that a handful of them were “in a position to substitute for the old top holding companies as a nucleus around which former subsidiaries could gather in the effort to retain or recapture unity of operation.”38 Deconcentration of industrial combines under the new law affected only a few firms and was not particularly severe. The following industrial groups were subjected to the deconcentration law, but by 1951 three firms in the pig iron industry accounted for 96 per cent of total output; three firms in the aluminum industry accounted for 100 per cent of total output; two firms in the glass industry accounted for 90 per cent of total output; and three firms in the beer industry accounted for 100 per cent of total output. Only the liquidation of trading firms, including the two largest ones, Mitsui Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoji, was vigorously carried out by Occupation authorities. But despite the 1948 Anti-Monopoly Law, a classic process of competition, bankruptcies, absorptions, and mergers occurred so that by mid-1952 nine trading firms dominated the field and concentration was still continuing. In fact the only question at the end of the Occupation concerning concentration in all sectors of the Japanese economy was how far the process of recombination would go.39

For Bisson, the Occupation dissolution program had clearly failed to create or maintain a competitive economy and new concentrations of wealth and power had emerged. Whatever changes the dissolution program had wrought in Japan’s business life, he contended, were “incidental rather than primary.” Without much elaboration, Bisson located the fundamental reason for this failure in the unwillingness of American policymakers to conduct “an operation seriously designed to shift political power into new hands.” The attempt to build a free enterprise economy through political parties linked to zaibatsu interests was doomed from the start.40

Admitting to the many difficulties of nationalizing industry and agreeing that the Social Democrats were not an ideal party, Bisson nevertheless concluded that public ownership and control of zaibatsu combines, mediated through the Social Democrats, “offered the best assurance available that the Occupation’s democratic objectives in business and in other respects would be attained.” The Occupation failed to gear its economic policy to the political reality that the Social Democrats, the largest popular party, favored nationalization not dissolution as the method for dealing with the zaibatsu. In adopting a dissolution program the Occupation “weighted the odds against the one party through which liberal political as well as economic change might have been achieved.”41 Left unsaid, though clearly implied, was that Yankee zaibatsu, through their influence on the Truman Administration, would never have consented to a program of nationalization or its political requisites in Japan.
The McCarren Committee Tragedy

Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan was written during the most difficult years of Bisson's life. Despite his outstanding record of publications and distinguished reputation as a scholar of contemporary Asia, Bisson might have felt vulnerable at Berkeley without the Ph.D. or tenure under ordinary circumstances. But beginning in 1949 circumstances at Berkeley and around the country for left-wing scholars, especially those in the Asia field, were far from ordinary. The collapse of Nationalist China, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb, the conviction of Alger Hiss for perjury, the outbreak of the Korean War, all provided ammunition to those anxious for a purge of "subversive" influences from American life. When the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee chaired by Senator Pat McCarren set out in 1951 to prove that the IPR had been a captive organization of the Communist Party (CP) with treacherous influence on American East Asian policy, Bisson inevitably was called to testify.²²

For two days at the end of March 1952 a hostile McCarran Committee questioned Bisson about his role in China Today, his trip to Yenan, what he knew of Philip Jaffe’s CP ties, why he had called Nationalist China "feudal" and Communist China "democratic" in a 1943 IPR publication, what his relationship was to Japanese Communists while serving in the Occupation, and much more. Senator James Eastland was not impressed by Bisson’s answers, accusing him of always turning up "on the red side of things." Once during Eastland’s questioning, Bisson lost his temper and said, "I have just been called a traitor." Eastland cut him off. "You have not been called a traitor, I said there was a question of whether you were a traitor."³³

A badly shaken Bisson could not put the Washington experience and the attendant publicity behind him. State Senator Hugh M. Burns, chairman of the California Un-American Activities Committee, subpoenaed Bisson in the fall of 1952 for a one day closed session at the State capitol. "After Sacramento," his wife recalled, "Arthur looked horrible. The nervous tension had built up so."⁴⁴ Undoubtedly, Bisson’s anxiety was related to the review by the Board of Regents of the University of California of his contract for the 1953-54 academic year. According to the only written account of Bisson’s dismissal from JAPAN!

in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Vol. 5, No. 3 (1973): Herbert P. Bix, "Regional Integration: Japan and South Korea in America’s Asian Policy.",

Brett Nee, "Sanya: Japan’s Internal Colony."


Vol. 10, No. 2 (1978): SPECIAL FOCUS ON JAPAN with works by Noriko Mizuta Lippit, Miyamoto Yuriro, Herbert Bix, Howard Schonberger, Barton Bernstein, Stephen Salaff, J.W. Dower, Alexander Kuo, Yuji Ichioka.

Bisson, in the spring of 1953 the Chairman of the Political Science Department was "ordered by the University Administration to release Bisson from the faculty." In all probability that order originated from the Board of Regents or a higher state official using undisclosed information supplied by California's "little HUAC" and the proceedings of the McCarran Committee.

At age 52, acceptance of his zaibatsu manuscript by the University of California Press in hand, T.A. Bisson found himself without a job and unable to get one. Everywhere he turned the doors were closed. After a year of odd jobs and unemployment, Bisson was hired by the small religious Western Women's College of Ohio in Oxford, long known to his wife and her family. There Bisson became chairman of the international relations program and one of the most popular professors on campus. After a year on the academic blacklist, he found it attractive to teach at Western even though he earned a far lower salary than at Berkeley and never again had the time or facilities for further major research.

Despite the trauma of the McCarran hearings and the loss of his job at Berkeley, Bisson did not swerve from his anti-imperialist political perspective. Occasionally he regained the old punch of his younger years. The U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam propelled Bisson into the anti-war movement sweeping college campuses. He sponsored the Inter-University Committee for Public Hearings on Vietnam, wrote a slashing critique of American policy in the widely distributed Public Affairs Pamphlet series, and contributed four pieces to the Western Round-Up, the student newspaper on his campus. In his last published work, which appeared appropriately in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in 1974, Bisson furiously assailed the "American-Japanese 'Co-Prosperity Sphere'" in Asia. The United States and Japan, he concluded, "pose as democracies, defenders of the "free world," but from end to end of the imperium they furnish arms and money to military dictators that betray local national interests, suppress the rights of free press and assembly, and shoot down students who seek to defend the true interests of country and people. [This] is not a matter only of Vietnam or Laos or Cambodia (it is just that in these cases imperialist force is directly applied), but also in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea where the ends desired can be achieved indirectly through the local military dictators. To the shame of all decent minded Americans, it is the United States that is the organizer and leader of this outrage, not only in its own right but also in carefully nursing Japan along so as to have a proper aide in handling the new co-prosperity sphere."

Even as his health deteriorated Bisson maintained a lively interest in current world affairs, particularly the struggles of all Third World peoples against the "modern imperial dispensation (of) the United States." But more and more Bisson turned in his final years to rereading literary classics from his vast home library, to enjoying the natural beauty of the Canadian homeland he adopted in 1969, and to gathering with his local friends who had little inkling of the reputation or controversies surrounding his life. At the age of 78 on July 7, 1979, Bisson died of heart failure in the Waterloo, Ontario area hospital.

The demise of the scholarly career of Thomas Arthur Bisson and the oblivion to which his writings were cast highlights the determination of American policymakers after 1947 to develop Japan as a counter-model to revolutionary China for the unstable and developing countries of Asia. Inevitably this task "required overtly or covertly enlisting America's Japan specialists in the task of cultural imperialism" and in providing a "selective portrayal" of Japanese history. For the Occupation period that meant emphasizing such aspects of Japanese developments as the creation of bourgeois parliamentary democracy and integration with international capitalism while concomitantly discrediting interpretations like those of Bisson that focused on the continuation from the pre-war period of unbalanced economic growth, inequality, exploitation, lack of freedom, even militarism.

It was hardly accidental that the conclusion of the peace and security treaties between the U.S. and Japan, locking Japan into the "free world" orbit, coincided with the McCarran hearings effort to paint as "Red" Bisson and many other of the best minds in the Asian field. The questions which Bisson asked, even the terms he used, were rendered taboo by the McCarran Committee assault. Subsequent Japan scholarship, heavily supported by the U.S. government, became preoccupied with the "successful" aspects of Japanese development and went about "creating a counter-ideology or counter theory to Marxism." Only recently, in the wake of the Vietnam War and rising fear of the American and Japanese imperiums, have Occupation "New Dealers" and leftist critics of the "New Japan" like T.A. Bisson begun to emerge from the long-neglected and buried history of the first generation of concerned Asian scholars.
NOTES

3. T.A. Bisson, East Asia Over Fifty Years; Selected Writings (unpublished manuscript, 1976), Preface (n.p.). Also T.A. Bisson and Faith Bisson interviews by author, Waterloo, Ontario, January 2, 3, 1978. (Hereafter Bisson interviews.)
6. Frederick Spencer, “Nanking Claps Hands with Japan,” China Today, October 1934; Frederick Spencer, “New Light on the Far Eastern ‘Problem,’” China Today, March 1936. The use of the pseudonym was necessitated by the “non-partisan” restrictions imposed by the FPA.
10. Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (Boston: Little Brown, 1945) and Andrew Roth, Dilemma in Japan (Boston: Little Brown, 1945). The Japanese Crowd considered these two books the Bibles of SCAP “New Dealers.” Lattimore and Roth were both friends of Bisson and deeply influenced by him.
16. T.A. Bisson, “Reform Years in Japan 1945-47: An Occupation Memoir,” (ca. 1975, unpublished manuscript), n.p. (Hereafter cited as Occupation Memoir). This manuscript is based primarily on a collection of over 100 letters Bisson exchanged with his wife while in Japan.
17. Ibid., pp. 38-45.
18. Ibid., p. 91.
19. Ibid., pp. 130-145.
20. Ibid., p. 102.
23. Ibid., pp. 352-358.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., p. 364.
29. Ibid., pp. 208-211.
32. T.A. Bisson to William Holland, September 22, 1946; William Holland to T.A. Bisson, December 4 and 20, 1946; T.A. Bisson to William Holland, October 31, 1946, Institute of Pacific Relations Papers, Columbia University, New York.
34. T.A. Bisson, Prospects for Democracy in Japan, pp. 130-133.
36. Ibid., pp. 202-203.
37. Ibid., pp. 158-179, 204.
38. Ibid., pp. 154-156, 205-206. See my ‘Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy’ Pacific Historical Review, v. 46, no. 3 (August 1977), pp. 322-359 for discussion of American role in reversal of deconcentration program and other reforms.
39. Ibid., pp. 208-213.
41. Ibid., pp. 51-57, 218.
44. Bisson interviews.
46. Bisson interviews.
47. Wesley R. Fishel and T.A. Bisson, The United States and Vietnam: Two Views (Public Affairs Pamphlet, August 1966), No. 391. Bisson’s piece was titled, “Why the United States Should Not Be in Vietnam.” The defense of American policy in Vietnam was authored by Wesley R. Fishel, head of the Michigan State University group in Vietnam during the 1960s which was exposed later as a CIA operation. The Western Round-Up articles by Bisson were “‘Vietnam—Escalation or Negotiation in Viet-Nam?’” (February 26, 1965); “On Michael’s Address” (December 10, 1965); “The Geneva Conference and After” (January 28, 1966); “Why Not Support the Vietnam War?” (April 28, 1967). These are all in T.A. Bisson, Selected Writings, Chapter 6.
49. T.A. Bisson, Selected Writings, pp. 370-71.
The Ingratitude of the Crocodiles
The 1978 Cambodian Black Paper

by Serge Thion
Translated by William Mahder

Our political bestiary is growing. One new entry is "the [Soviet] paper polar bear," whose mustache Deng Xiaoping tickled while "touching the [Vietnamese] tiger's buttocks." In a long document published in September 1978, the Cambodian government denounces the Vietnamese as being "even more ungrateful than crocodiles." Entitled Black Paper: Facts and Evidences of the Vietnamese Acts of Aggression and Annexation Against Kampuchea, this text airs the whole range of grievances of the Khmer communists against their former Vietnamese comrades. For this reason, it merits careful examination (since its authors are not usually very talkative) and a critical assessment of its implications.¹

The first chapter exposes "the annexationist nature of Vietnam" by arguing that, historically, the Vietnamese have never stopped trying to "devour" Cambodia. We are first told of the conquest of Champa, the Hinduized state close to Malay culture which ruled over what today is central Vietnam. Then came the conquest of the territories of the great South, the Mekong Delta, which had been under Khmer Suzerainty. This is not a difficult thesis to sustain. No one—certainly no Vietnamese—would dispute that the southern territories, what the Europeans later named Cochin China, were formerly part of the Khmer empire. However, this incontestable truth hardly seems to have been recalled out of concern for historical accuracy. To understand this centuries-old feature of Vietnamese history, this Drang nach Suden, we must remember that we are dealing with a feature of Chinese civilization which heavily conditioned Vietnamese civilization. For a long time this military and administrative expansion was carried out at the expense of the Vietnamese themselves in their Tonkin enclave. Besides wanting to occupy all the countries "between the four seas," the Chinese saw solid profit in maritime commerce and were irresistibly attracted by exotic objects from the South Seas. For evidence of this, one need only refer to the excellent Sinologist, Edward Schafer.²

We should also remember that neither the Chams nor the Khmers of antiquity were just innocent victims. The Chams were tough; they carried out a naval expedition against Tonkin and even against Angkor, which they totally sacked. One can still see them waging war on the sculpted frescoes of the Bayon temple. The Khmer empire never missed a chance to expand at the Chams' expense or to impose a vassalage tax on them. The reason the Angkor empire decayed was a weakness in its political system. Its successors let its immense territory be broken up to the advantage of more enterprising neighbors, and, despite its much greater economic potential, it shrank away. It is rather paradoxical to see the Cambodian communists speaking the same old language as the defunct monarchy, as if to absolve it of its past incompetence and put the blame on its eternally evil

Attention

We have published a number of articles on the inter-communist conflicts of southeast Asia: Steve Heder (11:1), Torben Retboll (11:3), and Anthony Barnett, Laura Summers, Ben Kiernan (11:4). Here in Volume 12, No. 4, we print four more statements by Serge Thion (France), Gareth Porter (Washington, D.C.), and again, Retboll and Kiernan (Denmark and Australia, respectively). We also wish to invite other readers to participate in this very important dialogue. We are seeking essays which present new evidence and documentation, approach the questions from a fresh perspective, and proceed in a comradely fashion.

The Editors
neighbors. The *Black Paper* wishes to convince us that the reason Vietnamese are expansionist is because of some mysterious "nature." As if Cambodians were not expansionist when they had the means.

To take just a few details: "The Cham race was totally exterminated by the Vietnamese" (p. 3). The defeat and annexation of Champa in the 17th century certainly entailed major massacres. Nonetheless, a population of Chams numbering in the tens of thousands still lives in Vietnam today. Despite undeniable pressure to assimilate, they exist. They existed in even greater numbers in Cambodia, since many Chams sought refuge there after losing their independence. This community, which had converted to Islam, dominated certain areas of the country and totalled roughly 200,000 people. It suffered a lot from the Indochina War; some of its leaders went along with the shady games of Lon Nol, who dreamed of re-establishing Cambodian influence over the high plateau of Vietnam by using the Chams as intermediaries with their Montagnard cousins. Other Chams took an active part in the resistance. The Pol Pot regime apparently was suspicious of them and forbade them not only to practice their religion (which happened to all Cambodians), but also to dress in their customary way. Above all, the regime's officials assert that their country is 99 percent Khmer, thus denying the very existence of the Chams, the hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Sino-Khmers, the small groups of Burmese and Laotians, the Montagnards and other Khmer minorities (Kuy, Pear, Samre, etc.). Here, allegedly, is a happy country without any problem of "national minorities."

Another revealing point: the *Black Paper* says that in 1715 the Vietnamese "through their adventurers practically controlled" the Cochinchina provinces of Ha Tien and Rach Gia to which it gives their old Khmer names as it does to the other provinces of what is now South Vietnam (p. 4). Perhaps it was distraction that caused them to neglect one important bit of information: these adventurers were Chinese emigres fleeing the new Manchu dynasty; and their leaders carved out a personal fiefdom in those underdeveloped regions at the tip of the peninsula. Intriguing with both courts, Cambodian and Vietnamese, they ended up under the banner of Hue. The Chinese, all kinds of Chinese, have always been present, in all sorts of ways, in this area. There has not been a political game played out there within the last 2000 years that has not had the local Chinese mixed up in it—and with Zong-guo, the Middle Kingdom, always watchful of what is going on across its borders.

For the authors of the *Black Paper* to say (ibid., p. 4) that the "whole nation and people of Kampuchea have always fought against Vietnamese invasions and annexations" is to throw a crude veil over all the requests for intervention, addressed to both Bangkok and Hue, by Khmer princes fighting for the throne. When all is said and done, national sentiment is a rather recent thing in Cambodian history, and the little survey of the past presented in the *Black Paper* is a web of anachronisms.

The most surprising thing in this rewriting of history is perhaps the attribution to the Vietnamese of the measures taken by the French colonial authorities to unite (with their colony, Cochin China) territories or islands which had belonged to Cambodia or had in fact escaped any political suzerainty, like the highlands of South Vietnam. The French authorities obviously saw an advantage in expanding the colony—a political structure they had well under control—at the expense of the protectorates (Cambodia, Annam, Tonkin), where, especially at the beginning, they had only superimposed themselves on an indigenous authority which was still endowed with its ancient legitimacy. According to the *Black Paper*, "The process used by the Vietnamese consisted of nibbling away at the territories, encroaching upon the borders and purely and simply establishing geographical maps by themselves. In fact all agents of the cadastral department were Vietnamese. The French just signed" (p. 7). It is hard to believe that the same people who had this finicky and strict French colonial government on their backs could imagine it so naive. As in a good many other places in this document, we see here a veritable political paranoia, which attributes to its evil neighbor all the ills of the universe.

A small paragraph entitled "The sordid use of Vietnamese girls" is an example of this.

The French called Kampuchea Krom [or lower, Southern Cambodia] "Cochinchine." This name is made up of the Vietnamese words Co-Chin-Xin. "Co" means "Miss," "Chin" is the name of a girl, and "Xin" means "ask for." Thus, "Co-Chin-Xin" means "Miss China asks for..."

The *Black Paper* goes on to tell the story of a Khmer king who married a daughter of the sovereign of Annam who is supposed to have requested permission in 1623 for his compatriots to settle in the Saigon area to do business. The Annamites soon thereafter colonized the area, according to the *Black Paper*, and the Vietnamese army came in to put the finishing touches to the occupation in 1699.3

The interesting thing is not that this account is a mixture of historical facts and legends. Rather, it is that this kind of episodic word game is given as irrefutable proof of the "sordid use" of young girls. The translation of the three Vietnamese words is in fact correct (disregarding the tones). The problem is that the word "Cochinchine" is not Vietnamese! It came into French usage from Portuguese, the language of the first European navigators in this area of the world. We know, moreover, that it designated different parts of the Indochina coast—Tonkin and Annam—and that the French use of the term in the 19th century extended it to central and southern Vietnam, to the point where the delta region was called "basse Cochinchine" [lower Cochin China]. The term "basse" went out of use because Annam, (from the old Sino-Vietnamese name that the Empire was given before the 19th century) became the customary name of the Center.

But the Portuguese must have found this name somewhere. In fact, its origin is given by one of the first Western travelers in the country, the Jesuit Father Christoforo Borri. In 1618 he wrote:

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A lot of smart pedants straightaway renounced the dirty colonialist word Cambodia for a rejuvenated Kampuchea, free of its past, for better or worse. Can such a grotesque rush to this cheap symbol be attributed to ignorance?
But having worked their way into Annam with the aid of the Japanese to do business there, the Portuguese, from the same word Cocî [=Cochî] of the Japanese and from this other word, Cîna [=China] created a third, word, Cocîncîna, applying it to that kingdom as if they had said Cocîn of China to distinguish it better from Cîna [=Cochin], a city in India also frequented by the Portuguese.4

As for the first part of the word, one can recognize the Japanese pronunciation of the two characters that the Chinese pronounced Kiao Che and the Vietnamese Giao Chi. This was the name of the Viet country, i.e., approximately Tonkin, at the time of the Chinese colonization, the first ten centuries of our era. To be more precise, this was the name of the capital of the Chinese protectorate, probably in the Hanoi area. It was customary to call a country by the name of its capital or the dynasty that ruled it. This is how the name “China” came to us.

### The lack of eagerness, not to say complete inertia, of the Vietnamese Communist Party leaders about making public the basic documents of their relations with the Khmers is regrettable. All there is in the Kampuchea Dossiers I and II published in Hanoi in 1978 is emotional reportage, virtuous editorials and diplomatic notes. The heart of the problem is systematically side-stepped. The Black Paper has innumerable defects, but at least it has the merit of trying to recount the history of relations between the two communist parties, in abundant detail. It is a partial, biased history which nonetheless carries weight because of its ounce of truth compared with the awkward silence from Hanoi.

Let us spend a moment on this problem of appellations. There are some linguistic usages that are particularly revealing. The reader will have noticed that I continue to use the word “Cambodia.” In the constitution they gave the country on January 5, 1976, the victors of 1975 baptized their state “Democratic Kampuchea,” rejecting the term republic, which was too closely associated with Lon Nol, and at the same time renouncing the principle of a kingdom. They did not spell out their reasons but in the documents translated by them, the word “Cambodia” has not reappeared.

A lot of smart pedants straightaway renounced the dirty colonialist word Cambodia for a rejuvenated Kampuchea, free of its past, for better or worse. Can such a grotesque rush to this cheap symbol be attributed to ignorance? Who can not see that Cambodia and Kampuchea are one and the same word, that they simply come from different phonetic contexts? When what used to be French Sudan rebaptized itself Mali, albeit a historical mistake (the Mali Empire was in another part of West Africa), this was at least a real change, the recovery of a political past which had been abolished by a colonial presence. But the Cambodia case is nothing like this. The term Kambuja is found in Sanskrit writings around the seventh and eighth centuries, when the ruling dynasty settled in Angkor. Previously, the country had been known only by the name given it in Chinese annals, Chen La.

The Portuguese navigators again tried to find a written form that corresponded to what they had heard, and came up with Cambogia. The first French missionary in the country tried to do the same thing: in 1783, he wrote “Kamphoxa.”5 It was the French version of the Portuguese transcription that was adopted by the first travelers and Orientalists. But also, how can one render the true sound of the Khmer word? The transcription “Kampuchea” is just about as far removed from the original. It is an approximation which, moreover, has been in use for a very long time. Prince Sihanouk, who often mixes French and Khmer in his speeches, had used it quite a lot. Similarly, he named a monthly magazine that he ran Kambuja, which is the Sanskrit transcription later modified to suit Cambodian phonetics. Should we end this squabble over transcriptions by proposing a new one just a bit closer to the original, and henceforth write “Kamp­pouchti”?6

As to the origins and meaning of the word itself, we are rather in the dark. Khmer myths claim a certain Kambu as an eponymous ancestor who is said to have united with a serpent goddess. There are many reasons to think that this is a case of the Khmers remoulding mythical material which, like much of the local culture, originates in India. Although we do not know anything about the local origins of this name, in the geography of classical India it is quite well known that there was a region of the northwest periphery, perhaps roughly what is Afghanistan, named Kamboja. It seems highly probable the Indianization, reinforced by the subsequent diffusion of Buddhism, transferred to Southeast Asia a geographic representation based on India and its Gangetic center. (The name Mekong is probably a doublet of Ganges.) In his remarkable work on Cambodian chronicles, Michael Vickery demonstrates the existence of this transfer by the fact that other regions of Burma and Thailand were called Kamboja during certain periods: “What is certain is that in medieval Burmese and Thai traditions “Kamboja” does not refer to Cambodia, and that the confusion is not due to the fact that the Khmers once ruled over central and southern Siam, as Coedes believed, but rather results from the displacement of classical geography.”7

One could give a thousand examples of this kind of phenomenon. Greeks and Romans easily transposed their own toponyms to the peoples they subjugated. The Crusades brought us a good number of Biblical place-names which became scattered over the map of Europe. Europe’s colonial expansion littered the world map with New Scotlands, New Hebrides, New Caledonias, New Yorks, New Amsterdams, etc., not to mention the bewildering toponymy of the United States. That the Northwest part of classical India should thus be transferred at an early time to the Northwest of what was undoubtedly the first center of Hinduization in the Indochina peninsula, in the lower Mekong Delta, seems highly probable. This is how history mocks fledging nationalisms. After all, what does France owe a few handfuls of Germanic warriors who crossed the Rhine in 454? Nothing, just its name.
Before finishing with these name traps, I would like to focus for a moment on a statement in the Black Paper:

*Yuon is the name given by Kampuchea’s people to the Vietnamese since the epoch of Angkor and it means “savage.” The words “Vietnam” and “Vietnamese” are very recent and not often used by Kampuchea’s people.* (p. 9)

All press commentators, without exception, have adopted this assertion that the ordinary name used by the Khmers to refer to their neighbors is pejorative. This fits perfectly with the assertion, also repeated a thousand times, of the hereditary antagonism that divides them. Not very convinced, I questioned various Cambodians. Apart from the word “Viet,” which is a foreign word (like the French term “les Britiches”), there is no other word besides “yuon” in Khmer to refer to the Vietnamese. Moreover, no one finds the word pejorative in itself. It designates in a neutral way—but the connotation is obviously the reflection of the sentiments of the speakers towards the Vietnamese. And with things as they are... .

Though I do not know if it is mentioned in the Angkor inscriptions (Cambodia and Vietnam did not have a common border then since Champa was between them), the antiquity of the term can be accepted. It exists in Thai, and Cham. This is where we can find the key to it, thanks again to Edward Schafer:

> In a few villages of Binh Thuan in southern Vietnam, no longer in touch with their former Chinese neighbors, are the remnants of the once rich and powerful Chams, now trifling enclaves among the Vietnamese, whom they contemptuously style yu’o’n—that is, Yavana (to use the Sanskrit original), or, ultimately, ‘Ionians’—a term suggesting subnormal, devilish men.

These inhabitants of Iona, or Ionaka (i.e., Ionia, Greece), cropped up rather abruptly on the borders of the Indus, brought there by Alexander in 326 B.C. The commotion was felt in the border zones. This is alluding here to the refugees who fled the escalation of the war in South Vietnam that followed the introduction of American combat units. This paragraph, which describes the settling of the Vietnamese, contains a phrase which I find interesting: “If measures had not been taken, they would have totally annexed the districts of Saang and Koh Thom.” (p. 7)

Naturally, the Black Paper never states what everyone knows, which is that Vietnamese nationals were almost all expelled from Cambodia immediately after the Communist Party took power. They are estimated to have totalled 300,000, of whom some were evacuated by special river convoys which came from Vietnam for this purpose. But the reference to Saang, which is not far from Phnom Penh, recalls another evacuation, the one Lon Nol troops provoked in 1970 when they launched their anti-Vietnamese pogroms. Saang had been taken by the guerrilla forces and, to get it back, General Sosthenes Fernandez’ troops advanced behind rows of Vietnamese hostages from the local Catholic community. The others were shoved into camps. Does the Black Paper, in recalling “the

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measures taken" to avoid "the total annexation" of Saang, wish to congratulate the Lon Nol regime?

Another practice of the Vietnamese which the Black Paper later re-examines at length is "the use of the flag of the revolution." There must be reasons for the relentlessness of their evil neighbors. First of all, of course, there is poverty. These Cambodians—the ultranationalists who wrote the Black Paper—whose country is one of the poorest in the area, whose agriculture is distinguished by its archaic techniques and by yields which are among the lowest in the world, believe themselves to be the object of economic desire. Let us return to the political factor:

As they had made the revolution, the Vietnamese enjoyed some prestige in Southeast Asia. At that time, the international community gave them aid and support. Europe supported them. China helped and supported them. The Vietnamese have taken advantage of this support and used it as political support in order to carry out their scheme of expansion and annexation. They wanted to dominate all of "Indochina"... They want to take possession of Kampuchea in order to use her as a springboard for their expansion in Southeast Asia..." (pp. 10-11).

The Black Paper mentions an anecdote: in 1965, at the time of the first visit by a CPK (Khmer Communist Party) delegation to a foreign country, the Khmers say they called Ho Chi Minh "Comrade President," which reportedly made him and his entourage livid with anger: the Vietnamese insisted he be called "Uncle Ho."

A strange story. It is hardly possible to reconstruct the real incident which lies behind this delirious account. But we can see that the Khmers thus want to reject any avuncular relationship. In their relations with the Cambodian communists and with the Cambodians in general, the Vietnamese always managed to avoid a slightly paternalistic attitude to which solidly-rooted prejudices might easily have made them prone? I do not think so. In this story, as in many others, in the Black Paper and in other documents, there are traces of hurt feelings. The blame lies with the Vietnamese, who were always stronger.

We all know that relations between communist powers are generally characterized by flippancy of cynicism. The revelation of Sino-Soviet relations and the Yugoslav stories about the 1948 confrontation taught us a lot. The way the Chinese dumped the Albanians, like brushing an insect off their sleeve, set off some interesting revelations in Tirana. Around 1965 and later, the Vietnamese would have needed an almost inconceivable supply of urbanity to treat their Khmer comrades without a hint of condescension, given their own prestigious past, long experience of struggle and political-military resources that bear no comparison with the several hundred ragged guerrillas, who had experienced more hardship than success. In an April 1970 internal document, an officer from a Viet Cong-North Vietnamese security unit stationed in Cambodia notes that

* Sosthenes Fernandez belongs to a very tiny minority of Christians descending from Khmer-Iberic marriages in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Finally, after the economic and political factors, comes the military factor: the Vietnamese need a powerful base to subjugate Southeast Asia. "One might object that the Vietnamese have no possibility of building up military bases, because they are not as rich as the United States imperialists" (p. 11). But, the Black Paper goes on, they created their own armies in the neighboring countries. "In Kampuchea, for instance, between 1946 and 1954, they had several times created separately an army composed of Khmers in their pay in order to use them as a tool of their policy of annexation" (ibid.). This phrase gives a curious feeling of deja-vu. This is not only Sihanouk's thesis, but was also that of the French military command in Indochina, which found the fact that the Vietminh came to attack them in Cambodia as well as in Vietnam in poor taste and used to denounce their "Annamization."*8

To avoid a long digression, suffice it to recall here that there was no revolutionary Khmer movement apart from the one involved with the Vietminh, and which was largely Vietminh-trained and officered. The communists of the time participated fully in it and the young intellectuals who were studying in Paris during this period, and who had joined the French Communist Party (PCF), wanted to send a delegation to the rebels. The delegation went and some of the presumed authors of the Black Paper played a role in it. This army "composed of Khmers" was "separate" only for the Cambodian right and its French protectors. This kind of declaration, which borders on the absurd, also represents a rather curious reversal of perspective. After the Khmer guerrilla delegation was denied right of representation at Geneva, with the agreement of the Eastern countries (first given by Zhou Enlai), the Communists' hopes relied entirely on the tenuous thread of proletarian internationalism, i.e., that the foreign policy of the countries called socialist might guarantee the Geneva Accords and thus the political representation of the Khmer left. They looked to Hanoi for this safeguard but nothing came. The international context, the difficulties in launching collectivization and, in an inverse and complementary way, the opportunities to construct a bureaucracy, all were such that the VCP (Vietnamese Communist Party) was in no way inclined to take risks at that time, or for its brothers in the South, alone against Diem's repression. The former resistance fighters in the South were hunted down and cornered before they could precipitate a movement and thus force the Hanoi leadership to accept its existence. It was then taken over by high-ranking cadres dispatched to the South, five years after Geneva.

In South Vietnam this bitterness and deception which followed Geneva were erased. But this was not the case in Cambodia. The VCP did not commit itself to action until after the coup d'etat of March 18, 1970. In the meantime, the Khmer communists had lost trust in them. Today we can see that they have also lost their memory of those difficult times.
Chapter II of the Black Paper deals with “Ho Chi-Minh’s Indochinese Communist Party’s” strategy of an Indochina federation. “The choice of the name of a party has its political significance,” it says, after stating that “The Vietnamese Party was founded in 1930, under the name of the ‘Indochinese Communist Party.’” (p. 16) This is false. It is not very difficult to find out that the party founded in February 1930 came from regrouping three Communist cells, all Vietnamese, which the Comintern had asked to unite. Nguyen Ai Quoc, the future Ho, did the federating and gave the new party the name “Vietnamese Communist Party.” It was later, in November on Comintern orders and herded along by Tran Phu, a militant fresh from Moscow who was to be elected Secretary General, that the party changed its name and became “Indochinese.” The Comintern’s directive was clearly aimed at unifying the different groups which were challenging each other for recognition by the “Center”; this recognition only came in April 1931, after Moscow was satisfied that the program conformed to Comintern strategy.10 From Moscow’s point of view, it would have seemed absurd to decree the existence of one party or of several different parties for a territory which drew its unity from colonialization. There were certainly social, cultural, linguistic and even national differences, but what country is devoid of them? Entities like the Soviet Union, China, India and Indonesia were endowed with a single party, even if, like India or Indonesia, they did not have a tradition of a centralized state. The decision to create a single party for Indochina seems to have been determined by ordinary common sense. And perhaps, moreover, we should not expect a Moscow bureaucrat of the time to distinguish between a Vietnamese and a Cambodian. Even today any Asian in the streets of Moscow runs a heavy risk of being considered a dangerous “Chink.”

Though scornful of these details, the Black Paper correctly notes that the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) statutes called for the creation of a “totally independent Indochina,” but it neglects to mention that the phrase is followed, in the 1930 text, by the following formula: “Indochina to be completely independent; National self-determination to be recognized,”11 phrases which certainly lack precision, and which can even be considered standard clauses (we know what happened to Menshevik Georgia, which was self-determined by the Red Army in February 1921); but if one wants to go back to the texts to prove intent, one must recognize that those which date from the foundation of the party prove only one thing: the Indochinese colonial space was the space of the anti-colonial struggle. The future lay in the “institution of the power of worker and peasant soviet,” which is still being awaited, in Vietnam as well as in Cambodia.

From the time it was formed, the Communist Party won out over the traditional and bourgeois nationalist movement in Vietnam. This is why in August 1945, when Japan’s attempt at hegemony collapsed, it was in an excellent position to present itself and be welcomed as the representative of national legitimacy. The VCP is one of the few communist parties, along with those in Yugoslavia and China, to bring off this feat; bourgeois nationalism was never again to succeed in challenging the party’s plans, and in 1975 was forced to leave the scene, completely discredited. On the other hand, this ability to ride nationalism limits control to the territory of the nation in question. The Indochinese Communist Party, by the very principle that served at its impetus, had to confine itself to Vietnam. The Black Paper notes that it was totally absent from Cambodia from 1930 to 1945, but it is indifferent to the fact that after 1951, when the ICP split up into three national parties (of which two, the Lao and the Khmer were rather embryonic), the Vietnamese never again spoke of an “Indochina Federation.” Coming from bureaucrats known for their obsession with compiling report after report, the fact seems significant to me.

The war against the French made the whole of Indochina a theatre of operations. The Black Paper is entirely correct in reminding us that, in Cambodia, operations on the Vietminh side were directed by a Vietnamese committee presided over by Nguyen Thanh Son. The country was divided into several operational zones and an intense effort at political organization was carried out among the Khmer population. It had some success, which contradicts those who believe in the supposed hereditary hatred between Khmers and Vietnamese. It needs to be said again that whether in 1885, 1950, 1970, or, it seems to me (at least in certain areas), in 1980, Khmers and Vietnamese have fought side by side against their enemies, the French, then the Americans, and now Pol Pot. This is why, when the Black Paper states that the Vietminh, with a support base among some of the Khmers Krom in Cochinchina, “kidnapped several* Khmers in order to train and supervise them, with a view to furthering their strategy of an ‘Indochinese Federation’ in Kampuchea” (p. 16), we can not believe a word of it. This is just a logical trick to be able to say that, at the time of the Geneva Agreements, all the Khmer cadres in the resistance were Vietnamese puppets, trained in their school.

Curiously enough, the Black Paper does not mention one of the arrangements set out in the Accords: the re-grouping of the guerrilla forces and the departure for North Vietnam of some two to three thousand fighters. The main leader of the Khmer resistance at the time, the former monk Mean, alias Son Ngoc Minh, also went to Hanoi. All those men who came back to Cambodia from 1970 onwards and took up important positions in the war against the Lon Nol regime and the U.S. intervention are ignored here. Further on, they are called “agents” of the * The English-language version of the Black Paper has “many” instead of “several.”
Vietnamese, as if it were impossible for a Khmer militant to be persuaded that the general line of the Vietnamese revolution is correct, and even that it is the best in contemporary Indochina. The policy of denying cadres the right to make a free assessment of the situation, eliminating and “unmasking” these militants and in a good number of cases killing them has undoubtedly led to serious convulsions within the CPK, of which we find only a muffled echo in the Black Paper. In any case it is people who followed this trajectory who are now trying to run the government in Phnom Penh. Admittedly they arrived in Vietnamese army trucks, but this is because they had to flee their country and leave their organization in order to survive. If you want to drown your dog, you say it has rabies, but then you should not be surprised if it bites.

The end of this chapter surveys in broad outline the period 1954-1970. From the beginning of the 1960s on, this period was marked by the installation of Viet Cong elements on the Cambodian side of the border. This fact is universally known, although the Vietnamese, to my knowledge, have never explicitly acknowledged it. “We have not respected the territorial integrity of Cambodia,” says one of the internal documents cited above. All the Western intelligence agencies agreed that this “occupation” did not go deeper than a few kilometers, mostly in lightly populated areas. This is why the astronomical figures given by the Black Paper are so astounding: 150,000 Viet Cong in 1965 (undoubtedly the equivalent of the whole liberation army), 200,000 in 1966, “between 1.5 and 2 million” (p. 18) in 1970. This is totally absurd.

It is explained by an ingenious theory: the Viet Cong had a mistaken political-military line. “It consisted of waging the struggle on the spot,” of “controlling the population, and keeping them on the spot.” In the Southern part of Vietnam, the members of the Vietnamese party who lived in the strategic hamlets were all enlisted in the army of the Thieu clique. Seventy to eighty percent of the youth, members of the Vietnamese party’s organizations, were enlisted in the enemy’s army. The remaining 20 to 30 percent complied with the enemy and gave up the struggle. There was nobody to lead the struggle of the population who, as a whole, were under the control of the U.S. imperialists and the Thieu clique (p. 18). The Pentagon brass would surely have been delighted to learn this bit of news. Without going on about such blatant falsehoods, we can try to find out what they mean. To say that all the Vietnamese were stationed in Cambodia both prepares the way for the statement that they were only able to win the war thanks to the assistance of the Khmer communists, who can thus denounce the ungrateful crocodiles, and explains it by their mistaken line. The Khmer military officers did not try to keep the population on the spot; they evacuated them. In a war which, more than in Vietnam, had front lines, evacuation of the population from areas recently conquered or threatened amounted to political control. We know that this measure, applied to the entire urban population, served as an instrument of the specifically political victory. It is also the tactic used by the CPK resistance against the invasion of the Vietnamese army. It was also the tactic used by Kutuzov against Napoleon, but now it is the paddy-fields and bamboo, and without the Russian winter.

The Black Paper then lists the advantages the Vietnamese resistance fighters derived from being in Cambodia: sanctuaries, particularly for various leadership bodies; supplies bought on the spot or through the local government; communications; and especially supplies through the port of Kompong Som (Sihanoukville), which greatly lightened the perilous Ho Chi Minh Trail trade. These benefits were considerable, but they were due to a tacit agreement with the Sihanouk regime which could not help but reinforce the latter in its policy of repression of the left.

The chapter ends on an enigmatic point: “In 1966, the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK] consolidated and strengthened its position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, and clearly discerned the true nature of the Vietnamese.” (p. 22) To start with the chronological point, nothing of note happened in 1966. The CP, which only consisted of a few hundred stalwarts, had bases in a few rural and peripheral mountainous areas, but was not conducting armed struggle. Its leadership was in the Northeast—i.e., judging by the balance of power, under the protection of Viet Cong troops.
... les associations pour la libération nationale formées par :
1) les paysans,
2) les ouvriers,
3) les jeunes,
4) les militaires,
5) les femmes.

Un congrès national réuni au début de l'année 1941 adopta un pro-
gramme politique et un programme d'action que nous rééditons ici.

L'action du VIET MINH était entièrement orientée vers la libération de
l'Indochine de l'occupation japonaise. Pendant la guerre, ces représ-
entants s'étaient mis en relations avec le Gouvernement de Tchang-
Kiang et exprimé l'espoir que les Nations Unies reconnaîtraient leur
aspiration à l'indépendance et leur fourniraient une aide matérielle. De
son côté, le VIET MINH organisait le sabotage et la guérilla contre l'effort
de guerre japonais.

Après la victoire des Alliés dans le Pacifique, le VIET MINH arracha
des armes aux Japonais et parvint à se constituer une armée. Il prit le
pouvoir en renversant le gouvernement installé à Hué par les autorités
nippones en mars 1945 (1) et en déposant l'Empereur BAO-DAI.

Le nouveau Gouvernement s'établit à Hanoi, où il proclama l'indé-
pendance de la République du VIET NAM et un comité exécutif fut
nommé pour la zone sud, à Saigon. Le VIET MINH prit en main toute
l'administration du pays (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchine) et montra sa
popularité en organisant des manifestations monstres dont l'une, à Saigon,
réunit plus d'un million de personnes.

Ces faits peuvent étonner le public français, auquel la propagande
CÉLÉBRE DE LA PROPAGANDE
soit abandonné le problème de l'Indochine, soit qu'il puisse être
consideré comme un trait de mentalité franco-vietnamienne.

L'histoire du VIET MINH, qui représente la résistance indochinoise
de l'Indochine étant occupée depuis trois-quarts de siècle par les troupes
françaises, et le mouvement de libération, ne fait qu'une organisation plus
cohérente des mouvements qui existaient déjà avant la guerre et repré-
sentent la conscience politique du pays, dans ce qu'elle a de plus pro-
fond et de plus sincère. Le peuple annamite a vu clairement dès 1940
l'identité du fascisme et du colonialisme et la nécessité d'une lutte
pour un régime démocratique qui seul, peut lui assurer une indépendance
effective. Le VIET MINH concrétise la volonté unanime aussi bien de
la masse que de l'élite et un comité exécutif fut

DELEGATION GENERALE DES INDOCHINOIS
14, rue du Helder, PARIS (9°)

So why 1966 in particular? The previous year, a CPK
delegation headed by Saloth Sar, alias Pol Pot, went to Hanoi
for the first time. This was the beginning of massive U.S. troop
intervention in the South. One can assume that, despite their
confidence, the Vietnamese leaders were a bit worried by this.
They must have emphasized to their Khmer comrades the abso-
lute necessity of having elbow room in Cambodia, whose strat-
egic importance had become crucial. According to the CPK,
the Vietnamese at the time recommended patience, saying that
after victory in the South, which was certain, they would come
to their aid. In short, still the same post-Geneva line: stay calm;
we need the Sihanouk regime and when our national interests—
which are those of the revolution—are satisfied, we'll look out
for yours. But this attitude, disheartening as it must have been to
to people hiding out in the underground to survive, became even
more and more toned down. It is tempting to date the real
rupture from this period—by which I mean the Khmer com-
munists’ decision for a political line deliberately contrary to
what Hanoi wished. We have a CPK document which dates the
Central Committee’s decision to adopt the name “Communist
Party of Kampuchea” from September 1966. 12 If this analysis
is correct, CPK history as written today by Pol Pot must be consid-
ered a “revision.” The date 1960 that he gives as the origin of the
CPK’s independent line, but which no facts sup-
port, must be the date when a new generation of communists
moved into leadership positions, a generation which came out of
the experience with the French CP and only distinguished itself
slowly from the “Indochinese” past of the party set up in 1951.
The turning point of 1965 made them realize that they were
running a major risk of being sacrificed again, that continuing to
support Sihanouk’s policy of neutrality while being hunted
down by his henchmen was not a position that could be sus-
tained forever. Between the egoism of the Vietnamese and the
nationalism that was Sihanouk’s forte, only some sort of ultra-
nationalist leftist could provide a way out of the impasse into
which Indochinese solidarity led. The whole ambiguity of the
situation is summed up nicely in this sentence form the Black
Paper: “From 1967 on, the people and cadres vigorously op-
posed all these activities of the Vietnamese, but the leaders of
the Kampuchean revolution always recommended to them that
they develop solidarity and mutual aid with the Vietnamese”
(p. 19).

Chapter III in fact deals with “the struggle between Kam-
puchea and Vietnam over the question of the political line from
1954 to 1970.” The reasoning goes like this. There were the bad
guys; the people installed by the Vietnamese were “the old
cadres they had trained before the 1954 Geneva Agreements and
that afterwards belonged to the Pracheachon group,” the legal
party of the former resistance movement (p. 24). “Once the
1955 elections were over, the enemy started their repression.
The people trained by the Vietnamese were scattered. Some of
them abandoned the struggle and some others turned traitor and
went over to the enemy.” (p. 29) This is undeniable: the Party’s
general secretary, Sieu Heng, went over to the Sihanouk regime
in 1959.

On the other side there are the good guys. “But there were
some real Kampuchean revolutionaries who faced up to the
situation. They continued to carry out their revolutionary tasks.
Some of them took responsibility for activities in the capital and
prepared for the 1955 elections. In order to carry out these
preparations successfully, some revolutionaries came from the
countryside to make contact with those in the capital, which
allowed the Phnom Penh leaders to get to know cadres from all
over the country. Through these contacts and acquaintances,
the Phnom Penh revolutionary leaders ipso facto played the role of
liaison committee for the whole country” (p. 29).

Here we have an outline history of the formation of the Pol
Pot group and of the origins of the experiences that shocked the
whole world and made Cambodia a famous myth: if anyone is
massacred somewhere, it is a new Cambodia. (I shall come back
to this mythic aspect.) The hard reality is the intellectual and
political confusion that reigned in Phnom Penh after 1954. The
small Khmer left was still inexperienced. After being formed
hurriedly in a situation of guerrilla war, it had to jump into an
election campaign with its advisors away in Hanoi. The Black
Paper is essentially the Pol Pot group’s version of history, the
version of the men who came to control the leadership of the
CPK during the 1960s and controlled the military apparatus
during the 1970–1975 war, ran the country from 1975 to 1978
and have been waging guerrilla warfare against the Vietnamese
forces. The best known are Pol Pot; Ieng Sary, who is in charge
of foreign relations, Son Sen, head of the military apparatus;
and others like Nuon Chea, the party’s deputy secretary general.
There are also other important figures whose pre-1975 political
careers are not well-known.
Apart from throwing discredit on the Pracheachon, the text shows that the Pol Pot group was part of it at that time, which is confirmed by other sources, and that they therefore were a long way away from their later positions, which did not separate and crystallize until around 1965–66. In my opinion the determining influence on this change was the version of Maoism which was vulgarized and "Linbiaoized" by the Cultural Revolution in a late paroxysm of the Stalinist vulgate.

The Pol Pot group dates its own emergence to 1960, the moment of the formation of the Communist Party, or, more precisely, of the change in name of the former People's Revolutionary Party. I have stated my doubts about the date of this change. It was hardly to be expected that the confusion would be cleared up since the party secretary general at the time was Tou Samouth, a former bonze recruited by the Vietminh in Cochinchina in 1946, the president of the United National Front in 1950 and thus a typical product of the policy of the Indochinese Revolutionary Party. I have stated my doubts about the date of this moment of the formation of the Communist Party, or, more precisely, of the change in name of the former People's Revolutionary Party. Hence the awkward silence from Hanoi. To those who ask for more detail, the Vietnamese respond with nothing, or at least nothing serious. Nor is repeating the Western press' worst output, like the Reader's Digest book on the atrocities in Cambodia, in a radio series (feuilleton) and in Nhan Dan, the party daily, the way to convince people you are serious. For, basically, the discussion is not without interest. How should we understand Cambodian society? Is it composed of classes? Which ones? This is a vast subject on which to reflect. What we know of the Cambodian communists' class analysis, most of which comes from Pol Pot's major speech of September 30, 1977, which made public the existence of the Khmers is appallingly weak. It uses the Soviet schema of the 1930s, which was mechanically adopted by the other Asian communists before and after World War II, but which is even more simplified and rigidified in its Cambodian version. Eighty-five percent of the country is made up of poor and medium-poor peasants. The exploiting classes constitute the rest, but they include a lot of patriots who joined the revolution. This is the 1975–78 version; we do not know what the 1960 version was like. But, when one knows how this kind of sociological analysis can be used to justify the party line, especially when it is in power, we can imagine that the discussion must have been charming—and a long way from Marx.

In 1965, a delegation led by Pol Pot went to Hanoi—as mentioned—and to Beijing, but the Black Paper passes over this latter interesting detail in silence. The CPK line "worried the Vietnamese because, if the Kampuchean revolution went on, this would affect their collaboration with the ruling classes in Phnom Penh" (p. 25). This is more than likely. The discussion seems to have been bitter, and without appreciable results for the moment.

They then intensified their activities against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In the East and Southwest revolution-

ary bases, the Vietnamese carried out activities aimed at creating confusion and division in the ranks of the Kampuchean revolution. They both acted themselves and also manipulated Khmer elements whom they had been organizing for a long time and had infiltrated into the ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They also conducted many divisive activities abroad. They distributed Lenin’s “Left-Wing” Communism, Infantile Disorder so that the Hanoi Khmers** would intensify their attacks against the KCP.

(p. 26)

The Black Paper here raises a poisonous question which it is undoubtedly impossible to resolve. The Vietnamese communists had allies in the ranks of the CPK. Many of them were former members of the ICP, whose political motives were without any doubt honorable. In a tiny, scattered party without a press, threatened by repression and with precarious communications, homogeneity was an inaccessible goal. The small group that ran the party certainly did not have the means to get its own way completely. The same situation continued to prevail after 1975 and this explains how directives from above, from the Ankar loeu [top-level organization], were so diversely applied, even according to refugees. For a long time, therefore, there have been—have always been, it seems—serious clashes within the party. The Black Paper unwittingly confirms this with its long list of conspiracies and plots which are now invariably attributed to the wickedness of the Vietnamese.

But, leaving aside the actions of real opponents, can we dismiss the accusations of Vietnam-inspired manipulation and interference which Pol Pot complains about now? The Cambodian version is more likely, but they do not offer a shadow of proof. And when they state that certain “agents” of the Vietnamese were simultaneously in the pay of the CIA (which is something they had not previously made public), and they claim to have found this out only from confessions by these “agents,” we have a right to find all this fairly suspect. It would be better to wait until we know more. Perhaps one day we will find out what is in the archives of Pol Pot’s political police which fell into the hands of the Vietnamese in January 1979.

Chapter IV brings us close to events fresher in our memories: “Vietnamese attempts at smashing the independent political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea from 1970 to 1975.” What emerges first is that around the summer of 1969, undoubtedly just as Sihanouk was setting up a very rightist Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government, the CPK leadership had foreseen some influence, their supporters passed round tracts, little dit- ties and even playlets castigating Sihanouk’s corrupt regime and Sihanouk himself. These three intellectuals (in Cambodia, this is almost a political label) and the others in their sphere of influence had a political trajectory quite different from that of the Pol Pot group, even though they had the same origin: student life in France and 1950s PCF influence (the good old days). They are the only ones who attempted to carry out a Marxist-style analysis of Khmer society and make it more widely known. The Pol Pot group produced no analysis or text before the major 1976–78 triumphal speeches in stilted, stereotyped language.

While the Pol Pot group worked in Pracheachon (and, more discreetly, in the Democratic Party) and little by little lost its illusions about the impact of this kind of work, the group of Marxist intellectuals joined the Sangkum, the party organized by Sihanouk, and ended up becoming ministers (with limited power). I find it hard to believe that such an operation was concerted, that one group fled to the forest while the other had its eye on ministerial portfolios within a coordinated general strategy. The divergence was real. One need only read the journal published in 1959–60 by Khieu Samphan, L’Observateur: the tone could be called reminiscent of Khruschev, with homilies on peace, peaceful coexistence, the beauties of the construction of

** In 1954, some Khmers fled to Hanoi for refuge with the Vietminh.
socialism, etc.—nuanced, of course, because of the censor, but with an influence of the PCF that is still quite marked.

Then comes the Cultural Revolution in China. The Phnom Penh milieu, which was heavily Chinese, was receptive to it. Several of these intellectuals were militants in the Khmer-Chinese Friendship Association, which circulated propaganda put out by the embassy on Mao Zedong Boulevard. The upsurge in youth protests, the Samlaut peasant revolt and the closing of the Association by Sihanouk drove these intellectuals underground in 1967, where they found the tiny CPK apparatus in the hands of Pol Pot supporters. There followed a "rectification of errors" (p. 31). But I tend to believe that at least some of them held ultra-Maoist positions and that they kept a certain autonomy, indicated by a congress in the maquis in May 1970 of a "Union of People's Struggle Movement," which was curiously short-lived since it was never mentioned again. In my opinion, what happened was that a third tendency within the CPK, the ultra-Maoist faction, was then formed, which coalesced for a long time with the moderately Maoist group of Pol Pot, and which seems to have lost its influence only around 1977, after the fall of the Gang of Four in Beijing. As for those who, like Khieu Samphan, survived all these crises physically and politically, they must have been able to bend with the wind and yet be tough when needed.

The elaboration of this policy of a United Front would soon prove to be of crucial value. Were the Vietnamese against it? The Black Paper does not blame them. It would have been surprising if the Vietnamese had been against it, coming from a party that had its greatest successes by practicing a frontist policy (Vietminh, NLF). Near the end of 1969, when another delegation from the CPK travelled up the Ho Chi Minh Trail for a new journey abroad, the main Vietnamese criticism was over the launching of armed struggle, on a reduced scale, which the CPK had decided on at the beginning of 1968. In Cambodia, things had started to heat up and the emerging government of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak closed the port of Sihanoukville to profitable trade which supplied the Viet Cong on the borders. The Black Paper indicates that in the discussion between the two parties, the Vietnamese tried to "get the CPK out by the armed struggle" (p. 32). This is exactly what Sihanouk was publicly asking of the Vietnamese and which was the aim of the trip he took to Moscow and Beijing during which he was overthrown. He wanted the allies of Hanoi to pressure the Vietnamese into withdrawing their troops from the border zones and stop deploying the "Vietminh Khmer." Neither he nor anyone outside the Indochinese communist movement could imagine the gulf that already separated them.

We have a good example of the dialogue of the deaf that went on in Hanoi that winter. The Vietnamese asked the CPK delegation:

Where and how will the CPK procure arms, ammunition and other materials? How will it get doctors and medicine? Where and how will it find the necessary finances? The CPK delegation did not takeaccount of the objections raised by the Vietnamese because the CPK had the situation well in hand before the decision to start armed struggle. If the CPK carried on armed struggle, it was because the concrete situation did not allow it to do otherwise. If it did not, it would be condemned to disappear. But if it persisted in this struggle, its continued existence would be assured (p. 33).

Perhaps this modest attitude toward its objectives indicates that, basically, the two parties were not discussing the same thing. The Vietnamese were faced with problems of fighting to seize power; presumably they thought the means to take over political power in Cambodia were very slim and they considered Khmer strategy adventurist. As for the Khmers, after a few initial successes in 1968, they were hunted down hard in 1969 and were fighting to stay alive. The presence of the Vietnamese on the borders, even if the aid which went with it was very small or even non-existent, nonetheless was a guarantee of safe refuge. Since 1963, moreover, the ruling organs of the CPK were based where the Ho Chi Minh Trail hits Cambodia. It should be noted too, that at the time, the CPK never called for the departure of the Viet Cong.

In any case, the relations among the leaders of the two parties seem to have been very strained: "The Vietnamese used open threats against the Communist Party of Kampuchea and all the members of the CPK delegation were unanimous in saying that the Vietnamese were furious and were capable of doing away with them" (p. 34). We are still waiting for the Vietnamese account of these conversations, as well as of the other CPK-VCP negotiating sessions, of which there were many after 1970, until 1976. Closed, xenophobic and "savage" though they be, at least in the Western press' portrayal, the Khmers have said more and spoken more frankly than the Vietnamese in this whole affair.

The Black Paper then tells us that, at the time of the coup d'etat and Sihanouk's arrival in Beijing, the CPK delegation was also there en route from Hanoi. The prince seems to have avoided the CPK delegation, and negotiations were carried out through the Chinese. We learn also that "the CPK delegation examined and modified the political program of the National United Front drawn up by Prince Sihanouk," (p. 35) adding that in the prince's appeal of March 23 to overthrow the traitorous regime and form the FUNK "there was no question of socialism or communism in this document" (p. 38). This must be considered a sure sign of the success of the united front policy, since elements as far removed from socialism and communism as the prince could be integrated into it. But foreign observers, and a good number of Cambodians, too, considered there was an enormous element of deception in this policy's success. Again in February 1975, at the time when the decision seems to have been made to evacuate the cities immediately after the forthcoming military victory, a FUNK congress reaffirmed its intention to establish a regime with a democratic, liberal, almost social-democratic appearance. Nothing in the public declarations indicates the kind of pressure that was to be applied to make Cambodia give birth to the new communist society desired by the Pol Pot group and the ultra-Maoists (although it is impossible to separate their roles in the decisions of this period). Some will point out that the Vietnamese did the same by not giving any substantial power to any members of the "third force" recognized by the Paris Agreements: neutralist patriots, victims of Thieu and the Americans, yet representative of a large part of South Vietnamese public opinion.

The question raised here is not of only historical interest. We have the same situation again today. On January 5, 1979, immediately after a party congress, and before leaving Phnom Penh, Pol Pot launched an appeal to resist the invaders. He
returned to a theme which had been abandoned for several years: a united front, a union between the “democratic” (i.e. controlled by the CP) and “patriotic” forces (the others, especially those in Sihanouk’s sphere of influence). This proposal created some malaise among Cambodian emigres. The non-communists have already paid dearly to learn how limited their place was to be under Cambodian communism. Those who considered this turnaround by Pol Pot to be the result of Chinese influence rather than a sound evaluation of the balance of power were confronted by the staggering news coming from Prince Sihanouk in Beijing. According to Han Nianlong, Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs, Beijing was recruiting troops to be armed, equipped and transported in Cambodia by the Chinese from among former Khmer Serei, old Son Ngoc Thanh heavies in the pay of the CIA and the Thai and Saigon intelligence services. This Holy Alliance of a new sort promised some pretty good bloodletting.

When does Chinese interference in this aspect of Cambodian communist affairs date from? The Black Paper says March-April 1970.

When the CPK delegation was in Beijing, the Chinese comrades told it that Pham Van Dong [who was also there] had informed them of the serious difficulties encountered by the Vietnamese and that he had asked them to intercede with the CPK so that the latter would agree to help them. The Chinese comrades themselves were perplexed. They had always heard that the Vietnamese had helped Kampuchea. The CPK delegation told them about the real situation: the Vietnamese had no territory at home [in Vietnam] and were taking refuge in Kampuchea. They had set up there their organs of leadership and command, quarters for their troops, hospitals, etc. . . . The Chinese comrades discovered the truth for the first time, because the Vietnamese had carefully hidden it from them until then (p. 50).

How much credit can we give to this statement? Is it possible that the Chinese were never kept informed about what was going on in the sporadic guerrilla war in the forests of Cambodia? They were playing the Sihanouk card, too, like everyone else, but could there have been no contact with the fraternal party? This is hard to believe. But we can also accept the Black Paper’s statement if we see this as the beginning of a real rapprochement, an active commitment on the part of the Chinese. With the CPK in the stronger position in the underground organization, the Chinese could see a card being added to what was already a very good hand containing: Sihanouk, the master trump; the Viet Cong, a major trump, being resupplied through Chinese merchants in Phnom Penh via deals financed by the Chinese embassy; and down to the Lon Nol card, which they played as long as possible. The Chinese involvement in the affairs of Indochinese communism was to have heavy consequences since it is the direct origin of the military flare-up in the peninsula in 1978-79. This is a subject on which the CPK has been totally silent. It does not fit very well with the doctrine of “sovereignty-relying only on one’s own forces.”

On the way back, when they stopped off in Hanoi after the March 18 coup d’état, the Khmer delegation found a completely changed atmosphere. Hugs and kisses instead of grimaces; “but in the middle of the embraces, Vo Nguyen Giap, ever boorish and undiplomatic, let this remark escape: “This is a historic occasion that allows our three parties to unite once again” (p. 50). The proud Cambodians must have shuddered. They saw right away that even though the Vietnamese were grappling with serious difficulties, they “did not for a moment give up their ambition to annex and devour Kampuchea” (p. 51). Try negotiating with such sensitive people . . .

However, there were urgent affairs to discuss. The Vietnamese made a number of proposals, the most important of which was the establishment of joint military commands—“which would be joint in name only,” adds the ever perfidious Black Paper (p. 52). The Khmers obviously refused. There then follows a murky story of a telegram from the guerrilla zone which was given to Pol Pot in truncated form, which it is hard to know quite what to think about. Further negotiations took place in Cambodia upon the return of the leaders. We learn incidentally that the Vietnamese offered a hospital with 200 beds and a full staff, including cooks. “The Vietnamese even wanted to teach Kampuchea how to cook rice,” adds the Black Paper hysterically (p. 54). On the same delirious tone, among the types of cooperation proposed by the Vietnamese the text mentions aid in organizing women, which elicits this vengeful barb:

Even with regard to work among women, the Vietnamese Nguyen Thi Dinh offered to come and educate the women of Kampuchea, to teach them how to work. In fact, this Nguyen Thi Dinh did not know how to do anything, either housework or mass political work, nor military work. What the Vietnamese really wanted was to control the people of Kampuchea like they did at the time of the fight against the French colonialists” (p. 55).

I will not pass judgment on Nguyen Thi Dinh’s competence at housework, but I recall that she was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Liberation Armed Forces in the South and that she was anything but ignorant of “military work.”
The *Black Paper* is very discreet about the positive results which must have emerged from the many negotiations. From the evidence of what happened on the ground in 1970, there was very considerable political, administrative and military collaboration. Here it is passed over in complete silence. It is also true that it extended to large areas where the CPK’s hold was minimal and where the Viet Cong’s partners were more likely to be Sihanoukists of diverse allegiance who in Cambodia were called “Khmers Rumdoh” (liberation) to distinguish them from the Rouges, the “Khmers Krahom.” The existence of this wing of the resistance, which was gradually eliminated, is never mentioned in CPK literature. Unless this is what the *Black Paper* is referring to when it speaks of a “parallel army” organized “in secret” in the East and Southwest, which the CPK demanded should be handed over to them. It apparently amounted to only four battalions. Some of these troops were perhaps auxiliary forces of the sort that the Vietnamese maintained along their communication lines for various protection and supply duties. For the same purpose, the Vietnamese had organized a certain number of their nationals residing in Cambodia. According to the *Black Paper*, they were more “cruel” in their repression than their compatriots from North Vietnam because they knew the Khmer language and the inhabitants. . . . The CPK launched a struggle against them both in an official way and by mobilizing the popular masses to organize large demonstrations against them” (p. 56). It is not very clear what the text is referring to here.

Collaboration must have been thorny. Military and medical training schools set up by the Vietnamese were closed on the orders of the Khmer party. “In fact, the party had already opened military and medical training schools for the whole country. These schools devoted more time to political education than to technical training” (p. 57). Note that at the time, the CPK had only a very brief military experience. As for medicine, the less said the better. The health situation was catastrophic in 1975–76 and producing simple traditional medicines did not relieve the situation much. Malaria in particular wrought serious havoc. But it is undoubtably better to die at the hands of a quack if at least he has a good political education.

The following episode, which is meant to show once again the malice of the Vietnamese, seems to be taken from a second-rate thriller. In November 1970, a meeting took place between Pol Pot and his associate Nuon Chea, and two high Vietnamese officials to discuss problems “of development of solidarity and cooperation.” The negotiations were held in the Northern zone and were organized by the CPK secretary of that region, Koy Thoun, a member of the central committee, vice-minister of the economy and finances of the royal national union government [GRUNK]. We do not know much about the content of these discussions, which lasted eight days. The *Black Paper* states: “As to their offers of aid to Kampuchea, the Kampuchean side politely told them that it was completely self-sufficient, both in state power and in the army. At the same time, the CPK already had a fairly large quantity of weapons and in each zone there were already numerous battalions’’ (p. 58). This is without a doubt the biggest and most blatant lie in the whole text. Everyone, from Sihanouk to Lon Nol, the Americans and the Khmer Rouges whom I interviewed on the spot in 1972, all said that a major part of the weapons came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But this is not the really interesting part about the story.

Koy Thoun was arrested in April 1976. He confessed, reportedly in written form. These confessions conform perfectly to the classic pattern of Stalinist psychopathology. Koy Thoun was born in 1928 in the province of Kompong Cham and was a former pupil of Son Sen at the Pedagogic Institute and apparently followed him underground in 1963 or 1964. There is no trace of him again until 1970, when he surfaced as a member of the central committee of the clandestine CPK, and was also a member of the FUNK central committee, a deputy minister and secretary of the Northern area. In 1973 he welcomed Sihanouk to Angkor as secretary of the area but he was not part of the Democratic Kampuchean government set up on April 14, 1976. There are rumors that he tried to stage a pro-Vietnamese coup.

His “confessions” have not, of course, been published; but the *Black Paper* tells us that he had been an agent of the CIA since 1958, that he joined the party in 1960 and that, on the orders of a double agent in the service of the CIA and the Vietnamese communists, he wanted to poison Pol Pot during the November 1970 meeting, thanks to his wife “who was doing the cooking on that occasion” (p. 59). However, it does not appear that he actually tried because this story only surfaced in 1976. Other facts thus become “clear”: the reason the revolutionary forces did not succeed in taking Kompong Cham during their vigorous 1974 offensive was because the operation was led by Koy Thoun, who was a CIA agent. Will we be disingenuous enough to lend credence to this murky story? The CIA undoubtedly had its informers; but we old skeptics were immunized a long time ago by Victor Serge and others. Who will tell us the real story of Koy Thoun? He well personifies what is tragic in the history of Khmer communism, the last-born of the communist parties which have got into power.

For good measure, the *Black Paper* criticizes the behavior of Vietnamese soldiers stationed in Cambodia. Passing over a grotesque story of discontented soldiers overturning the chicken soup offered them by some nice village people, there is not much under this heading except for an incident that occurred in July 1973 in the Southwest, not far from Kampot, in which six village people are said to have perished, burned alive in a house. This quickly degenerated into a military confrontation and the Viet Cong withdrew toward the Vietnamese border after senior political officials intervened. Perhaps what is most interesting is what the *Black Paper* does not say. In this same sector, serious incidents between Khmer Rouges and Khmers Rumdoh occurred in November and December 1963 which also degenerated into military confrontations. At the bottom of it all lay a campaign by the communists against Sihanouk and their desire to control the paddy crop. The villagers chased out the communists, who were only able to have their way the following year. One cannot help but think that there is a connection

* The English-language version of the *Black Paper* here speaks of “strong official protests.”

** This phrase is missing in the English version of the *Black Paper*.

† The word “several” appears in the English version instead of “numerous.”
between these two series of incidents, and that they form the framework of the slow and sometimes difficult takeover of the guerrilla apparatus by the communists, and especially by the Pol Pot group. In this game the Viet Cong were trouble-makers since they also gave their support to the Sihanoukists, whom they considered an essential component of any political settlement in Cambodia. The Chinese, then as now, thought the same. In its own way, the small group of CPK hard-liners also recognized this, which is why they tried to eliminate the Sihanoukists during the war (the reverse was undoubtedly true locally) and the Lon Nol supporters after the war, since, ultimately, they were the same political class. Apart from the fervent supporters of Ngoc Thanh and some of the communists, who in Cambodia was not a Sihanoukist at one time or another, to a greater or lesser extent? In 1959 Khieu Samphan respectfully dedicated his thesis to Monseigneur Sihanouk. Hou Yuon did not do this.

We shall stop here on this brilliant sophism: “The CPK representative told the Chinese comrades that the Kampuchean revolution is independent and sovereign but that if the Kampuchean revolution had bound itself to Vietnam, it would not have been able to carry on the fight because there would not have been unanimity within the party” (p. 62). This chapter ends with the year 1975 showing that without the victory of the Khmer communists, the poor Vietnamese would have had trouble taking Saigon. Suddenly, “their plan to seize Kampuchea automatically collapsed” (p. 64).

The next brief chapter (5) deals with the Paris negotiations. Without getting into the explanations the Black Paper gives on the profound reasons of the Vietnamese for negotiating, one can accept the assertion that they exerted considerable pressure on the Khmers to get them, too, to negotiate with the Americans and Lon Nol. It had been known for a long time, and the Khmers Rouges had let it be known more than once, that they did not want another Geneva. They thought, not without reason, that the Lon Nol regime was collapsing from within and did not have long to go. Why give up on a sure thing?

One thing which can never be repeated too often is the appalling price the country paid for what was, basically, a refusal to allow a political solution to be dictated from outside, which was modeled on the American-Vietnamese compromise, and which was a short-lived mutant anyway. Besides, the Americans did not want a real compromise. In order to try to enforce their solution, between January 27 and August 15, 1973, Kissinger and Nixon concentrated all the air strike power at their disposal in Southeast Asia. Thanks to the British journalist William Shawcross, who obtained them through the Freedom of Information Act, I had the chance to see the American military maps. They show, month by month, the places that were subjected to massive B-52 bombings. One might have expected the bombings to have had strictly military targets and to be concentrated on the sanctuaries, communication lines and rear areas where fighters were likely to be regrouping and gathering their forces to attack Phnom Penh. But the bombing pattern is hallucinating: it is concentrated on the most densely populated areas, on the paddies of the central plain. By devastating the fields and villages with giant bombs, the economy was certain to be severely hit. Phnom Penh, surrounded by a devastated void, was condemned to live solely on the river and air supplies decided on annually by the Americans, depending on the good will of Congress.

I am not one of those who think that the reasons for the 1975 evacuation of the cities were primarily economic or humanitarian. I think that political considerations were predominant. But who can be surprised that these bombings, straight out of the tradition of Tokyo, Dresden and Hiroshima, had some consequences, economic and political and psychological?

The last chapter deals with the period following 1975. Curiously, it is the least informative. It begins thus: after April 1975 “the Vietnamese had to leave Kampuchea and return to their own country. the CPK told* the Vietnamese to withdraw before the end of May 1975 and at the latest the end of June 1975. But in fact they withdrew partially,” (p. 73). As in the previous chapter, the Black Paper neglects to say here that, with the exception of the border zones that they traditionally used as sanctuary, the Vietnamese troops withdrew from Cambodia around the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973. This was one of the clauses in the Paris Agreements and the reports of the American intelligence agencies confirmed this withdrawal. The 1975 withdrawal, therefore, concerns only a very small portion of Cambodian territory.

On the subject of omissions, I would add Sihanouk’s trip to the liberated zones in February and March 1973. I have a lot of trouble imagining that such a trip, which Sihanouk had pressed for over such a long time, could really have been to the liking of communist officials who had embarked on a full-scale campaign to eliminate Sihanouk’s followers from all positions of responsibility, and before they launched the agrarian reform movement which was radically to change the face of the Cambo-

*I in the English-language version of the Black Paper, the word “requested” is used instead of “told.”
dian countryside. Only the prince could make political mileage out of this, and only the Vietnamese could give him the means to do so, by letting him go down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in an automobile convoy. Here they used a lever they had on their Khmer comrades. Rumor had it later that the Khmers confined the prince and made it impossible for him to have direct contact with the peasant masses.

The Black Paper thus acknowledges that in 1975 the majority of Vietnamese had left. Besides, the text does not distinguish between Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers on the one hand, and civilians on the other—the latter often being long-time residents in some places: “Their forces numbered more than a thousand men, scattered here and there in groups varying from 10 to 100,” (p. 73). There were a few incidents and the Vietnamese withdrew. Probably these were in places where the boundary is not perfectly demarcated. The question of Cambodia’s borders is a nightmare which would fill several volumes. The French colonial authorities had marked out administrative boundaries, which most often were favorable to the colony of Cochin China and to the detriment of the protectorate kingdom of Cambodia. The numerous protests from the Cambodian throne were never taken into consideration. After independence the French boundaries had to be accepted, with some imperfections. When Saigon and then Bangkok put forward territorial claims, the Cambodian authorities became alarmed; they reiterated that they were ready to give up all their rights to the lost provinces and asked the international community to recognize the “current borders” and declare them inviolable. For a while, Sihanouk even made this the precondition for diplomatic relations with any country. Saigon, Bangkok and (for a long time) Washington refused to go along. Negotiations with the NLF failed in 1964 and 1966.
because of claims which the Vietnamese termed "unreasonable," improbable though they may seem. Finally, in May-June 1967, the NLF and Hanoi responded to Sihanouk's demands and recognized the "current borders."* It seems that, as the Khmers saw it, this meant there were no grounds for negotiating further about the borders and that for special cases where the demarcation was imprecise (because of discrepancies between maps, absence of physical evidence on the ground, or imprecise colonial directives, etc.) the Khmers were given latitude to define the border precisely, according to the principle that villages composed of Khmers and formerly administered by mandarins answerable to Phnom Penh should be on the Cambodian side. Judging from their number, geographical distribution and total surface area (roughly 100 square kilometers), these are the cases that came up again in 1975. The Cambodians did not want to get into discussions and evacuated them under duress. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Black Paper mentions the border problem only in relation to the CPK-VCP encounter in June 1975 and is completely silent about the negotiations in April-May 1976, when a Vietnamese delegation went to Phnom Penh to prepare a summit meeting on this question planned for June. Without explanation, the Khmers abandoned the discussion.

It seems certain that the maritime border question was the cause. It is complicated even more by the fact that the notions basic to its existence have evolved considerably since the colonial period. The problem has taken on considerable significance with the onset of oil prospecting in 1972-73. Judging from what the Vietnamese themselves say, it is clear that they have not accepted the Brevie line, which was used as the administrative demarcation line during the colonial period; the pretext being that it had not been recognized as such in practice under the Thieu and Lon Nol governments. The Cambodians were certainly justified in considering their interlocutors to be in bad faith and in viewing this as a maneuver aimed at renegotiating the border—in this case the border between the maritime zones which are dotted with islets, most of which are uninhabited. Renegotiation contradicted the solemn declarations of 1967.

The reason the Black Paper is silent about this episode, although it would provide material for criticizing the Vietnamese for their obvious bad faith, is undoubtedly because the border problem has largely been overtaken by events: for Phnom Penh the thing is to establish an indictment designed to go beyond any possible negotiations [and to leave no room for discussion—Ed.].

Another, more understandable omission, concerns the attacks by Cambodian commandos on Vietnamese border towns from January 1977 on. Here we must pause for a moment and encounter in June 1975 and is completely silent about the 1975 incidents which involve both sides but which seem to be resolved amicably in 1976—a year of relatively good relations between the two countries—the year 1977 marks the beginning of what became a real war. The Vietnamese report Cambodian attacks in January, March, April, May and all the following months of the year. The Black Paper tells us: "In December 1977, the Vietnamese launched large-scale attacks of invasion and aggression [sic] against Democratic Kampuchea" (p. 7), a fact confirmed by Western sources. It seems equally unquestionable that, as the document says, the Cambodian army cut the attackers to pieces. One can imagine the shock in Hanoi. The December 1978 offensive and the January 1979 occupation clearly originate in the lessons the Vietnamese generals learned from this failure.

It may be noticed incidentally that this Vietnamese invasion, which stirred up profound emotions in international public opinion, had not always been set in the context of the veritable war which had been going on in the area for two years, and that it is not all that rare, even if it is highly regrettable, that wars end or are pursued by military means. In my humble opinion, it would be proper to criticize this kind of undertaking not according to nationalist principles (all the more so since we are dealing with the nationalism of others), but according to the degree of political liberty this kind of action brings to or takes away from a given situation. We recognize it implicitly in not criticizing Nyerere for invading Uganda, because obviously the Ugandans are the gainers. As for the Cambodians, how are we to know?

The Black Paper, written in September 1978, asserts that the Vietnamese "blitzkrieg" strategy is and will be undone by long-term war, people's war and its classical doctrine. At the same time, Pol Pot was telling foreign visitors that, if his regime was as unpopular as the Western press said it was, it would not last a second against the Vietnamese. The test of truth was going to come and we would see.

We have not stopped seeing. The Vietnamese maintain a stubborn silence about their occupation while their supporters rewrite history. The serenity displayed by the Khmer communists does not reflect the real setbacks they have suffered. If one listens to some of the more informed observers with experience in Cambodia, who speak Khmer and who talked recently with refugees on the borders, their impressions are conflicting. The Vietnamese were welcomed as liberators in certain places and violently opposed in others. All is shifting, nothing is decided. Everything that has been said and written about Cambodia for almost four years now is an inextricable mixture of truth and lies. The press as a whole played its usual role, that of a historian, had not always been set in the context of the veritable war which had been going on in the area for two years, and that it is not all that rare, even if it is highly regrettable, that wars end or are pursued by military means. In my humble opinion, it would be proper to criticize this kind of undertaking not according to nationalist principles (all the more so since we are dealing with the nationalism of others), but according to the degree of political liberty this kind of action brings to or takes away from a given situation. We recognize it implicitly in not criticizing Nyerere for invading Uganda, because obviously the Ugandans are the gainers. As for the Cambodians, how are we to know?

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Notes

1. There are a number of editions of the Black Paper:
   b) Paris edition, January, 1979, E-100 Edition du Centenaire, 87 pages. Contrary to what it claims, this edition is not "the complete reproduction" of the first. Several phrases were omitted or truncated. The revisions were made in Phnom Penh.

Quotations from the Black Paper have been determined by the following criteria. The French language text (which I used in a previously published version of this article: Serge Thion, "L'Ingratitude des Crocodiles" in Les Temps Modernes, No. 402, January, 1980, pp. 1283-1323, Paris) has priority. Where citations coincide with those in the English-language version available to us, the quotations are reprinted directly as in the English-language version. Where there is a conflict, or the English version seemed inferior for any reason, the French text has been re-translated. Major discrepancies are noted in the text of this essay. The name "Communist Party of Kampuchea" is always cited in full in the English-language version; here it has often been abbreviated to "CPK.


3. Those interested can find an account of the origins of this old Cambodian legend in Thai Van Khien, "La Plaine aux Cerfs et la Princesse vue Jaue," Bulletin de la Societe des Etudes Indochinoises, No. 4, 1959. The arrival of the Vietnamese in the Saigon area dates to about forty years later. According to the Khmer chronicles, the young woman's name was Nang Cu.


5. Cited by Father Boulleveaux, Ma visite aux rues cambodiennes en 1850, Memoires de la Societe academique indochinoise, I, 1874, p. 11.


11. Text in Etudes vietnamiennes, [Vietnamese Studies] 24, July, 1970, p. 208. [In the English edition of "Political Theses of the Indochina Communist Party," October 1931, p. 193, point number 6, the language seems to vary slightly. We have inserted that into the text here. Eds.]


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Vietnam’s Ethnic Chinese and the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict

by Gareth Porter*

The massive exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam to China in 1978 and to Southeast Asia by boat in 1979 seemed to the outside world explainable only in terms of racist policies toward an ethnic minority paralleling the Nazi policy toward the Jews. But Vietnamese policy toward the ethnic Chinese themselves can be understood only in the context of the development of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. While racism toward the Hoa in the form of resentment toward an unassimilated and privileged minority had long existed among ethnic Vietnamese, there had also been a long-established Communist Party policy of discouraging Vietnamese from anti-Chinese sentiments or actions, in contrast with non-Communist Vietnamese governments in the past. Communist Vietnam had always portrayed the Hoa as active participants in the anti-imperialist struggle, linking friendly relations between Hoa and Vietnamese with close cooperation between China and Vietnam.†

The evidence from Hoa refugees as well as from other sources indicates that, despite only partially successful efforts by the SRV to impose Vietnamese nationality on the Hoa, relations between Vietnamese authorities and the Hoa minority had remained calm until the Spring of 1978, when the Hoa exodus began. Then the Hanoi government concluded that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was using the Hoa to destabilize and weaken the Vietnamese economy and society, as it prepared for later military confrontation with Vietnam. From then on, Vietnamese policy toward the Hoa was based primarily on security considerations, in anticipation of possible war with China.

Vietnamese control over the Hoa was a sensitive issue between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) even when relations between the two states were closest. Among the first matters negotiated by the Central Committees of the two parties were agreements on making the Hoa Vietnamese citizens gradually and transferring responsibility for the Hoa from the Chinese party to the Vietnamese party. A 1955 oral agreement on the problem of nationality was followed by a formal agreement in 1957 specifying that “all the work regulating the Hoa people from now on, including the problems of mass organizations, newspapers, schools, hospitals, and all other relief associations for unemployment and social welfare, will be done by the Vietnamese side.”‡

Vietnamese sensitivity about the potential for PRC interference in Hoa affairs was heightened during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, when many Hoa in North Vietnam carried on their own “Red Guard” activities, complete with red books, Mao badges and large character posters. The political content of these activities included denunciation of the Vietnamese Party as “Revisionist.” Vietnamese officials later alleged that the PRC Embassy in Hanoi clandestinely organized Maoist political groups and party cells in the cities of North Vietnam during the period.§ One of the consequences of the episode was the first major reform of Chinese schools in North Vietnam in 1970, aimed at eliminating those aspects of the curriculum which strengthened the sense of Hoa community—what Hanoi termed “reactionary idealistic nationalism.”¶

After the U.S. war in Vietnam, Chinese and Vietnamese interests and worldviews were increasingly in direct conflict, and the Vietnamese viewed Chinese assertions of ideological leadership of Vietnam, the use of force to seize the Paracel islands in January 1974, and its reneging on earlier pledges of postwar assistance, as signaling Chinese pressure on Vietnam to fall into line with its foreign policy. Under these circumstances, Hanoi decided to ignore the 1955 oral agreement calling for Sino-Vietnamese consultations on the problem of the Hoa in South Vietnam after liberation and ordered that all Hoa in the

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*This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington D.C., March 21-23, 1980.
South register for the 1976 National Assembly election under the nationality they had acquired during the previous South Vietnamese regime. Since the Ngo Dinh Diem regime had decreed enforced Vietnamese citizenship in 1956, this meant that virtually all of the Hoa had to register as Vietnamese citizens. The Vietnamese did not want to encourage a pattern of Hoa loyalty to the PRC by restoring Chinese nationality after two decades of Vietnamese citizenship.

The PRC protested this Vietnamese move in June 1977, putting Hanoi on notice that it would regard the Hoa in the South as Chinese nationals whose interests Beijing had a right and responsibility to protect. The now-united Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was thus even more inclined than it would otherwise have been to see China’s hand behind the scattered acts of resistance to Vietnamese citizenship among the Hoa in the South in 1977 and early 1978.

The most sensitive problem relating to the Hoa in 1977 centered on the Sino-Vietnamese border area, where the Hoa represented a much higher proportion of the population than in the country as a whole. In the process of improving security in the northwest border provinces, which involved primarily mov-

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\text{Having created new demands for repatriation among the Hoa, the PRC then refused to go ahead with the operation unless the SRV conceded publicly that the Hoa were Chinese nationals who were being “ostracized and persecuted.” Then, on July 12, the PRC suddenly closed its border with Vietnam to the Hoa, stopping all but a few from crossing into China. In August, Beijing began to demand that Vietnam take back “Vietnamese citizens who have been driven to China” and Hoa who were now willing to return to Vietnam.}
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ing the population some distance from the actual border, the SRV began in October 1977 to expel those Hoa who were regarded as living illegally in Vietnam—Chinese who had entered Vietnam after relations were established between the two communist states but had never acquired official papers. This security measure, which affected a relatively small percentage of the Hoa in the border area, continued up to the time of the Chinese invasion.

The Exodus in 1978

But it was not until April 1978 that a major exodus of Hoa people from Vietnam began. The fact that the exodus coincided with the SRV campaign for the socialist reform of capitalist trade in Ho Chi Minh City, which began in late March, created the impression that it was largely a response to a crackdown on Chinese merchants there. But a closer examination of the socialist reform campaign and of the exodus itself shows that the main cause of the exodus lay elsewhere.

The campaign to eliminate South Vietnam’s merchant class was the culmination of a struggle between the revolutionary government and the capitalists in the South, the overwhelming majority of whom were Hoa, for control of the economy. The timing of the campaign was determined by the SRV’s larger strategy for the socialist transformation of South Vietnam, which required the early liquidation of the economic and political influence of the capitalist class. The Vietnamese leadership feared that permitting the merchants to continue to operate would inevitably encourage a “spontaneous tendency toward capitalism” in agriculture. Moreover, they viewed the capitalists as the natural center for political opposition to the new revolutionary regime. The removal of the capitalists from the cities was thus to be carried out as soon as the administrative-political apparatus in the South was strong enough to manage it.

Contrary to the PRC’s portrayal of the socialist reform as an anti-Chinese measure, the Hoa who left the South in 1978-79 later testified, with few exceptions, that the campaign was carried out without any discrimination against the Hoa. Indeed, the Vietnamese leadership anticipated—and tried to prevent—a capitalist attack on the campaign as anti-Chinese in order to rally the support of the Hoa community against it. Alternative Political Bureau member Vo Van Kiet emphasized to a Party conference in Ho Chi Minh City in mid-1977 that there should be no discrimination between Vietnamese and Chinese when the socialist reform of capitalist trade was implemented.

The exodus of the Hoa from the South certainly did reflect in part the reaction of the Hoa to the threat of being sent to the New Economic Zones, which had frequently failed to provide minimal conditions for settlers to make a living. It also reflected Hoa dissatisfaction with the loss of economic privileges and with pressures on them to accept Vietnamese nationality (primarily because it meant that Hoa youth would be conscripted for the first time). And it was fueled by rumors of impending war between Vietnam and China over Kampuchea and of the possibility of transiting China to Hong Kong and then to the U.S.

But the majority of the 90,000 to 100,000 Hoa who crossed the border into China in April, May and June 1978 were from North Vietnam (primarily from the border province of Quang Ninh, Hanoi and Haiphong). Both China and Vietnam charged each other with inciting this exodus by spreading the rumor that war was about to break out between China and Vietnam and that the Hoa would be punished by Chinese troops as traitors unless they returned to China immediately. Hoa refugees from Hanoi and Haiphong interviewed later confirmed that there was a serious panic as a result of such rumors, and that at least some of it was quite deliberate. They also recalled that Vietnamese authorities had tried to counteract the rumors, calm the Hoa population and persuade it not to leave the country. Since the exodus of the Hoa deprived the SRV of vitally important skilled workers such as accountants, engineers, dockers and miners, it was clearly not in Vietnam’s interests.

Another factor in the exodus from the North was tension between some elements of the Hoa community and the SRV over the nationality issue. The Hanoi government had made an accommodation with the Hoa population on the issue, treating them as Vietnamese citizens except in one respect: they did not have to serve in the military. But many Hoa insisted on maintaining their Chinese nationality, and some lost their jobs as a result. And again, in the Spring of 1978, rumors were circulating in Hanoi and Haiphong that China was requesting Hoa to return to help build up the fatherland, and that Hoa could obtain good jobs in the PRC.
The rumor campaign among the Hoa came some weeks after the PRC had announced a new policy toward Overseas Chinese which emphasized their “glorious tradition of supporting and participating in China’s revolution,” and viewed them as an integral part of the “anti-hegemony front.” 14 This latter point represented a reversal of the previous policy toward Overseas Chinese of discouraging them from participating in political activities which might disturb the government of the host country. 15

The SRV later published allegations of direct involvement by the PRC embassy in inciting the exodus of the Hoa, in the form of confessions by Hoa who said they had spread rumors of a Sino-Vietnamese war. 16 These stories have not been verified from independent sources, but the circumstantial evidence and the testimony of Hoa refugees who believed the PRC probably was behind the rumors led Western embassies monitoring the situation to conclude that the PRC had indeed played a role in the exodus. 27

The Turning Point

In May 1978, the PRC took the occasion of the Hoa exodus to begin terminating its aid projects and denounced Vietnam in a major media campaign “ostracizing, persecuting and expelling” the Hoa and thus for having broken with Vietnam’s traditional policy of friendship with China. Finally, Beijing announced on May 26 that it was sending ships to bring the remaining “victimized Chinese residents” back to the PRC, and brushed aside Vietnam’s offer to negotiate on the problem of the Hoa as a “deliberate hindrance to China in the exercise of her lawful right to repatriate Chinese residents.” 18 These moves were accompanied by a Chinese military buildup on the Vietnamese border. 19

This series of events was the critical turning point in Vietnamese policy toward China. The SRV saw these Chinese actions, including the instigation of the Hoa exodus, as an aggression against Vietnam and a signal that a military confrontation with China was a distinct possibility. The Vietnamese leadership, which had become convinced by early 1978 that the PRC was behind the Pol Pot regime’s aggressive policy on the Vietnamese border, had nevertheless avoided an open break with Beijing, for fear of precipitating an aggressive Chinese military response. Now Hanoi believed that the PRC was preparing its own public opinion as well as world opinion for even stronger pressures against Vietnam. 20

The Vietnamese Political Bureau, meeting repeatedly in June to determine its response to the new situation, saw Vietnam facing war with China on two fronts. It was no longer a situation in which military restraint on Kampuchea could be expected to avoid provoking China. As a result of the new strategic analysis, the Political Bureau decided to identify China clearly as the main and immediate enemy of the Vietnamese revolution, begin a major military buildup and reorient the economy toward defense needs, and draw up plans for a military offensive to overthrow the Pol Pot regime and replace it with his Kampuchean opponents. 21

The Chinese move to send ships to pick up the “victimized Chinese residents” gave further impetus to the flight of the Hoa from Vietnam. It caused a new panic among the Hoa in Cholon, who sold their goods and immediately registered for repatriation to China. Hoa refugees estimated that more than 30 percent of the Hoa in Cholon applied to leave by ship, suggesting that 200,000 or more expressed their desire to leave Vietnam. 22 Having created new demands for repatriation among the Hoa, the PRC then refused to go ahead with the operation unless the SRV conceded publicly that the Hoa were Chinese nationals who were being “ostracized and persecuted.” Then, on July 12, the PRC suddenly closed its border with Vietnam to the Hoa, stopping all but a few from crossing into China. In August, Beijing began to demand that Vietnam take back “Vietnamese citizens who have been driven to China” and Hoa who were now willing to return to Vietnam.

Although the PRC cited the need to observe proper procedures for crossing the border and the strain on its own resources as reasons for the border closure, there may have been a far more important reason: thousands of Hoa who had arrived in China had refused to consider themselves Chinese citizens and demanded instead to be resettled in the U.S. or elsewhere. 23 They gathered in Canton and became a headache for PRC authorities, even organizing at least one demonstration against their treatment in China. 24 Beijing, which had defined the Hoa in Vietnam as both Chinese citizens and “patriotic,” apparently lost enthusiasm for encouraging them to leave Vietnam and tried to return to the SRV those Hoa who did not want to stay in China.

Later, Vietnamese officials would admit privately that the new policy toward the Hoa adopted in the wake of the Chinese invasion had been an overreaction and would try once more to persuade the Hoa to remain in Vietnam.

The Vietnamese, however, viewed the Chinese refusal to go ahead with repatriation, the border closing and the demand that Vietnam take back certain Hoa as a new twist in the PRC plan to destabilize Vietnam: to keep the discontented Hoa in Vietnam to serve as a potential fifth column while sending back Hoa agents to work among them. In light of the widespread desire of Hoa in Cholon and in the North to leave the country for China, SRV leaders were no longer as confident of the loyalty of the Hoa population as they had been before. The Vietnamese began in September to charge China with the intention of creating “a small Chinese nation in Vietnamese territory” that it could use for “troublemaking and disturbances.” 25

Hanoi then decided to relieve what it viewed as potentially dangerous pressures by cooperating with the Hoa community leadership to assist departures by boat by those Hoa who wished to leave the country. The mechanism was at hand for implementing this policy in the form of Overseas Chinese networks linking the Hoa in Vietnam with syndicates in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, which had been formed earlier to help Hoa escape from Vietnam overland to China and by boat to Southeast Asian countries. 26 Before August the SRV policy had been to prevent Hoa as well as ethnic Vietnamese from escaping by boat. But after the events of June and July, Hanoi made an accommodation with the Hoa and permitted the Overseas Chinese network to function in a semi-legal manner. 27
According to those who used the system to go to Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Vietnamese government was involved in the "permitted departures" only in the initial screening of the list of passengers, the final checking of the list against those on board, and taking exit fees from passengers. The fees paid to SRV authorities, ranging from about $1,200 US to $2,400 US per adult, appear to have been in line with the fees charged by the Overseas Chinese network when it was still operating illegally. The Hoa organizers were permitted to take one-fourth to one-fifth as much as the official fees for themselves. The intervention of the SRV had the effects, therefore, of vastly increasing the number of Hoa emigrating by boat and of transferring the bulk of the profit made on the trips from the Overseas Chinese network to the SRV itself. The exit fees, paid in gold leaf, were thus a means of gaining control of a portion of the substantial wealth the Hoa community had converted to gold in order to keep it safe from currency changes and other anti-capitalist policies.

The system of departures by boat, including the arrangement for obtaining the boat, food and other supplies, and the selection of passengers, was entirely the responsibility of the Hoa themselves. The system responded to the strong desire, for a variety of reasons, of hundreds of thousands of Hoa to leave the country. The "permitted departures" raised the number of arrivals from Vietnam to Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand from about 5,000 in May and June to 10,000 in October and then 20,000 in November. Seventy percent of the departures were ethnic Chinese, the remainder consisting of ethnic Vietnamese who either left on their own without permission or illegally obtained papers identifying them as ethnic Chinese.

Pressure on the Vietnamese—and on the U.S.—from the receiving countries to stop the departures by boat mounted rapidly. At the conference on refugees in Geneva in December 1978, sponsored by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, SRV Ambassador in Paris Vo Van Sung was asked by the U.S. to slow, but not to stop, the outflow of Vietnamese by boat. U.S. officials admitted privately that asking the SRV to stop the departures by boat completely would have been a "fundamental violation of human rights." But the U.S. suggested to the Vietnamese that they could "send the U.S. a signal" by diminishing the flow of refugees and eliminate that problem as an obstacle to the normalization of relations.29

Evidently responding to ASEAN complaints and wishing to keep the normalization process alive, Hanoi did reduce the flow of boat people sharply by suspending the permitted departures completely at the end of 1978. The figures on arrivals in Southeast Asia for January 1979 returned to the levels that had prevailed before the system was unofficially sanctioned by the SRV, and refugees later confirmed that orders had come down to local officials to suspend all departures by boat. This move coincided with a shift in Vietnamese policy on the larger question of emigration from Vietnam, as Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh announced in January that Hanoi would agree to negotiate an orderly departure agreement with the United Nations High Commission on Refugees.

The combination of a halt in departures by boat and negotiations for the orderly departure over a longer period directly to countries of resettlement offered a more humane and less conflictive solution to the problem of Hoa who wanted to leave Vietnam. But an orderly departure agreement would have required that the U.S. and other Western states be willing to resettle hundred of thousands of Hoa. It would have also required that the U.S. use all of the diplomatic leverage at its command to prevent a Chinese invasion of Vietnam, with its predictable impact on Vietnamese policy toward the Hoa.

In fact, the U.S. evinced no interest in a longer-term solution to the problem of the Hoa boat people. U.S. diplomatic attention was focused in January 1979 on the problem of getting Vietnamese troops out of Kampuchea. While President Carter and Secretary Vance argued during Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's Washington visit against a PRC invasion of Vietnam on the grounds of a risk of Soviet intervention and on public relations grounds, the fate of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam in the event of an invasion was never considered an issue.

The Chinese Invasion

Chinese troops invaded Vietnam on February 17, accompanied, according to Vietnamese officials, by Hoa who had previously left Vietnam for China and who now acted as guides and intelligence aides for the invasion forces.31 And a number of Hoa serving in the Vietnamese Party and security forces, who had previously been trusted despite their ethnic ties with China, were said later to have been traitors during the Chinese attack.32
Following the Chinese troop withdrawal announcement on March 5, the Vietnamese reached a decision which would create a new international crisis over the Hoa: orders were issued by the Ministry of Interior to move the Hoa out of cities, areas near the border and other areas that were sensitive in terms of military security. Usually the Hoa were told that they had to leave by April 10 and warned that they would be sent to New Economic Zones for the Hoa if they had not moved by then. 33

In Hanoi and Haiphong, cadres convened meetings of ethnic Chinese at the end of March and the beginning of April to explain that, in view of the possibility of another Chinese invasion, the government policy was to move them “as far away from the war zone as possible.” They were told that they could go to New Economic Zones to engage in agricultural production or go abroad, in which case the government would “create conditions to help them leave.” 34 In the South, on the other hand, only those who had been identified as troublemakers were directly pressured to leave, while indirect pressures increased on the Hoa remaining in the cities by cutting off rations and calling up Hoa youth for military service. 35 The system of “permitted departures” was once again used to implement the policy of reducing selectively the Hoa population in both North and South Vietnam.

As a result the number of arrivals in Southeast Asia jumped from 9,000 in February 1979 to 17,000 in March, 34,000 in April and finally 58,000 in May. The scenes of desperate boat people being turned away from Malaysia and Indonesia and the complaints of the Southeast Asian governments themselves created new political-diplomatic pressures for action by the international community, culminating in the convening of another Geneva conference on Indochinese refugees. The SRV was again asked to do its best to stop the departure by boat and did pledge to do so. But even before the conference had begun, Vietnam had again bowed to the pressures of its neighbors and ended the departures by boat in July. 36 Later, Vietnamese officials would admit privately that the new policy toward the Hoa adopted in the wake of the Chinese invasion had been an overreaction and would try once more to persuade the Hoa to remain in Vietnam. 37

The exodus of the Hoa from Vietnam was thus far more complex—in terms of its relationship to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the role played by the SRV and the Hoa community, and the motivation of the Hoa who left the country—than the popular image of a racially-motivated purge of ethnic Chinese. Official SRV policy and the reasons for leaving varied between North and South, and from one period to another. The exodus began in large part because of an artificially stimulated fear of Sino-Vietnamese war. When official pressures were applied to the Hoa to leave Vietnam, it was in the context of an overreaction by the Hanoi government to the Chinese invasion and doubts about the loyalty of the Hoa.

The SRV did allow those who wanted to leave the country to do so and permitted the Hoa community to make the arrangements. And while the post-invasion pressures on the Hoa clearly violated their rights, the system of “permitted departures” was a response to the reality of a sudden change in the atmosphere among the Hoa in Vietnam. The Hoa were clearly the victims of the restructuring of the Vietnamese economy they had long dominated. But they were even more victimized by the conflict between Vietnam and China, which both provoked the Hoa exodus and was spurred by the Vietnamese reaction to that exodus.
Notes

1. The policy of countering traditional Vietnamese attitudes toward the ethnic Chinese predates the establishment of PRC-DRV relations. See the appeal by Ho Chi Minh to Vietnamese youth to maintain solidarity with the ethnic Chinese during the occupation by KMT troops on November 27, 1945. Nhun Loi Keu Goi cua Ho Chu Minh. (Appeals by Chairman Ho, Vol. 1, 2nd Ed. (Hanoi: Su That, 1958), p. 54.

2. This excerpt from the text of the 1957 agreement was given to me by an official of the SRV Foreign Ministry in Hanoi, November 1978.


7. See the address by Chairman of the People's Committee of Hoang Lien Son Province, Ha Thiet Hung, in Nhan Dan, June 16, 1979.

8. The most authoritative document on the thinking behind the socialist reform of capitalist trade is found in speeches by high party officials in Ho Chi Minh city to cadres during the campaign. Vu Dinh Lieu and Tran Tong Tan, Cai Tieu Triet De Ho Thong Thuong Nguyen Tu Ban Chu Nghia a Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh (Thoroughly Reform the System of Capitalist Trade in Ho Chi Minh City) (Ho Chi Minh City: Nha Xuat Ban Ho Chi Minh, 1978).


13. Benoit, "Vietnam's Boat People," loc. cit.; Paul Quinn-Judge and Sophie Quinn-Judge, "Refugee Camps, Hong Kong, June 4-10 (1979)," pp. 20-21; "Comments by Refugees at PRC Resettlement Farm. . . .", p. 3.


24. One such protest was seen by an African student in Canton and reported to an American visitor to Canton in September 1978.


26. Fees for China during the period when the network operated illegally were said by Hoa interviewed in the PRC to have ranged from about $500 U.S. to more than $1,000 U.S., while the fees for getting to other countries by boat were said to have been higher. "Comments by Refugees at a PRC Resettlement Farm. . . ."


32. This was the account given by SRV senior security officials to a


34. Quinn-Judge and Quinn-Judge, pp. 7-8.


New Light on the Origins of the Vietnam-Kampuchea Conflict

by Ben Kiernan

"Don't make pretexts about Kampuchea Krom in order to hide your jaw of traitor."

On January 7, 1979, Vietnamese-backed forces captured Phnom Penh and overthrew the regime of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. The population of Kampuchea generally welcomed the change. But many Khmers still harboured the suspicion best described by Martin Woollacott, who quoted one as saying: "Yes, the Vietnamese have saved us, but what have they saved us for?"

The motives of the Vietnamese communists, and of the Pol Pot government, in pursuing the two-year (1977-78) border fighting that led up to Vietnam's final push have been described in a number of ways. It has been interpreted as a somehow irresolvable "frontier dispute," longheld Vietnamese plans to dominate all of Indochina, Chinese attempts to weaken Vietnam by encouraging Pol Pot raids across its borders, or Pol Pot's need to bolster his flagging internal position by creating an external conflict. However, a 1976 Pol Pot internal communist party magazine gives another angle on the problem, describing it as "the continuous non-stop struggle between revolution and counter-revolution." The June 1976 issue of Tung Padevat ("Revolutionary Flags"), continues:

We must have the standpoint that the enemy will continue to exist for 10, 20 or 30 years. The national struggle is the same as the class struggle: in a word, the struggle between revolution and counter-revolution will be continuous . . . When we are strong they are weak, when they are weak we are strong . . . (p. 21)

Vietnam, to which this document undoubtedly refers, was thus seen as a longterm enemy whose interests were directly opposed to those of Kampuchea. It was June 1976. What was the background to this policy conviction of the Pol Pot regime?

After the twin victories of the Vietnamese and Kampuchea communists over US-backed regimes in April 1975, they immediately began fighting one another on land and sea. It is difficult to pinpoint what it was that sparked off these serious battles, but they ended with Vietnam capturing Kampuchea's Wai islands and then, in August 1975, handing them back. Further sporadic clashes took place later in the year, but these were not serious, and the year 1976 was a much more peaceful one.

The Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Vietnam and Kampuchea agreed in April 1976 to sign a border treaty in June. From May 4-18, preparatory talks were held in Phnom Penh between the two sides. It was agreed to coordinate border liaison committees, but there was little agreement on the maritime frontier, and Kampuchea postponed the June summit indefinitely. Significantly, though, "following the meeting" of May 4-18, according to Vietnam, "border incidents decreased in number." Neither side, including Vietnam in its detailed history of border clashes, publicly mentions any fighting between the two countries during the rest of 1976. Vietnam's Deputy Minister and Vietnamese reporters visited Kampuchea, reporting favourably on economic reconstruction. Women's delegations from the two countries exchanged visits, and agreement was reached over air links. Interestingly, the Pol Pot regime's detailed official history of Vietnamese "aggression" against Kampuchea neglects to mention these important May 1976 talks or their aftermath.

But Tung Padevat, the internal magazine of Pol Pot's party, did make some interesting observations about the border situation in its June 1976 issue.

Within the general framework of the country, the enemy carried out several activities along the land and sea border from the months of November and December (1975) to January and February (1976). From March onwards, the situation has softened considerably.

Along with this we have destroyed the enemies within
our country and scattered many of them. They have no strong forces . . . (p. 20)

Interestingly, there is again no mention of the May negotiations. The magazine goes on:

We want to build socialism quickly, we want to transform our country quickly, we want our people to be glorious quickly. But especially this is to prevent the enemy from harming us. Even now the enemy cannot persist in trying to have his way with us. (p. 42, my emphasis) . . . The enemy is hesitant towards us (p. 44) . . . We believe that we could quickly build up the country. It is impossible for the enemy to attack us . . . (pp. 51-51).

1976 was clearly not a year in which Kampuchean saw any serious indication of Vietnamese ambition on their country, even though Pol Pot’s regime had broken off negotiations.

Internally, however, Kampuchea in 1976 was deeply riven by political strife, from which the Pol Pot group emerged supreme only at the end of the year. Beginning around early 1977, a vast series of purges was launched. Leading communists such as the Cabinet Ministers Hu Nim and Touch Phoeun, and other equally senior figures such as Non Suon, Phouk Chhay and Tiv 01, were executed. But even more frequently, throughout three-quarters of the country and right down to the village level, the revolutionary cadres in place were dismissed, and in most cases executed, sometimes along with their families. Their replacements were newly arrived cadres from the Southwest Zone, which had become the stronghold of the Pol Pot group since victory in 1975.

According to Tuy Padevat of April 1977:

... our enemies no longer possess a fifth column in the bosom of our party and people to use as a nucleus from which to foment counter-revolutionary activities with the aim of overthrowing our regime, destroying our revolution, dismantling the Communist Party in Kampuchea, enslaving our people, throwing our army into confusion and annihilating our democracy. From another point of view, they are no longer able to attack us militarily from the outside.

Who, then, was doing the fighting that had definitely broken out not long before? The magazine continues:

Faced with this encouraging situation, what position could we adopt? Should we attack our enemies more fiercely, or should we be content with the results obtained: . . . We should attack them without respite on every terrain by taking our own initiatives and by scrupulously following the directions of our party, both in the internal political field and in the field of foreign relations . . . We must fight the enemy coming from the outside in all theatres of operations and in every form.3

Interviews

What follows are accounts by Kampuchean refugees whom I interviewed in France during 1979–80.

Mrs. Lang Sim, a Khmer refugee now in France, was in Snuor district of Battambang province in mid-1977 when new cadres arrived from the Southwest Zone. At a meeting in her village of Lopecak at the end of that year, these cadres told a gathering of about thirty people at which she was present that “Kampuchea aimed to fight to recover Kampuchea Krom [the Mekong Delta] from Vietnam, as well as Surin and other provinces from Thailand.” Bopha, a Phnom Penh woman who lived in Saang district of Kandal province after the 1975 evacuation, said that the Khmer Rouge there were “all right” until April 1977 (we know from other sources that the province party secretary had been arrested on March 15). Brutality against the population then became a hallmark of government control of Saang, she said. In 1978, Bopha went on, the Khmer Rouge cadres told villagers including herself that the government of Kampuchea “aimed to fight to get back Kampuchea Krom.”

Ngoun Son, a worker in a large Phnom Penh “mineral factory” under the Pol Pot regime, recalls that around November 1978, Ta Khon, the director of the factory, said in a meeting that “we aim to liberate the people of Kampuchea Krom and have already liberated 10,000–20,000 of them.”

A former Khmer interpreter for North Korean advisers in the Pol Pot period, who had an opportunity to travel widely in Kampuchea, said that the policy to reconquer Kampuchea Krom from Vietnam was “not official,” in the sense that it was not mentioned in official statements and publications. Nevertheless, he went on, “right through 1978, from the beginning of the year until the end, everybody I met in the army was talking in those terms.”

Although changes in village leadership and many aspects of policy began in various parts of Kampuchea in early 1977, as cadres selected by the Pol Pot group from the Southwest Zone started to arrive in the villages, in the case of Saut Nikom district of Siemreap province, cadres from Kampot arrived in March 1978. Sovannareth, 19, was at that time working in a bean-growing production unit in the district. He recalls:

They arrested the previous local leaders, and made us suffer more than those cadres had. They said they were “real, strong socialists” and that their predecessors were “traitors.”

At a meeting of 1000 people in the village where I worked the Southwestern cadres put up banners denouncing the “Vietnamese aggressors of our land who are trying to form an Indochina Federation.” Another banner asked the Vietnamese a question: “You want us to join a Federation: do you know how to manufacture guns?” Another said: “I am a Kampuchean, and I resolve to fight the Vietnamese,” and others “Long live the great and strong Kampuchean revolution.” There were many other banners as well.

We sat on the ground during the meeting, which lasted from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. The village chief talked about how the people resolved to work hard so that guns and ammunition could be bought to defend the country. Fifteen village chiefs
from the district also talked for about ten minutes each, telling us to "destroy all bad habits and oppressive acts."

Then, the big leader spoke. His name was Ta Meng; he was about fifty years old, and killed people like anything, right in front of others. He talked about how the country had developed, showing photographs, and about the war between the Revolutionary Army and the Vietnamese. He said they had killed 30,000 Vietnamese in Svay Rieng province, destroyed 50 tanks and shot down four Russian-made planes. In order not to waste anything, he said, the bodies of the tanks had been used to make plates for the people to eat on . . .

Their plan was to take back Kampuchea Krom. He said that the Vietnamese were swallowing of Khmer land and that "the Khmer people resolve to liberate again the Khmer land in Kampuchea Krom." He talked all about "Moat Chrouk" (Chaudoc province of Vietnam) and "Prey Nokor" (Ho Chi Minh City) and so on. He called for the recruitment of ten youths from each village to join the army . . .

He also said that Thai planes had attacked Kampuchea's Oddar Meanchey province, and that "we are preparing to attack the Thai in order to take back the Khmer land in Thailand." Later he said: "We will have to fight Thailand in 1979, and we will certainly win. The Thais do not know how to fight because they have never fought before. For example, we went into their villages and killed them and burned their houses, and there was nothing they could do." He said they aimed to get back the provinces of Surin and Sisaket and so on from Thailand. This was in June 1978, in Koh Kong village.

Prince Sihanouk

In 1979, Prince Sihanouk described some of the background to all this in his book, Chroniques de guerre . . . et d'espoir:

In September 1975, I was indeed surprised to hear Khieu Samphan, Son Sen and company say, smiling and very pleased with themselves, that their soldiers were "displeased" with "the Party," because the latter did not give them the green light to go and take back Kampuchea Kram as well as the border districts of Thailand which belonged to Kampuchea in the past (Arany, Surin, etc.)

Later Sihanouk provided more detail about this conversation.

In the past, they said, our leaders sold out Kampuchea Krom, sold out South Vietnam to the Vietnamese. Our armies can't accept the status quo. We must make war against Vietnam to get back Kampuchea Krom. As the first step, if there are [sugar] palm trees, the soil is Khmer. In Chaudoc and Ha Tien, there are still palm trees. We must occupy.5

Sihanouk's book continues that after the 1975 Khmer Rouge victory, they . . . tried to conquer a part of Kampuchea Krom and committed horrible atrocities on a large number of Vietnamese male and female civilians (including old people, women and children).

The Pol Pot government rejected all the proposals for a peaceful solution presented on several occasions (in particular 5 February 1978) by the Hanoi government . . .

In 1978 Khieu Samphan confided to me, concerning the Kampuchea-Vietnam war, that his soldiers (Khmer Rouge) were "unstoppable": whenever they saw sugar palms in the territory of Kampuchea Krom, these patriotic soldiers could not prevent themselves from crossing the frontier and advancing "until they came to the last Khmer sugar palm." . . . According to Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister in charge of National Defence, his glorious "revolutionary army of Kampuchea" considered itself capable of dealing very easily with Giap's (Vietnamese) army, and with the much more puny one of Kukrit Pramoj and Kriangsak Chamanond (Thailand)!

Although Sihanouk's account is possibly sensationalised, it is not unlikely that the Pol Pot group outlined such a policy to the Prince as early as 1975. But apart from the clashes in May-June of that year, serious attacks into Vietnamese territory did not begin until 1977. Serious incidents along the border between northeast Thailand and Kampuchea started around the same time. (This was just when Pol Pot's group was successfully consolidating its power over the internal party opposition.) These attacks by Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge or by joint Khmer Rouge-Thai communist forces were characterized by a brutal militarism quite unlike what is known of the operating methods of the communists in other parts of Thailand at that time, where the tendency was to use political persuasion rather than coercion, to win the support of the population.

Around December 1977, according to the leftwing Bangkок journal Thai Nikorn (14/5/79), a secret agreement was reached between representatives of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), Northeastern Committee, and the Kampuchean party secretary of Oddar Meanchey province (adjacent to Surin), representing Pol Pot's Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). The meeting agreed:

To set up a mixed force of CPT and CPK in order to act in the southern part of Northeast Thailand . . .

It was agreed that the Kampucheans would send one unit of forces to join the CPT movement, in order that the mixed force should use Pol Pot's lessons on how to seize power, i.e. wherever the conditions are ripe for striking against the stable underpinnings of Thai civil servants, an effort should be made to strike, and every day and every night in order to terrorize Thai officials. Wherever conditions are not ripe, a report should be made to the central unit of the Kampuchean side. If it should be thought appropriate, the Kampuchean base unit will enter Thailand and strike against the base without the mixed force having to become involved. (my emphasis)

The Thai communist guerrillas in this southern part of northeast Thailand (mostly Surin, Buriram and Sisaket provinces) were nearly all ethnic Khmers of local origin. Their movement, which enjoyed the use of about a dozen base camps inside northern Kampuchea (formalized in the December 1977 agreement), was internally known as Angkar Siem, or "the Thai Angkar," in Khmer: angkar, the Khmer term meaning "the Organization," was the word used by the Communist Party of Kampuchea to describe itself. It seems to me extremely
curious that a Thai group would explicitly describe itself as virtually the Thai branch, as appendage of the word "Siem" implies, of a characteristically-named Kampuchean movement. Unless, of course, certain "Thai military strategists" are correct in thinking that "Phnom Penh increased its support for the Thai communist insurgency along the northern Cambodian border to back irredentist claims on a wide swathe of Thai provinces settled by a mixed Khmer-descended population." A similar evaluation of Pol Pot's designs by the CPT leadership, as well as a realization of the political disaster created by the use of coercion against the Thai border population, and Chinese pressure on Pol Pot to stabilize the Thai front in order to concentrate his forces against Vietnam, may have been the reason for the CPT's cracking down on the activities of Angkar Siem around mid-1978.

In this connection one may legitimately ask what purpose could have been served by the construction of a long road through the forest of northern Kampuchea parallel with the Thai frontier. Work began on this in early 1977, according to one participant in a number of work-teams of teenage Khmer peasant boys.

At almost the same time, Kampuchea began to clash with her third neighbor, Laos. After a December 1978 visit to southern Laos, Nayan Chanda wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review (12/12/78):

"It is now clear that the situation on the [Lao-Kampuchean] border has been deteriorating since the end of 1976.

The CPK and Vietnam

But it was against Vietnam that Kampuchean border attacks were the fiercest and most systematic. It is widely accepted that the fighting that broke out in early 1977 and continued throughout the year was initiated by the Kampuchean side, and consisted mostly of raids on villages or shelling of towns. Vietnamese civilian casualties were extremely high.

Summarizing numerous reports in the press, Keesing's Contemporary Archives gave the following account of the conflict during 1977:

The situation gravely deteriorated from March 1977 onwards. According to an official Vietnamese document published on 6th January 1978 the Cambodian forces made raids into the Vietnamese provinces of Kien Giang and An Giang on March 15–18 and 25–28, 1977, along a sector nearly 100 kilometres long from Ha Tien (Kien Giang) to Tinh Bien (An Giang). Strong Cambodian forces launched concerted attacks on Vietnamese army posts and on border villages in An Giang between April 30 and May 19, killing 222 civilians, and shelled Chau Doc, the provincial capital, on May 17. These reports were corroborated by Vietnamese refugees reaching other Asian countries, who stated that the civilian population had been evacuated from Ha Tien on May 16 and from Chau Doc on the following day after the two towns had been shelled... According to the Vietnamese document, fighting continued at intervals throughout mid-1977... The scale of the fighting greatly increased in the second half of September—this development coinciding with Mr. Pol Pot's resumption of the premiership and his visits to China and North Korea. The Vietnamese document of 6 January 1978, which was supported by reports from US intelligence sources, stated that from September 24 onwards Cambodian forces totalling about four divisions had launched continuous attacks along the entire border of Tay Ninh province, and that over 1,000 civilians had been killed or wounded in this area between September 24 and late November...

Of course, some supporters of the Pol Pot regime dispute that Kampuchea continually instigated clashes with Vietnam during 1977. But so far they have provided little or no evidence to sustain their case. The Pol Pot regime itself accuses Vietnam of beginning its attacks that year only in June (and even for this there is no corroborating evidence), whereas we know from many independent sources that the fighting began in March. The Black Book, Pol Pot's detailed official history of the border conflict, in its discussion of Vietnamese "aggression" in the year 1977, mentions only the real Vietnamese cross-border offensive of December.

Two Kampuchean refugees in France provide eyewitness accounts of the border fighting in 1977. Veasna fled his country for Vietnam in December 1975. He says he was allowed to live normally as a Vietnamese citizen, taking various jobs. He lived very close to the border, in the village of Ap Sase (Minit, Ha Tien, Kien Giang) and "could see the Khmer Rouge working every day." He says there was no fighting between Kampuchea and Vietnam during 1976.

In mid-1977, "the Khmer Rouge started the fighting," Veasna says. "I saw this in actual fact with my own eyes, since my house was 500 metres from the border. When the Khmer Rouge crossed the border everybody ran and grabbed their children and all ran into their houses. But the Khmer Rouge came into our village and burn down houses and burnt goods, and killed about twenty people who were not able to run away

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**THEATER AS STRUGGLE**

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Before that, in nearby Prey Tameang village, the Khmer Rouge had killed two hundred civilians, including ethnic Khmers as well as Vietnamese, he adds.

"The population asked the Vietnamese military to fight back against the Khmer Rouge, but they replied that they didn't have orders from above to do so. In 1977 the Vietnamese did not go into Kampuchean territory." (Interview in France, 7 October 1979.)

Heng escaped to Vietnam from Svy Rieng province of Kampucha in October 1975. He too was given permission to live and work as he chose, and he settled down in the Kimher-Vietnamese village of Ke Mea, in Tay Ninh province. He found that the Vietnamese authorities referred to the Khmer Rouge as "brothers," and that all through 1976 there was no fighting along the border. The local Vietnamese community, he said, were not racist in their attitudes towards the Khmer; in Vietnam "they didn't teach the children to hate (the Khmers) as in Kampucha." Further, "Vietnamese girls liked Khmer boys."

Then, in May or June 1977, the Khmer Rouge shelled Ke Mea, killing "hundreds of people." Many of them were ethnic Khmers as well as Vietnamese, Heng says. The Vietnamese authorities still insisted that the Khmer Rouge were their "friends." Only in early 1978, according to Heng, did they mount loudspeakers in the villages "telling their people what the Khmer had done." (Interview in France, 8 October 1979.)

The Vietnamese counter-offensive of December 1977-January 1978 was followed by a Vietnamese withdrawal from inside Kampuchean territory (or a defeat), and the offer of negotiations, a mutual pullback five kilometres either side of the border, and international supervision of the border to prevent aggression across it. The traditional Vietnamese communist view of themselves, as patrons of the other IndoChinese revolutions, had been overcome by a more urgent priority, the desire for a peaceful frontier. If Pol Pot had accepted this offer, made by Hanoi on 5 February 1978, his regime would most likely have survived. But this would also have meant the abandonment of policies towards Vietnam that had become clear enough over the previous year. But with Chinese backing, a desire to reconquer the Mekong Delta from Vietnam, and internal instability within Kampuchea's ruling communist party, the Pol Pot group was not prepared to abandon those policies. They refused the proposal, and their conflict with Vietnam became locked into "the continuous non-stop struggle."
Statement to the Conference on Vietnam and Kampuchea
Dassel, West Germany

by Torben Retboll

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea is a tragedy, to both Vietnam and Kampuchea. Firstly, because Vietnam thereby has violated Kampuchea's right to self-determination. And secondly, because this military operation is not likely to improve the welfare of the people in either of the countries.

Self-determination

By invading and occupying Kampuchea, Vietnam has violated the very principle for which it fought for decades—first against the French and later against the Americans—namely that the problems of each nation should be solved by that nation's own population.

The two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have never taken a principled stand against military invasions, but only against those committed by their opponent. Soviet protests over atrocities for which the U.S. is responsible are just as cynical and hypocritical as are American protests over similar cruelties perpetrated by the Soviet Union. The principle that each individual nation has a right to determine its own political course is only valid to them when there are no costs involved. When the U.S. waged its war against Southeast Asia, the so-called "hawks" contended that America could win if only a sufficient amount of dollars were spent and a sufficient number of bombs were dropped, while the so-called "doves" thought that a military victory was too costly and should be abandoned. But none of them questioned America's right to intervene. The Peace Movement in the U.S. (and in other Western countries), however, adopted a third and much more honest position, namely that the U.S. had no legal or moral right to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries.

After the end of the war, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated that "a lesson we learned from Vietnam is that we should be very cautious about intervening in any place where there is a poor political base for our presence." That is, the U.S. need not refrain from governing the world, but should merely be careful where they do not have a strong position. If one opposes Soviet invasions in Eastern Europe and American invasions in Latin America and Asia (basing oneself on the principled stand which was the foundation of the Peace Movement), then, it seems to me, one must also—if there is to be any logic—oppose the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. To say this is not to deny or ignore that there are divisions and disagreement within the Kampuchean people. Of course there are. But these problems should be solved by the Kampuchean themselves and—so far as possible—without pressure from the outside world. The decisions should not be made in Hanoi, Moscow, Washington or Beijing.

The cynicism of American policy towards Kampuchea is well known and need not be described here. In fact, the attitude of the Soviet Union is no less hypocritical, and perhaps a few details are in order. Up until 1975, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic recognition of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government, and consequently the Russian embassy staff was expelled from the country in May 1975 together with all other foreigners "on the back of a truck" as the American commentator Joseph Alsop noted in a remarkable article from December 1975 in which he predicted the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. But in spite of this humiliation, the Soviet Union nevertheless declared its full support for the new government in Phnom Penh from April 1975 until December 1977.

The Soviet press praised the revolution in Kampuchea. The past was so effectively suppressed that the weekly New Times in October 1977 was able to write that "the Communist Party and the government of the Soviet Union have invariably supported the Kampuchean people's struggle under Communist leadership for freedom, independence and territorial integrity." The same article also said that "with scant information coming from Kampuchea, the Western press alleges without proof that the new leaders are using 'tyrannical methods,' 'neglecting the
needs of the nation’s development’ and so on. ‘’ And whereas the former statement is notoriously wrong, the latter statement is not at all a bad characterization of the activities of the Western press. 5

From January 1978, however, when the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict came into full public light, the situation changed overnight and the Soviet Union gave full support to the Vietnamese position. In September 1978, New Times now reported on “the Kampuchean tragedy,” and the following month falsified pictures of Communist atrocities in Kampuchea appeared in the Literaturnaja Gazeta as an illustration to an article entitled “‘Socialism’ by the recipe of Peking.” The source for these pictures was the conservative West-German magazine Stern. The text of the article was mostly long excerpts about atrocities in Kampuchea taken from different Western publications, and there were no questions raised about the credibility of the pictures or the quotations. Usually, the Soviet Union is highly contemptuous of the “bourgeois” and “anti-Soviet” Western press, but in this case its accounts were presented as the gospel truth. 6

Nor did the Soviet press refrain from lying about what the American journalists Elizabeth Becker and Richard Dudman reported about their visit to Kampuchea in December 1978. On January 11, 1979, the New York correspondent for Pravda informed us that “Becker and . . . Dudman write about a period of evil and tyranny which was forced upon this country by a government following China’s political system. They say that there were systematic executions in Kampuchea and that the victims of these executions came from all the different social groups.” In Becker and Dudman’s articles, however, there is nothing of all this.

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea has caused protests from many countries. It is true that the new pro-Vietnamese government in Phnom Penh was quickly recognized by the Soviet Union and its allies, but apart from this, international recognition has been slowly forthcoming. 7 At the conference of non-aligned countries in Havana in September last year, there was so much disagreement over who should represent Kampuchea that the seat remained empty during the meeting. But when the United Nations General Assembly opened a few weeks later in New York, there was a great majority who wanted the country to be represented by the government of Democratic Kampuchea and not by the government that Vietnam had installed by the use of armed force.

On the Left, however, among the remnants of the Peace Movement, there has been considerable disagreement among those who either defended or condemned the invasion. The Trotskyists had many and extensive discussions whether or not Kampuchea had been what they termed a “degenerated workers’ state.” The point was that in the first case the invasion was not a good thing, but in the opposite case it could be accepted. The Trotskyists are not very fond of “degenerated workers’ states” (a category to which Vietnam also belongs), but they believe that this type of state nevertheless is to be preferred to capitalist democracy. 8

The Danish party, the Left Socialists, which in one of its very first important decisions condemned the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, was also divided and unable to condemn Vietnam. Thus, Inger Johansen, a member of the party’s international secretariat, declared at a public meeting in Copenhagen in March 1979 that it was wrong to demand withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops: “Apparently, the new government [in Phnom Penh] considers these troops a necessity,” she said, “and we have to respect that wish.” 9 By a similar logic, one might—ten years ago—have said about the Thieu-regime in South Vietnam that “apparently the government in Saigon considers the American troops a necessity and we have to respect that wish.”

Since then, the Left Socialist Party has moved from uncertainty and disagreement to a full and whole-hearted acceptance of the invasion.

The Vietnamese army has crossed into Kampuchea and has installed a regime which is more sympathetic towards Vietnamese wishes. In the beginning, the official view was that there were no Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. This claim was strongly contradicted by all available information, and hardly anybody took it seriously. Those who did easily ran into self-contradictions. In January 1979, Wilfried Gluud, who is a prominent member of the Danish-Vietnamese Association, wrote the following passage: “At this moment, it is impossible to prove or disprove the claims that there are regular Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. But Vietnam denies it, and we will go on believing that.”

Gluud, however, is also a member of the leftist organization KA-ml, and in the paper of this organization, he wrote at approximately the same time that “regardless of how strong KNUFNS 10 is considered to be, everything points to the fact that regular Vietnamese troops are taking part with armoured cars and planes. This must be condemned as an act of aggression and as an illegal invasion of the territory of another country.”

These two statements were placed together by another left wing paper which with good reason concluded that Gluud must be “a pure double man.” Gluud replied to this a few weeks later: The article in which he had criticized Vietnam was based on a “too fast and wrong judgement” of the situation, he then explained. 11

But even people who were sympathetic towards Vietnam refused to swallow Hanoi’s propaganda. Thus, the American Dave Dellinger wrote shortly after the invasion that “it is ludicrous to suggest that the rebels possessed the planes, pilots, tanks, heavy artillery, organization and numbers to conduct the blitzkrieg that swept Kampuchea.”

In the same connection, Dellinger also said that he had attended a gathering in New York in the autumn of 1978 in which people from the Peace Movement and some Vietnamese officials took part:

In a formal presentation, the Vietnamese excoriated China for having supported Lon Nol during the period he headed the pro-American, anti-Communist Kampuchean government (March 1970-April 1975), and for having received Nixon in Peking during the saturation bombing of Vietnamese cities. No mention was made that the Soviet Union recognized and supported the Lon Nol government whereas in fact China did not. Nor was it mentioned that Nixon was similarly in Moscow during the same period of massive U.S. bombardments.

And Dellinger then adds that “Americans in the anti-war move-
ment had come to expect better from the Vietnamese—and many of us hope for a higher level of political discussion in the future."

Later, Vietnam gave up its pretense that the changes in Kampuchea were caused only by an internal uprising. This happened when Vietnam entered into a treaty with the very government that they themselves had just installed in Phnom Penh. The treaty made it legal for the Vietnamese troops to be stationed on Kampuchean territory (just as the Soviet Union did one year later in Afghanistan).

The welfare of the people

There are, however, some people who believe that the principle of self-determination may be a noble one but that it sometimes must give way to another one, namely the principle of the welfare of the people. According to this view, Vietnam has liberated Kampuchea from what Wilfred Burchett—a firm supporter of Vietnamese policies—has characterized as "four years of Khmer Rouge madness" and should be praised for restoring human rights in Kampuchea.

I am not inclined to share this view. There is no doubt that there was repression in Kampuchea before December 1978, but if we were to recommend a military invasion in every country run by a repressive government, there would be no end to invasions. And who is going to decide when an invasion is justified? The perspectives are horrifying indeed. To my knowledge, it is rather difficult to find examples in which a military invasion has improved the welfare of a people, and Kampuchea seems to be no exception to the general rule.

Eighteen months after the invasion, the situation is still difficult to evaluate with any certainty, but my view is this: Firstly, Vietnam has introduced war into the country. When the front moves back and forward the Vietnamese and the resistance movement take revenge against those who—willingly or not—co-operated with the opponent. Secondly, only 5 or 10 percent of the fields are cultivated and Vietnam has about 150,000 soldiers plus civilian personnel stationed in Kampuchea and seems determined to starve the resistance movement to death if this is necessary to crush it. Thirdly, each day, more people become victims of hunger, disease and death as a direct result of the war situation. And finally, the Vietnamese population has to support a huge military apparatus which is causing severe economic problems in Vietnam.

Before, the invasion, virtually all foreign observers in Kampuchea reported unanimously that the people appeared healthy and well-fed and that all the fields were being cultivated. Thus, the conservative Hong Kong magazine, The Far Eastern Economic Review, in its 1979 yearbook reported the following:

A team of Japanese diplomats based in Peking and an economist attached to the mission visited Cambodia in August [1978]. The group has reported that it did not get the impression people were deprived of food. Supplies seemed to be adequate. Vegetables were abundant, with plenty of fruit, and the diet was supplemented with pig-breeding. The findings of the mission are, of course, from a swift tour from Phnom Penh to Angkor Wat. However, the economist, who had been in Cambodia in the time of the Lon Nol regime, found agriculture in better shape than before the liberation and irrigation much better organised than at that time. This stands in dramatic contrast to virtually all reports from foreign visitors after the invasion.

Last year, the noted French priest, François Ponchaud, even claimed that the Vietnamese were systematically plundering Kampuchea for machinery, furniture, rice and so on. Pro-Vietnamese observers, however, such as Wilfred Gluud in Denmark, have insisted that Ponchaud is anti-Communist and therefore a bad and unreliable witness. The question of credibility is important and I would like to comment briefly on it.

I believe that when Pol Pot and other members of his party accuse Vietnam of plundering Kampuchea, it is not very surprising, or even credible, if nobody else does so. In fact, others do. And when a sworn opponent of Pol Pot such as Ponchaud does it, one should, in my opinion, take it more seriously.

Gluud says that "there are true accounts about Vietnamese who have committed crimes in Kampuchea, but these are relatively few individual incidents," and "all foreign visitors have rejected the claim that Vietnam is plundering Kampuchea." In addition, Gluud refers to the Australian scholar Ben Kiernan who has conducted a number of refugee interviews and concludes on the basis of this that "the Vietnamese army has displayed a model behaviour towards the Kampuchean civilian population."

I think that Gluud and Kiernan are right: It is not the official policy of Vietnam to plunder Kampuchea, and therefore one should make a proviso when Ponchaud says that Vietnam is "systematically" plundering Kampuchea.

Nevertheless, all this does not lead me to condone the invasion. Gluud's arguments may seem convincing but upon reflection they become high dubious: By a similar logic, one might just as well condone the German occupation of Denmark during World War Two. In that case, the story would run as follows:

"There are true accounts about Germans who have committed crimes in Denmark, but these are relatively few individual incidents, and all foreign visitors have rejected the claim that Germany is plundering Denmark. The German army has displayed a model behaviour towards the Danish civilian population."

But this occupation would hardly be condoned by anyone.

One of the latest reports from Kampuchea that I have seen comes from the Swedish journalist Bengt Albons and was published in April of this year. Here, Albons says the following:

The evidence that the Vietnamese invasion forces emptied the occupied houses in Phnom Penh and other cities is overwhelming. They filled trucks with refrigerators, fans, machinery, medicine and antiquities and took it all to Vietnam, people say with disgust . . . . It is not certain that the plundering has been officially sanctioned policy, but the accounts that they have taken place are so many and so wide-spread that they cannot be rejected.

On this point, then, Albons seems fairly close to Gluud and Kiernan. However, Albons also says that the rice stores have almost come to an end in Kampuchea: The seeds for sowing have been eaten, and a new hunger catastrophe is threatening. Moreover, he reports that the inhabitants of Phnom Penh complain that the Vietnamese are acting as new masters in Kampuchea, that they have taken over the best houses in the city and are living better than everybody else. Anti-Vietnamese feelings are marked by horror and contempt, Albons says.
Thus, the invasion does not seem to improve the welfare of the Kampuchean people.

The future

It is difficult to see how a quick and just solution of the conflict in Kampuchea can be achieved. Bengt Albons concludes, on the basis of his recent visit, that there is no political force in Kampuchea today that has sufficient popular support—neither Pol Pot nor Heng Samrin—and that this will mean that Vietnam will feel forced to remain in Kampuchea for many years to come. This judgment is, in my view, plausible—but also tragic. It means that war, starvation and disease will continue to demand many victims in Kampuchea, while the Vietnamese people will have to go on supporting a huge and costly military apparatus. The great powers have for too many years had a considerable and tragic influence in Southeast Asia. The U.S. has been assisting Indonesia’s war against the former Portuguese colony East Timor, just as the Soviet Union is delivering weapons to Vietnam’s war against Kampuchea. In 1977, during a congressional hearing on human rights in East Timor, a spokesman of the U.S. government stated that one purpose of American assistance to Indonesia is “to keep that area peaceful.” Similarly, in December 1979, another spokesman claimed that the major objective of U.S. policy is “the welfare of the Timorese people.”12 I am quite certain that the Soviet Union will claim that the purpose of their policy toward Kampuchea is precisely the same. The facts, however, tell us a different story. But if there is no local solution to the Kampuchea-Vietnam conflict, it is not unlikely that the great powers will attempt to press for their own solutions. And this is not likely to benefit the people, either in Kampuchea or in Vietnam.

Pro-Vietnamese observers have said that Vietnam cannot withdraw now, because this might cause a bloodbath if the resistance movement takes revenge on those who have co-operated with the Vietnamese. The argument seems familiar: It is the same argument that every occupation force has always used in order to justify its presence once it has intervened. And by a similar logic, one might claim that Germany during World War Two could not risk withdrawing from France for fear that the resistance movement would take revenge on French collaborators.

At the preparatory meeting of the non-aligned countries in Colombo in the summer of 1979, the Foreign Minister of Democratic Kampuchea, Ieng Sary, stated in interviews with the New York Times and Le Monde that his government now gave first priority to the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces: All political parties should be allowed to operate, and the government to be formed afterwards should be established on the basis of free and secret elections conducted under supervision of the United Nations.13 This suggestion is, in my opinion, worth pursuing, even though pragmatists may reject it as unrealistic.

Our chances of influencing Vietnam to accept such a suggestion are not exactly overwhelming. Nonetheless, the sufferings that the people of Kampuchea have been going through demand that we in the West attempt to work towards a situation in which these people will finally be allowed to decide their own destiny without pressure from the outside and to express their own political beliefs and wishes without fear of revenge or persecution from anybody.
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Review: Indonesia

by Richard W. Franke

While the major media in the U.S. remained fixated on “boat people,” Thai-Kampuchean border camps, and the like, they paid little attention to the atrocities and intrigues by the pro-US military government in Indonesia in its attempt to suppress independence movements and to stifle the economic and social potential of several peoples in the Eastern Archipelago. A series of recent publications, however, have made available much information and analysis—some of it previously known but in less accessible form, others entirely new.

Willard Hanna's Indonesian Banda is a short and microcosmic history of one group of the spice islands. Theoretically, the study leaves much to be desired. After announcing in his forward that he has chosen the small nutmeg islands in order to gain a simpler but more accurate perspective on the otherwise overly complex Indonesian society as a whole, the author never returns to explain just how the material in the remainder of the book relates to this goal. Indeed, Hanna’s descriptive material, which summarizes much Dutch archival data not easily available to the non-Indonesia specialist, seems more appropriately attuned to a study of colonialism in microcosm: the broken treaties, the intrigues, the Dutch-English-Portuguese rivalries, the genocide, the fabulous profits in the home country and the impoverished workers in the nutmeg groves. Hanna also documents the extreme irrationality of colonial relationships. In one instance the Dutch actually exterminate the entire nutmeg tree population of one island to prevent its fruits from being gathered by the British.

Hanna’s account is highly readable, sometimes shocking in its portrayal of the actions and mentality of the early colonial traders and conquerors. It adequately introduces the reader to the squandering of human and environmental resources that went into building the empire of the Dutch East Indies. The author’s conservative political leanings come through in a few places such as when he sounds a hopeful note for the future of the now impoverished islanders with the demise of Sukarno and the rise of the more development-minded Suharto government.

And, rather inconsistently, he comments towards the end of the study that while Banda in the 16th century was evidently relatively well-off, “The present population of 15,000 [though the same as in the 16th century] is clearly excessive.” (p. 144) What a sad comment on the effects of 400 years of European control and thirty years of neocolonial independence!

Kees Lagerberg’s study of the island of New Guinea “was commissioned and written to inform the world, as fully as possible, of a very great modern injustice to which no fair solution is yet in sight.” But we are neither told by whom the study was commissioned, nor why the author cannot come up with a “fair” solution for the Irianese who are now fighting a protracted guerrilla war for independence under the leadership of the OPM or “Free Papua Movement.” Lagerberg, a former district officer from the period of Dutch “enlightened” colonial control of the 1950s is currently a professor of anthropology at the Catholic University of Tilburg, The Netherlands. Unfortunately, however, little anthropological knowledge is transmitted in the book. It is mostly a history of the diplomatic machinations leading to the transfer of sovereignty from The Netherlands to the United Nations in 1962—but under Indonesian administration—and the “act of free choice” of 1969 in which a small number of Papuan representatives were coerced into joining the Indonesian Republic on behalf of a resentful population. Lagerberg sees much of what happened from the narrow perspective of an embittered Dutch official, and constantly heaps vituperation upon former Indonesian President Sukarno. Numerous other ad hominem remarks lead one to be rather cautious in recommending Lagerberg’s factual material—but much of it is rather useful if read in conjunction with the more informative and Papuan-oriented Rule of the Sword by Nonie Sharp (reviewed in BCAS, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 24). In a few places Lagerberg brings to readers some important material on the political intrigues that sealed the Indonesian takeover. On April...
2, 1962, for example, then-President John F. Kennedy apparently sent a secret letter to the Dutch Prime Minister De Quay in which Kennedy spelled out why the US was not going to allow a Dutch-sponsored decolonization program to continue. The reason: a conflict would arise between Indonesia and The Netherlands, and, quoting from Kennedy's letter, "Such a conflict would have adverse consequences out of all proportions to the issue [Papuan independence—RF] at stake. . . . Only the Communists would benefit from such a conflict. . . . The whole non-Communist position in Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaya would be in grave peril and as you know these are areas in which we in the United States have heavy commitments and burdens." (p. 87) Like the East Timorese 13 years later, then, the national rights of the Irianese had to be sacrificed to the geopolitical interests of the United States. And like Portugal today, The Netherlands found itself unable to influence the policies of its dominant NATO partner.

The Irianese, however, have continued to resist Indonesian occupation with its corruption and brutality. Nonie Sharp's brief account in *Arena* makes available information on an apparent plan by the Indonesian military regime to extend its control from West Irian to the newly-independent state of Papua-New Guinea—the eastern half of the island. Both the continued occupation of portions of East Timor, and the threat to swallow up the eastern half of New Guinea represent policies never anticipated in the earlier take-over of West New Guinea which was justified on grounds that it was included in the previous colonial boundaries of the Duth East Indies.

Torben Retboll has brought the valuable documentation service of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) to the East Timor question. The collection of documents includes the 1978 and 1979 UN statements by Noam Chomsky (much of which is contained in a *BCAS* article in vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 40-68), statements by FRETILIN (the Timorese liberation movement), accounts from refugees in Portugal, letters smuggled out of Timor, and many other sources, several of them from West European and Australian newspaper accounts that were not given space in the US press. Many of the UN resolutions and the voting records of selected countries on these resolutions are also presented. The collection ends with a useful bibliography and list of addresses in various countries where further information can be obtained.

Kohen and Taylor's *An Act of Genocide* is the most definitive description yet of the Indonesian attempt to suppress the independence movement of the East Timorese. A "reasured and carefully documented analysis," as Chomsky states in his foreword to the book, *An Act of Genocide* is documented entirely from Western news sources or from reliable refugee accounts for the most recent period. After summarizing the history of East Timor, the authors describe the events leading to the Indonesian invasion of 1975, the exceptionally strong FRETILIN resistance up to 1977 and the eventual use of massive bombing to destroy crops and villages and to force a large portion of the population into camps where they must live on international relief. Two concluding chapters sum up the overall relationship between the Western nations and East Timor: in one chapter there is a list of the various economic and military assistance programs of the United States, Australia, West Germany, The Netherlands, and Britain to the Indonesians, including specific counterinsurgency weapons. And finally, there is a chapter outlining the "Right to Self Determination" which the evidence so clearly shows has been willfully denied thus far to the people of East Timor. A stalemate has developed between Indonesian brutality and military occupation on the one hand and the commitment of the people of East Timor to gain their independence on the other. The addition of massive Western armaments to the Indonesian military has made that stalemate deadly as somewhere between 1/10 and 1/3 of the entire population of East Timor have been killed; the rest suffer massive dislocation.

### Books to Review

The following review copies have arrived at the office of the *Bulletin*. If you are interested in reading and reviewing one or more of them, write to Bryant Avery, *BCAS*, P.O. Box W, Charlemont, MA 01339. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list of the available books in print—only a list of books received.

We welcome reviews of other worthy volumes.

- Chr. L. M. Penders (ed.): *Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism*, 1830-1942 (Univ. of Queensland, 1977).
- Thomas A. Breslin: *China, American Catholicism, and the Missionary (Penn State, 1980).
- Eugene Cooper: *The Wood-Carvers of Hong Kong* (Cambridge Univ., 1980).
- V.I. Semonov: *Lu Hsun and His Predecessors* (M.E. Sharpe, 1980).
- George Kao (ed.): *Two Writers and the Cultural Revolution: Lao She and Chen Je-hsi* (Univ. of Washington Press, 1980).
- Roger W. Bowen: *Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan* (California, 1980).
- Kim Chi Ha: *The Middle Hour: Selected Poems* (Coleman Enterprises, 1980).
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New Books for theEighties

The Future of Taiwan
A Difference of Opinions
Edited with an introduction by Victor H. Li
This volume records the conversations of a politically balanced group of prominent Chinese-American scholars who met to try to come to grips with the future of Taiwan and their own destiny as reflected in it. The result is a lively and candid discussion—sometimes emotional, sometimes acerbic, and always interesting.
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Industry and Business in Japan
Edited with an introduction by Kazuo Sato
"...a rare opportunity to become acquainted with the work of Japan's leading economists. A highly significant contribution to dialogue between Japan and the West. It will be read eagerly by academics and government officials alike." —Eleanor M. Hadley, George Washington University
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Scratches on Our Minds
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(Previously reprinted as Images of Asia)
By Harold R. Isaacs
With a new preface bythe author
"...a gold mine of material in which precious nuggets will be found by political scientists and psychologists, by economists and philosophers, and by any thoughtful citizen who wants to get to the roots which have nurtured our policy in Asia." —The New Republic
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232 pages  $20.00

Li Chih (1527-1602) in Contemporary Chinese Historiography
New Light on His Life and Works
Translated from Wen wu and other sources with introduction, notes, and appendices by Hok-lam Chan
Foreword by Frederick W. Mote
"...an original and valuable contribution to our study of Chinese history. It will be especially useful in college courses on Chinese history because it constructs a sophisticated bridge between the world of late Ming Confucian scholarship and the world of political and academic struggle in the People's Republic of China of the 1970s."
—Jonathan Spence, Yale University
216 pages  $20.00

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Congress O.K.s new nerve gas plant

By Robert Howard

WASHINGTON

ITH LITTLE DEBATE AND even less deliberation, the Congress has taken the first step toward dismantling 10 years of bipartisan government policy concerning the production of weapons for chemical warfare.

During one week in September, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved first $3.15 million for the construction of a chemical weapons plant in Pine Bluff, Ark., and then another $19 million for the production equipment to be housed inside it. The Senate, by a much closer vote, has also approved the construction money, and position on the equipment funds is soon.

The $22 million part of the first phase of what is expected to become a $4 billion production effort of the most lethal of all chemical weapons is now complete.

More evidence surfaces of Soviet germ-warfare accident

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

The USSR is concealing the truth about an anthrax epidemic at Sverdlovsk last year that probably involved Soviet violation of a 1975 treaty against manufacturing biological weapons, according to Intelligence reports released by a congressional committee June 30.

Critics of the Carter administration, led by US Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin, are charging that the administration's awkward handling of news about a reported explosion in a Sverdlovsk germ-warfare research laboratory that allegedly led to hundreds of Soviet casualties has made it more difficult to get at the truth.

In comments prepared for delivery on the House floor June 30, Congressman Aspin agreed with findings of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that there is strong evidence "the Soviets have cheated" on the biological weapons treaty.

However, Mr. Aspin agrees with the subcommittee's majority report that absolves the Carter administration from allegations that it played politics with the Sverdlovsk germ-warfare information. Some critics have charged that the administration withheld the information from the US public until all hope for the ratification of the SALT II treaty by the Senate had been lost in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The committee's ranking Republican member, Rep. John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, and Rep. C. W. Bill Young (R) of Florida, added the opinion that the US should sign no arms-control treaties with the Soviets "unless they are self-enforcing or if we have the capability to fully monitor them through our intelligence agencies or with on-site inspection.

The committee document and a related,