2019.21: Francis L. F. Lee: On Radicalization in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong
Moving toward the end of October, the wave of protests in Hong Kong originally triggered by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government’s proposal to revise existing laws regarding extradition of fugitives is still ongoing. Between the million-strong demonstration on June 9 and the weekend police-protester clashes in mid-October, Hong Kong society witnessed not only several large-scale protest rallies and demonstrations, but also a wide range of actions that have never been conducted in Hong Kong before, such as international airport sit-in rallies, “human-chain actions” along metro lines, sizable protest marches in various residential districts, and collective singing of the movement song, Glory to Hong Kong in shopping malls across the city.
At the same time, the level of violence involved in the police-protester clashes has also surpassed what Hong Kong has experienced in any contentious political events in the past fifty years. On the side of the protesters, disruptive and confrontational tactics have evolved from the use of umbrellas for self-protection and the throwing of bricks to setting rubbish on fire and the use of petrol bombs. Since September, there also has emerged so-called “private resolution,” a phrase used to describe violence against counter-protesters. Originally, private resolution was meant to be an act of self-defense: given a total lack of trust in the police force, protesters believed that they needed to protect themselves by exercising proportionate violence when they were attacked by counter-protesters. But it is debatable whether the use of force in instances of private resolution has been proportionate and only against people who had initiated physical attacks.
The Anti-Extradition Bill (AEB) Movement has exhibited a clear trend of tactical radicalization over the past four months. This trend can be quite readily explained in terms of a cycle of escalation resulting from the relational dynamics between the protesters and the police force. When the government rejected the movement’s original demand to table the bill, protesters had to consider employing more disruptive and confrontational tactics. These confrontational tactics were met with tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets. Repression and other police misconduct enraged the protesters, leading to even more confrontational tactics. The latter was then met with even higher levels of police violence, which triggered a further escalation of protest actions. By the time the Hong Kong government announced the withdrawal of the bill on September 4, the core demands of the protesters had shifted to police abuse of power and a demand for democratization. Withdrawal of the bill was no longer adequate for de-escalation.
However, what is remarkable in the AEB movement is not so much the tactical radicalization itself than public receptiveness of radical tactics. Hong Kong society has been widely regarded as conservative in terms of protests and politics. Sociologist Agnes Ku has long argued that Hong Kong’s public culture places a strong emphasis on order so that public attitudes toward protests and protesters can quickly shift once violence or disorder arose.[i] This was also a major reason why the 2014 Umbrella Movement insisted on non-violent civil disobedience. But in the AEB movement, participants in peaceful protests have exhibited a high level of sympathy towards radical tactics, as shown in a series of surveys I and my colleagues have conducted at protest sites. Close to seventy percent of participants surveyed during the two-million-strong June 16 protest agreed with the statement, “When the government fails to listen, the use of radical tactics by protesters is understandable.” This figure rose to 83.5% in the July 1 protests and 94.2% in the 1.7-million-strong protest on August 18.[ii] The same question was asked in surveys conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in early September and October. The results found that 55% and 59% of the respondents in the two surveys, respectively, agreed with the statement.[iii]
Understanding moderate movement supporters’ and the general public’s receptiveness toward radicalization holds one of the keys to understanding the solidarity demonstrated among movement participants and the sustainability of the AEB movement as a whole. A short essay, of course, is not the place to provide a comprehensive and fully documented explanation of the phenomenon. But three parts of the explanation can be briefly outlined.
First, it should be noted that movement demands are supported by a majority of the public. In the CUHK survey in September, eighty percent of respondents supported the setting up of an independent commission of inquiry, and seventy-five percent supported the re-initiation of democratic reforms, two of the core demands of the AEB movement. Therefore, when the government continued to ignore the demands, a large part of the public could also feel the anger that drove more militant protesters to adopt radical tactics. They thus found the use of force by protesters “understandable,” if not entirely unproblematic. Meanwhile, police violence has provided a “standard” against which the protesters’ violence is measured. The CUHK surveys in September and October found that around seventy percent of the public agreed that police had used excessive force, whereas only around forty percent of the public agreed that protesters had used excessive force. In other words, the combination of strong public approval of the movement’s goals, government irresponsiveness, and police brutality has set up the basic condition for public receptiveness toward radical tactics.
Second, for the moderate participants in the movement, their receptiveness of radical tactics is arguably grounded in their direct, indirect, or surrogate experiences of police repression. Many police-protester clashes have occurred in association with supposedly peaceful protest marches and rallies. The militant protesters often chose to begin their actions toward the end of protest marches and rallies, and the fluid movement of the militant protesters means that police-protester clashes often enter various residential districts. In such scenarios, the police can hardly restrict their use of force to the militant protesters. Moderate movement supporters and even district residents often have suffered from tear gas and other police threats. Besides, even without directly suffering from police violence, the end of a peaceful protest often involves a tense retreat in which a large number of moderate movement supporters quickly leave a protest site as if they were fleeing from a war. Such experiences instill fear and anger and reinforce people’s perception of police abuse of power, thus strengthening the basis of sympathy toward the militant protesters.
Third, the appropriateness and legitimacy of the specific radical tactics employed need to be explained to the broader public. Here, the role of digital media platforms is crucial. From the beginning of the AEB movement, the messaging app Telegram and the online forum LIHKG have served as central communication platforms. Large numbers of movement supporters congregate in such channels to discuss movement goals and tactics. The platforms also are where completed actions are debated and evaluated. Discussions on these forums help articulate justifications for various tactics. Norms and principles governing the use of certain radical tactics also have been developed. These might pressure militant protesters to exercise restraint in their actions. More importantly, these discussions help people make sense of the radical tactics and point to the restraints exercised by militant protesters. Analysis of our protest onsite survey data shows that, among movement supporters, those who use Telegram and LIHKG are more likely to agree with the use of radical tactics and have a stronger feeling of solidarity with the militant protesters.
The above discussion outlines the conditions and mechanisms behind the Hong Kong public’s sudden increase in receptiveness to radical protest actions during the AEB movement. Certainly, it does not mean that the Hong Kong public will always remain receptive no matter how far movement tactics are radicalized. When militant protestors began to use gasoline bombs in late August and “private resolution” tactics in September, the online discussions in LIHKG and Telegram became more heated, the tension between the moderate and radical flanks of the movement more conspicuous. Whether the existing conditions and mechanisms will be adequate in maintaining public receptiveness toward radicalism is an open question, but the answer to this question will play a highly important role in shaping the development and outcome of the movement.
Francis L. F. Lee is Director of the School of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is co-author, with Joseph Man Chan, of Media and Protest Logics in the Digital Era: Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (Oxford University Press, 2018) and editor of Media, Mobilization, and the Umbrella Movement (Routledge, 2016). He can be reached at francis_lee@cuhk.edu.hk.
[i] Ku, A. S. (2007). Constructing and contesting the “order” imagery in media discourse: Implications for civil society in Hong Kong. Asian Journal of Communication, 17(2), 186-200.
[ii] Information about the methodology of the surveys and selected findings are available at: https://sites.google.com/view/antielabsurvey-eng
[iii] The survey was partly sponsored by Ming Pao Daily News. Survey findings can be found in the news reports by Ming Pao Daily News in various months.