Commentary | Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, The May 2023 Elections and the Triumph of Thai Youth Social Movements
The result of the general election in Thailand on the 14th of May 2023 shocked the whole of Thailand and Southeast Asia. The youthful party, the Move Forward Party (MFP), won the election and not only gained the most Members of Parliament (MP) with 113 out of 400 local members of parliament and 39 out of 100 in the party list, but also earned 14 million votes out of 41 million in the popular vote. It defeated the earlier political giant, the Pheu Thai party, which came second with 112 local MPs, 29 party list MPs and 10 million votes. Meanwhile, other military-backed, conservative, and local boss parties in the former government could hardly maintain or increase their votes. The Palang Pracharat Party (PPRP), the United Thai Nation (UTN) party, the Democrat Party, and the Bhum Jai Thai Party gained 40, 36, 25 and 70, accordingly.
In the media, these results have been ascribed to the failure of the earlier authoritative governments, the compromise policy and political campaign of the Pheu Thai party, the clear direction for structural reform of the MFP, the charismatic leadership of Phita Limjaroenrat, the MFP leader, and in many cases the shift of the earlier anti-Thaksin supporters from the military-based party toward other non-Pheu Thai parties. Yet, an alternative explanation that needs more attention is the changing of the electoral landscape as a result of the fluidity and dynamics of the interplay between the youth movement and the MFP.
From the Online movement to the Ballot Box
The roots of the MFP’s recent victory were lain with the emergence of youth activism opposed to the 2014 military coup. Even though the pioneer youth political activists could not organize mass protests against the coup at the beginning, young people started to fight back against the junta through online activism in late 2015. Hundreds and thousands of young cyber warriors successfully toppled the junta government’s proposal of “a Single Gateway,” an internet “gateway” to control and restrict internet access. After several successful rounds of attacking and freezing several governmental websites, the junta government announced a retreat on the controversial single gateway plan. This was the first time in Thai political history that campaigners successfully pressured the government to abandon a policy through an online campaign. However, these young people did not move from online to the street immediately.
From the second half of the 2010s, earlier youth activists gradually institutionalized themselves into party politics. They were not only part of the Future Forward Party (FFP) from day one, but the younger generation was also the reason for its successes in the 2019 general election (The FFP would be later dissolved in early 2020. The party then coined a new party called the Move Forward Party). For example, Parit Chiwarak, who later became the leader of the United Front of Thammasat Demonstration (UFTD), was one of the key founding members of the FFP. Tattep Ruangprapaikitseree, a vital member of the Free Youth group, was an FFP youth wing staff member. Many others were recruited for public relations, as youth-wing campaigners, MP candidates, and policy advocators. At the same time, first-time voters desiring a new political option (approximately 8 million out of 51 million eligible voters) provided strong mass support for the party. Subsequently, the support of these young and first-time voters made the underdog party, like the FFP, win the third biggest party in the 2019 general election. Yet, its election gains were not the party’s only triumph. It also laid the foundation for a sense of belonging among young voters. Many felt they were the ones who won this party’s seats in parliament and expected it to promote change according to their desires.
From the Future Forward Party to the White Ribbons Movement
After the election, the FFP tried to lower the degree of their initially radical proposals, particularly toward monarchical reform and LGBT and the socio-economic policies, to survive in the oppressive conditions of authoritarian government after the election. These compromised directions soured the relationship between many radical activists and the party. After several disagreements and fights, many members, like Ford Tattep Ruangprapaikitseree and Parit Chiwarak, resigned and left the party to continue activism against the military junta and establishments.
When the FFP was dissolved by the constitutional court at the beginning of 2020, many of those who had left the party started a mass youth movement even before the party could decide what to do next. Other ordinary young people organized flash mobs in schools and universities. Together, they successfully mobilized one of the biggest youth movements in Thai political history. At its peak on 19 September 2020, the mass protest included hundreds and thousands of protesters. By the August-October 2021 riot, the youth movement had expanded beyond students to include lower-class youth and young urban poor.
At this point, the MFP and its members had to step out of their comfort zone to join the protests, provide indirect support, and highlight radical issues like monarchical reform, by reconciling with their leaders and regaining the trust and support of their youth constituency. The MFP youth wing organized youth workshops that helped link activists from different universities and schools to meet and be empowered. MPs facilitated youth protests in their localities by coordinating with the local authorities not to threaten the protesters and to provide minor protest equipment like speakers, microphones, tents, etc. MFP MPs also used their political positions to bail out countless activists after the state had arrested them. Former FFP and MFP members appeared at several significant demonstrations as ordinary participants. Meanwhile, the youth movement instrumentalized the MFP as their political tool to campaign for radical demands in parliament.
Along these lines, the movement pushed policies that the party had previously downplayed, notably monarchical reform, LGBT rights, and anti-monopoly business reforms, etc. These leaders risk their life to push demands breaking the ceiling of Thai politics. Since the ten proposals of monarchical reform were launched by the UFTD, the topic has been widely popular and has become a significant concern among younger generations. Subsequently, after years of avoiding the issue, the MFP eventually directly and openly criticized the monarchy's arbitrary power, intervention in parliamentary politics, and lack of transparency. MFP MPs walked out in protest at a budget allocation increase for the Royal Office in the Budget Expenditures Bill. The MFP publicly even proposed reforms and amendments to the lèse majesté law (Section 112 of the Criminal Code).
From the movement to the Move Forward Party
After nearly two years of fighting on the street, countless leaders and ordinary participants were arrested and injured. The mass protests rolled back. By early 2022, only a few radical groups like Talu Wong (Breaking through Palaces) remain. Nonetheless, youth political activism did not disappear. It just retreated and transformed. Many young activists and leaders opted for electoral and party politics, the cheaper but more effective political tool. In mid-2023, many started joining the political campaign for the Bangkok gubernatorial election. Both movement leaders and supporters split to join the campaigns of the two pro-democratic candidates, Chatchart Sitthiphan, an independent candidate, and Viroj Lakkana-adisorn, a representative from the MFP, both of whose campaign rallies attracted former participants of the youth movement. The result was an overwhelming victory for Chatchart, with 51.8 per cent of the vote. This success convinced young people that the election was more accessible, safer, and more effective in winning over the conservative and authoritarian regimes.
“The 2023 general election is strong evidence of the continuation of the earlier youth movement in Thai electoral democracy, marking a historic triumph for young people’s power in party politics.”
The 2023 general election is strong evidence of the continuation of the earlier youth movement in Thai electoral democracy, marking a historic triumph for young people’s power in party politics. Firstly, at least 20 former youth movement leaders joined the MFP as MP candidates. For example, Piyarat Chongthep, Toto, a former FFP candidate and a leader of the WeVo group, won a local MP seat in Bangkok. Rakchanok Srinok, a former independent anti-coup figure, defeated the long-term local bosses of the Pheu Thai party in the same city. Chonthicha Jeangraew, a former LLTC leader, won a MP seat in Prathum Thani, the university community. Phuthita Chaianun, a former anti-coup student activist in Chaing Mai, also won a vital seat in Pheu Thai.
Secondly, many activities joined the MFP as assistant campaigners, volunteers, and in policy think tanks. During the MFP Hackathon policy initiative, countless former movement leaders and ordinary bright students brainstormed to form the MFP campaign. They scrutinised the budget proposal of the former authoritative government. Patsaravalee Tanakitvibulpon, a former leader of the Free People movement network and Witaya Osaki, a Medical Doctor student, joined hands in various Hackathon activities.
Thirdly, mass youth supporters were prominent online and offline as organic political brokers for the MFP. Unlike other massive and expensive political campaigns of other parties, the MFP adopted low-cost and low-budget strategies. Their candidate cycled to knock door-to-door and meet with local constituents. The party put fewer and smaller campaign posters than others. Above all, they normal should have spent more money and energy organizing political brokers or canvassers. Surprisingly, ordinary young people volunteered on their own, helping the party produce an online campaign, and pursued their family members to vote for MFP.
Lastly, the MFP was set apart by participants in political rallies and caravans. Different from other parties who organize audiences at political rallies, MPF rally stages and road trips were full of participants who came on their own. There were also more participants than the organizers expected. Most attendees were young people with political banners promoting their own ideas and problems. Some even organized their own activities to express their concerns to the party. The ambience was familiar to those who remembered the youth protests back in 2021.
Before the election, many wondered whether the mass support the MFP received online and at rallies would turn into an actual votes. But by the end of 14th May, the nationwide results revealed everything. Without a doubt, the MFP’s recent victory is a direct outcome of the 2020-1021 mass youth movement.
Dr. Kanokrat Lertchoosakul is an assistant professor at the Department of Government, faculty of political science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. During the past two decades, she has focused her research on various social movements in Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia. Her PhD thesis at LSE, The Rise of the Octobrists: Power and Conflict among Former Left-Wing Student Activists in Contemporary Thai Politics, was awarded by the Thailand National Research Committee in 2016. It was later published as a book by the Council on Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University. Her later research focused on contemporary conservative mass movements and Thailand's 2020-2021 youth movement.
To cite this essay, please use the entry suggested below:
Kanokrat Lertchoosakul, “The May 2023 Elections and the Triumph of Thai Youth Social Movements,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, May 30,2023; https://doi.org/10.52698/IMCJ3733.