Commentary | Abdillah Noh, ASEAN’s role in the Myanmar Crisis: Averting a “Syrian crisis” problem at its door?

With more than 700 protesters reportedly killed and the military government doing its best to shut the country out from the rest of the world, the crisis in Myanmar is putting pressure on ASEAN to abandon its principles of non-interference. To its credit, ASEAN has been quick off the blocks in stating its position on the issue. The day the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) took control, the ASEAN chair, Brunei, issued a statement urging all parties to reconcile and find an amicable end to the crisis. Three ASEAN member countries – Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia – have voiced their concerns, asking for a quick end to the crisis.  The latest was the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting in Jakarta on April 24 that included Myanmar’s junta leaders Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. In the meeting, ASEAN leaders agreed on a five-point consensus, the important ones being the appointment of a special envoy to meet with various parties involved in the crisis, for the ASEAN chair to mediate in the crisis, and to provide humanitarian aid.

For those who want a quick end to the Myanmar issue, ASEAN’s “constructive engagement and dialogue” did not go far enough. ASEAN leaders’ latest reaction was, yet again, a slight tweak to its core founding principle of non-interference and a sharp contrast to the UK, US, and the EU, who have all called for greater sanctions against the military government. Advocates of change want ASEAN leaders to demand the unconditional release of political prisoners and for ASEAN to include representatives of the National Unity Government (AUG) in all meetings. They also want ASEAN to pull the rug from under the Tatmadaw and force it to return to the barracks and reinstitute constitutional democracy by taking out ASEAN strategic interests — especially economic interest — from Myanmar.

While these are novel demands there is also a need to consider this: Would such demands – by way of outright economic, political and social sanctions – do enough to produce a tenable and sustainable solution in Myanmar? More importantly, will intervention ensure continued regional security, or will it produce a new global security hotspot? There are few things that we need to consider when we broach the idea of a more forceful or contrived ASEAN intervention in the Myanmar issue.

The first is that any intervention is far from clinical, quick, or easy. While advocates of change are calling for ASEAN to be unequivocal in its demand for the Myanmar military government to hand over power to a civilian government, the examples of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria – are enough to show that intervention is never quick, easy, or clinical. While the policy choices, ex-ante, seem obvious, getting the desired results is far complicated.  We know enough now that change to a political system is anything but risk-free. Like-wise, intervention in Myanmar – on the scale of what many are hoping for – comes with unknown and known risks. Three generations of Myanmarese, at least, grew up knowing of no other ruler than the military. Since 1962, the military complex has pervaded most, if not all aspects of Myanmar’s social, political, and economic life. The military has spawned the country’s institutions in a myriad of ways to serve its purpose.  In the last ten years, for example, the military has increased its financial largesse as it consolidated its presence in almost all sectors of the economy through tie-ups with international companies. The hard truth is, Myanmar’s civil institutions have atrophied or non-existent and any intervention that attempts to uproot the military complex without putting in place quickly and effectively democratic institutions could see Myanmar spiral into civil chaos. Any form of contrived or forcible intervention would inevitably invite plenty of pushbacks from the Tatmadaw. Too much is at stake for the Tatmadaw. Demanding that it gives up power and retreats to the barracks is asking the impossible, especially after the Tatmadaw, has built up massive resources and power over the years. We must also add the Tatmadaw is used to hustling from the international community and no amount of international pressure would it buckling under pressure. It is more than prepared to stick to its position for the long haul, more so now given its huge resources. Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or Syria offer some telling examples of interventions gone wrong. The plain truth is that any intervention plan must include the military.

Any intervention plan also needs to weigh Myanmar’s multi-faceted challenges. Myanmar’s politics is highly fractious and the weak state of its political economy means that the road to democracy would be long and winding. The country suffers from endemic corruption, fragile state institutions, a huge military presence in the economy, and — the most problematic — long-standing disputes between the central government and armed groups in the peripheral regions. While 62 percent of the population are of Bamar descent, the country has over 135 tribes or ethnic groups and some of the ethnic groups have long-running battles with the Tatmadaw. For decades, armed groups in the Rakhine, Kayah, Shan, Kachin states have fought for independence or autonomous status. These groups are well-organised and are waiting in the wings to stake their claims should there be a power vacuum. Attempts to remove the military without putting in place adequate democratic institutions to resolve long-standing regional conflicts could see Myanmar getting into perpetual civil wars and possible disintegration. Indeed, Myanmar’s political disintegration could produce no favours to regional and global economies already struggling due to the pandemic.  

A final point is that as much as interventionists would like to believe that there are like-minded people in in the target country that would champion the cause of democracy and make for a smooth transition to constitutional democracy, evidence suggest that local champions would rarely see through the democratization process once they assume power. We see that in Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan and Ahmad Chalabi in Iraq. Both found it tough to honour the democratic ideals as they battled the need to respond to a local audience for legitimacy. It was the same with Au Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK). Many had come to expect her to be the flagbearer of democracy and that after serving years under house arrest, she would introduce a more inclusive and progressive leadership and bring much change to Myanmar’s many institutions. But ASSK performance fell short of expectations when she took office in 2015 as state counsellor. Poverty and household debts have not improved. More importantly, her reputation as the voice of democracy and human rights took a hit after she defended the military action in the Rohingya crisis at the International Court of Justice.  Going by such reasoning, there is no guarantee that local champions in Myanmar now, who now speak of democracy and human rights would not pander to sectional interests once the crisis is over and they assume power. In Myanmar, there are now many domestic interests who are waiting in the wings to assume leadership. The National Unity Government (NUG) might speak with one democratic voice now, but there is no guarantee that once the crisis is over these voices would not pander to sectional interests or power bases to remain legitimate, given Myanmar’s fractious politics. The lessons from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya suggest that intervention needs a comprehensive strategy. But right now, going by current results, this plan is very much a work in progress.

How should ASEAN “mediate” in the crisis? 

An important to note is that any form of national reconciliation must come from within Myanmar and must include the military. It is never a realistic option to expect the Tatmadaw to readily give up its resources and capabilities built over the years. Second, any mediation needs to appreciate the dynamics that come with transitional politics. Change needs time. We should not expect that intervention today guarantees democracy tomorrow. A realistic assessment is that some parts of Myanmar's democratic institutions are still in their infancy, weak or even perhaps, non-existent. Any policy design must be realistic enough to consider that this is a country that needs time to make the transition. The biggest challenge, for Myanmar and ASEAN, is to design a change process that can ultimately convince the military that its best option — in the long term — is to stay out of politics. A possible way to do this is by creative institutional layering that will allow the military to continue to coexist with constitutional democracy until a concrete exit strategy is put in place. This naturally invokes competing demands and contentious politics but ASEAN is well-positioned to play the arbitration role between competing parties just as it did so well in the past under its “constructive engagement” policy in Myanmar. Also, ASEAN can originate periodic dialogue sessions or institutional mechanisms that would bring interested parties both from within and outside Myanmar to come together to find common solutions to securing regional security and economic prosperity. The object is to situate Myanmar’s politics within the larger regional security arrangement. An important caveat is that any policy intervention needs to be meticulously weighed to secure durable peace. Any political and social implosion of the Myanmar state from poorly executed reconciliation plans would have deep economic, political, and social repercussions to the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. ASEAN certainly can ill afford a “Syrian problem” at its door.

Managing Myanmar’s political transition requires ASEAN’s endurance and long-term commitment because institutions can be stubbornly resilient and pushbacks can be expected. At the same time, in searching for long-term solutions we need to appreciate Myanmar’s seemingly intractable problem; a highly fractious and fragmented state that has been battling regional and tribal interests for years. On a brighter note, history suggests that Myanmar — while tripping over many times — will move to a constitutional democracy. Since 1947, Myanmar has made several attempts at reinstituting democracy – before 1962, in 1988, 2015, and now, 2021. While such past attempts might have failed, there is no doubt that the pressure to institute democracy continues. This latest episode is not the first and certainly not the last in Myanmar’s fight for constitutional democracy. 

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Abdillah Noh is an Associate Professor in the Department of History and International Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

To cite this Commentary, please use the suggested entry below:

Abdillah Noh, “ASEAN’s role in the Myanmar Crisis: Averting a ‘Syrian crisis’ problem at its door?,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, June 2, 2021; https://doi.org/10.52698/AZGW2110.