Notes from the Field | William Hsing, The Metamorphosis of Fangcang – The Life and Afterlife of a Chinese Concentration Camp
In the past year, the Chinese government formally lifted the state and city lockdowns that were imposed due to the pandemic. Yet the decision left ordinary citizens who were not part of the bureaucratic system wondering about the reasons behind this shift. As part of this policy change, the many module hospitals called fangcang erected during the pandemic were ordered to be demolished. Known for their container-style design and role in bio-political control, these fangcang facilities suddenly became illegal in the bureaucratic system. However, despite central government orders, fangcang still remain in the suburbs of most cities in China. In some cases, they have been repurposed as dormitories for young laborers who have migrated from rural areas, playing a vital role in a new wave of post-COVID urbanization in China. This commentary outlines the brief history of fangcang facilities and resists the dominant narrative and memory manipulation that may arise from the party-state power.
Fangcang: Concentration Camps and the Failure of Biopolitics in China
Fangcang refers to the cuboidal module hospitals that were introduced by the Chinese government in response to the outbreak of the Covid virus. While it is commonly understood that module hospitals were initially introduced by the US Army during the Vietnam War, it is important to recognize that their utilization as a means to concentrate and exert control over people is an indigenous innovation unique to China.
(Fangcang facilities in Nangong city, a small town near Beijing, from the official website of the Nangong government. Source: https://www.nangong.gov.cn/.)
As the picture above shows, fangcang are different from ordinary module hospitals, since they no longer house soldiers in urgent need of medical treatment. Instead, they are now mainly used for concentration, separation and incarceration. Official documents from government and extensive medical research papers claimed that fangcang are low-cost, large-scale, and rapidly deployable. This particular scenario appears to align with a paradigmatic illustration of biopolitics, wherein the state employs extensive mechanisms that delve into individual bodies to oversee and enhance public health.
However, in practice, due to absolute coercion and the scarcity of medical resources, the result has been a significant failure in healthcare and numerous deaths. Not only are COVID-19 patients forced into fangcang, but their contacts and even secondary contacts are also compelled. To make matters worse, China did not develop effective medications during the pandemic, often resorting to ancient herbal treatments in fangcang. Thus, fangcang present a paradoxical and even anachronic existence. Fangcang attempt to safeguard and promote life through a utopian-infused, sino-futurist approach, as discussed by Giorgio Agamben in his analysis of biopolitics. But simultaneously, fangcang yield rather brutish outcomes, akin to what Foucault observed in his studies of the earliest leprosariums, where life is simply abandoned and left to perish.
The Reappropriation of Fangcang: from Concentration Camp to Labor Dormitory
In December 2022, the Chinese central government formally lifted the state of epidemic emergency and halted the practice of imprisoning infected citizens. As a direct consequence of the pandemic-induced social control, the fangcang facilities, despite the cessation of their construction, endure in the outskirts of each city, serving as lasting testaments to covid era.
In 2023, three years after the outbreak of the Covid virus, the dilapidated fangcang facilities charted a course that exceeded all prior expectations. Jinan, an emerging city in northeastern China, made an unprecedented announcement revealing their plans to remodel and repurpose the local fangcang as dormitories catering to young individuals from rural areas who migrate to Jinan in search of employment opportunities in various factories. This audacious decision spurred a ripple effect, inspiring numerous cities across China to adopt a similar strategy.
If we envision China as an unwavering authoritarian apparatus, the metamorphosis of the fangcang becomes perplexing. From the vantage point of the central government, the continuation of fangcang stands as concrete testimony, not only attesting to the persecution endured by its inhabitants, which taints the party and the nation's reputation but also encapsulating a profound sense of shame stemming from the flawed policies previously espoused by the party-state. Regarding the latter aspect, it is evident that the CCP methodically suppresses discussions pertaining to the actual policies enacted during the COVID-19 era on internet platforms in order to cover the true history. However, rather than eradicating these remnants of concentration camps, they have instead undergone a metamorphosis and now function as dormitories for laborers.
To thoroughly elucidate this transformation of fangcang, it becomes crucial to shift our focus away from a simplistic paradigm anchored in biopolitics and instead immerse ourselves in discussions grounded in the realm of political economy. In contrast to conventional ideas, the extensive construction of fangcang does not simply adhere to top-down authoritarian designs. Right from its inception, local governments issued bonds specifically earmarked for the construction of fangcang, utilizing anticipated future profits as collateral to amass a substantial amount of social capital. In other words, fangcang was intricately entwined within a complex web of political-economic circumstances from the very beginning. Consequently, when the central government rescinded the stringent state of emergency regulations, the legitimacy of fangcang was compromised, thereby subjecting local governments to immense financial pressures that proved arduous to alleviate.
In the post-COVID era, where the apprehension of infected individuals is no longer permissible, leveraging the location advantage of fangcang and repurposing these individual living spaces as dormitories for factory workers serves as a mechanism to attain desired profit objectives. This dynamic imparts the impetus for local governments to embrace policy risks and effectuate the transformation of fangcang.
Collective Memory as Resistance: Exploring Yangge in the Post-COVID Era
How to commemorate fangcang, a violent and traumatic space stands as a concentrated metaphor for comprehending contemporary China in the post-COVID-19 era. It is crucial to note that local governments, in circumventing central directives and opting to retain and transform fangcang, are devoid of innate moral motivations or a sense of justice. Local officials harbor no intention of preserving this facility as a means to document the calamity or provide future generations with an opportunity for introspection. When undertaking the transformation of fangcang, their objective is to eradicate any remnants associated with its "medical" nature (for instance, via repainting and concealing the cross symbol emblematic of healthcare). Once again, we confront the quandary eloquently broached by Jean-François Lyotard — the impossibility of recollecting the experience of Auschwitz.
However, through my field research, I was astounded to uncover that within the realm of yangge—a traditional ceremonial song and dance indigenous to the northwest borderlands of China (frequently executed by illiterate middle-aged and elderly women)—collective memories have been meticulously preserved. In the initial stages of the pandemic, the CCP assimilated infected individuals from fangcang into yangge performances, compelling them to showcase their restored “physical well-being” and extol the party state through modifications to the lyrical composition. These performances subsequently be disseminated among the populace via short videos.
After the CCP announced the termination of the state of emergency, the surviving performers returned to their villages. Naturally, they immediately rejected the new lyrics imposed upon them by the state. However, instead of reverting to the lyrics rooted in their ancestral reverence for nature, they cleverly incorporated the essence of the persecution endured within the fangcang into the final verses of their songs through subtle irony. In a time where most evidence has been eradicated, with the fangcang itself transformed into dormitories for workers, their songs serve as a reminder that the memory of a disaster can always be preserved and resistance always remains possible.
William Hsing is currently studying at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, where he is pursuing research in archives about East Asia. His master's research project focuses on the history and literature of late imperial China, especially the technology, gender issues, and modernity in narrative literature. Meanwhile, he is devoted to recording the Chinese people's life during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, conducting field studies, and uncovering collective memory of this disaster within various literary and artistic works.
To cite this essay, please use the entry suggested below:
William Hsing, “The Metamorphosis of Fangcang – The Life and Afterlife of a Chinese Concentration Camp,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, August 14, 2023; https://doi.org/10.52698/TKHZ5382.