Commentary | Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Myanmar: Why the Military Took Over
This month’s military coup in Myanmar can be seen as the latest episode in the military’s attempts to regain its shrinking authority in an ongoing power struggle with the National League for Democracy (NLD). This conflict goes as far back as 1988, when the NLD assumed the leadership of popular demonstrations against the authoritarian Burma Socialist Program Party and the military.
Why now?
The possibility of a military coup has always been a threat in a fragile democracy like Myanmar, where the military (or Tatmataw) has ensured itself a continuing role in the post-military period through special provisions in the 2008 constitution. These include the military’s prerogative to “safeguard” the constitution in an emergency; the reservation of 25% of the seats in all legislatures and veto power over major constitutional changes (those requiring more than 75% approval in the parliament); control over three key ministries (defense, border affairs, and interior); immunity for its past record of human rights violations; and veto power in the National Defense Security Council (NDSC, a body formed to rule on major political and security matters, including emergency situations).
The military envisioned a slow and gradual transition to democracy, including progressively withdrawing from the legislature once Myanmar reaches a “stable and peaceful” stage of development (although this point has never been clearly defined). Aung San Suu Kyi’s overwhelming victory in the 2015 elections, and the poor performance of the Union Solidarity Development Party (the incumbent government party in 2011-2015, backed by the military), surprised everyone including the military. However, the Tatmataw may not have seen this result as a significant threat, as it was confident that the restrictions enshrined in the 2008 constitution would effectively check the power of the NLD, and particularly its charismatic leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
The NLD’s actions and practices in the post-2015 period seriously undermined the Tatmataw’s confidence in its ability to contain the new administration. First, Suu Kyi circumvented restrictions that prevented her from becoming president (a post denied to those married to or having children with foreign citizens) by creating the position of “State Counsellor” that was approved by a simple majority in the parliament. This office is similar to a prime minister in a semi-presidential system and has allowed her to serve “above the president,” as she stated in an interview. She also assumed the position of foreign minister, which carries one vote in the 11-seat NDSC, and refused to host regular meetings for the NDSC. She also tried, but failed, to change the constitution to reduce the number of seats reserved for the military in the parliament.
The military may have interpreted Suu Kyi’s troubled relationships with several ethnic minority groups, who felt alienated by the NLD’s attempt to monopolize power and impose its cultural hegemony, as a sign of the party’s declining popularity. These problems were manifested in the NLD’s relatively poor performance in the bi-elections held in 2017 and 2018 in areas with large ethnic minority populations, and a lack of progress in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreements with several ethnic armed groups. Despite these setbacks, and to the surprise of many, the NLD performed even better in the 2020 elections than in 2015; many analysts attributed this to unexpected developments such as the rollout of covid-related assistance that advantaged the government, as well as a statement by Tatmataw C-in-C Sr General Min Aung Hlaing that backfired. In response, a desperate military issued public statements and called press conferences demanding an investigation into the possibility of election fraud perpetrated by the Union Election Commission (UEC), a body created by the NLD to oversee elections. These allegations were dismissed by the UEC and the NLD, as well as by international elections observers. A public statement issued by the Tatmataw a day after the coup claimed that the coup was an act of last resort following the release of numerous public statements, press conferences, and failed attempts to get the attention of the UEC and the parliament, and to convene the NDSC to discuss the issue. It announced that it would implement guidelines for an ‘emergency’ period, and host another “free and fair” election to hand over power to the winning party in order to establish a “disciplined democracy.” No one really knows what took place in the closed-door and tense negotiations between NLD representatives and the army in a meeting held preceding the coup.
A handwritten letter signed and dated January 28 by the C-in-C and reportedly presented during the meeting stated that the Tatmataw had found 10,482,116 cases of duplications in voter lists (with a summary table of their findings attached). The letter demanded a reformed UEC, composed of “trustworthy and respected” people put forward by the Tatmataw, and postponement of the new parliament while this new body investigated voter irregularities. The letter also threatened that the army would take action according to the 2008 constitution if the NLD failed to address the Tatmataw’s request. The coup was timed for February 1, the morning that the NLD planned to convene the new parliament,
Myanmar’s weak state capacity
The UEC, the subject of the military’s complaint, is one manifestation of the failure of governance in Myanmar, and is the result of a lack of resources, training, and adequate state capacity. Before and during the elections, some political parties challenged the UEC’s nontransparent and inconsistent decision to cancel voting in some areas, particularly those occupied by minorities that could favor minority parties. The UEC received 287 complaints about this issue, including those initiated by the military. On February 3, 2021, 23 political parties issued a joint statement in support of the coup.
Errors are bound to happen in a country that does not have accurate and reliable population data, and where covid-related restrictions have further constrained the UEC’s ability to provide adequate human resources and training for volunteers. In Myanmar, the demographic makeup of the country differs depending on whether one looks at the data compiled by the General Administration Department, the 2014 population census, the household registration list, or the UEC data (which focuses on eligible voters). The 2014 census yields by far the most up-to-date and reliable population data, but it contains some flaws. Another challenge in obtaining accurate population data is the high volume of both internal migrants (which constitute one fifth of the population) and external migrants (it is estimated that 3 million citizens have been working in neighboring countries), factors which could explain why voters’ names might appear on more than one roll. In addition, eligible voters’ lists are also based on household registration registers, which often include the names of deceased persons or those living abroad. Many people failed to correct out-of-date personal information in the voters’ lists posted by the UEC. There is a strong possibility that the military will bring charges against UEC members, many of whom have been detained, to justify the coup.
Of course, in a truly democratic system it is not the role of the military to question the legitimacy of elections, let alone to stage a coup. But Myanmar is a fragile state, in the early stages of a transition to democracy, where the military still holds significant power and has created well-organized institutions parallel to the civilian bureaucracy. Given that no one knows what exactly happened in these tense negotiations, it remains a matter of speculation why the NLD failed to investigate the military’s complaints about elections irregularities and proceeded with its plans to hold the new parliament.
Is the coup being driven by the C-in-C’s personal interests?
Many analysts have explained the coup as a result of the personal ambitions of Sr General Min Aung Hlaing, the Tatmataw commander in chief (C-in-C). It is also likely to be a pre-emptive move against the International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice to further investigate the army’s alleged genocide against the Rohingya population. It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the military made a “goodwill gesture” to the Rohingya IDP camps in Rakhine state, with promises to improve their situation, four days after the coup. Whether or not this is a contributing factor, the coup seems to have strong support within the military as a way of protecting its economic and institutional interests. However, it is unlikely to have the universal support of members of the armed forces. There are those in the military who dislike Sr General Min Aung Hlaing, others support the NLD (especially strong among navy and air force personnel), and morale is low among mid-level officers, a group which has experienced high causalities in conflicts with various ethnic armed groups (with the Arakan Army in particular). Prior to the coup, there were reported defections and a high number of resignation applications among mid-level officers. It is also difficult to imagine why a coup made up of ambitious officers looking for promotion would rally behind a figure who is past retirement age. Some will have chosen to obey orders due to the heavy penalties associated with insubordination.
However, personal text messages and Facebook comments passed between protestors and military personnel show a deep-seated resentment by the latter, who felt humiliated under NLD rule in 2015-2020. They resented the repeated defeats suffered by military representatives at the hands of the “majority dictatorship” in the legislature, and being called names like “sit kwe” (dog army) or “chin (basket) troops” (a reference to the bamboo baskets used as backpacks). In addition to these grievances, they used the same narratives about voting irregularities discussed above to rationalize the coup. In fact, a source close to junior military officers said that the coup has boosted morale among some soldiers who have applauded the firm and swift action taken by a C-in-C “who does exactly what he says.”
A divided society
The coup has unraveled the many layers of division that exist within Burmese society. During the period of NLD rule in 2015-2020, some individuals, political parties, civil societal groups, and armed groups became alienated by what they saw as the NLD’s high-handed and exclusive policies. Some of these individuals and political parties became collaborators in the administrative council established by the junta immediately after the coup.
The coup has served as a rallying point for communities from diverse backgrounds and across different generations, including those who generally dislike Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. They are unified in their condemnation of the coup and in their call for the release of detainees including Aung San Suu Kyi and prominent NLD leaders. However, despite this apparent unity of aims, the protest movement is displaying diverse and contradictory objectives which range from demands for the restoration of the 2020 election results, to abolition of the 2008 constitution, to support for federal democracy and equality for ethnic nationalities. The country’s minorities are split between those who prefer to stay on the sidelines, because they see the coup as a case of Bamar fighting Bamar, and those (especially younger people) who see the coup as a blow to national reconciliation and democratic transition, as well as to their personal economic prospects which have already been seriously undermined by the pandemic.
While Myanmar’s most serious and immediate challenge is the military coup, the coup itself reflects as well as complicates the deep divisions within Burmese society and its weak state capacity, which has long posed serious threat to its democratic transition. Increased poverty levels and the healthcare crisis created by the pandemic are only exacerbating the crisis.
Dr. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung is Chair and Professor in the Political Science Department at the University of Massachusetts Lowell.
To cite this essay, please use the suggested entry below:
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, “Myanmar: Why the Military Took Over,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, February 22, 2021; https://doi.org/10.52698/JNWF5808.