Commentary | Ryōta Nishino, Beyond Zero-Sum Geopolitics: Asia-Pacific and the Shadows of the Asia-Pacific War
Diplomatic contestation between Western nations and Communist China over Pacific Island nations has been intensifying in the past decade. China is flexing its diplomatic and financial muscles with loans and development aid across the Pacific. Chinese moves have disrupted the West’s assumption that it monopolized a sphere of influence in the Pacific: the United States in the north and American Samoa, with Australia, New Zealand, and France in the south. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a countermeasure against China’s assertive stance mirrors the West’s anxiety, as do other initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS. The Quad is a four-nation partnership comprising the United States, Japan, Australia and India. AUKUS is “an enhanced trilateral security partnership” involving Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Meanwhile, Pacific Island nations have long felt neglected and have begun to explore their options for better partnerships. For these island nations, security means more than international geopolitics, it means day-to-day realities of poverty, health, climate change, and infrastructure. In September 2019, Kiribati and Solomon Islands ended their diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of mainland China. This move raised alarm in the new Australian government, elected in May 2022, and quickly elevated Pacific diplomacy into its policy agenda.
Few would draw an instant parallel between the current geopolitical tussle and previous iterations. However, once again many Pacific Islands and their residents have become involved in conflicts not of their own making. That is to say, this is not the first time that the islands of the South Pacific have been contested terrain between opposing imperial forces.
“Once again many Pacific Islands and their residents have become involved in conflicts not of their own making.”
Western imperialism led to the colonization of the Pacific Islands in the 18th and 19th centuries. Japan’s foray into the imperial race later in the 20th century and its administration of Nanyō Guntō, or the South Seas Islands, left brief yet indelible marks on the islands. Many Pacific islands became battlegrounds between the Allies and the Japanese as Japan’s own imperial aspirations collided with the West’s and resulted in the Asia-Pacific War.
World War II occasioned the construction of airstrips and airports that now serve both strategic and commercial purposes. One consequence is that many Pacific Islands have gone down the route of “militourism,” offering land for military bases for foreign forces and welcoming tourists to earn foreign revenue. “Militourism” heightens the paradox of island nations having to trade strategic geopolitical locations and enduring images of the idyllic paradise for their livelihood.
Lurking beneath the surface of these infrastructural remnants are the memories of the Asia-Pacific War. The interactions between former Australian Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, and his Japanese counterpart, Abe Shinzō, as Abe visited Australia on a three-state tour of New Zealand, Australia, and Papua New Guinea in July 2014 are illustrative. In an address before the Australian parliament, each leader told friendly tales of two former adversaries overcoming past hostility to form solid ties. Abbott’s praise of Japan’s military “skill and honor” drew especially strong rebuke from Australian veterans and the Returned and Services League, the association of Australian veterans and their families. While some veterans might concede that the Japanese soldiers were skilled, many questioned Abbott’s use of “honor” to describe the conduct of the Japanese towards many other nationalities in Asia and the Pacific. Abbott’s critics assailed him for overlooking the suffering wrought upon Australians and calling the Japanese soldiers honorable. Thus, even as historical memories come in many iterations reshaped to present-day purposes, they also pose challenges in the present.
One WWII campaign against the Japanese that Australians remember well took place in today’s Papua New Guinea (PNG), at the time an Australian territory. The Japanese occupation of Rabaul, New Britain Island, in January 1942 and its subsequent attacks on the shores of New Guinea Island shocked the Australians. Moreover, the Papua New Guineans found themselves caught in the crossfire, having to co-operate or collaborate or risk facing the consequences. The battles against the Japanese have become a vital part of Australia’s national history. In particular, the Kokoda Campaign of 1942 is remembered as a crucible to defend mainland Australia from foreign foes. In his 2014 address to the Australian parliament, Abe referenced Kokoda and expressed his “most sincere condolences towards the many souls who lost their lives,” but fell short of an apology.
Equally significant is the tales of camaraderie between the Australian troops and between the Australians and the Papua New Guinean carriers known as the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels for their contribution to the Australian war effort. While the carriers’ contribution elevated PNG’s stature in the eyes of the Australians, the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angel trope still preserved the hierarchy between the two groups.
Visiting PNG, Abe met its Prime Minister, Peter O’Neill. There, talks centered on Japan’s aid to PNG and PNG’s commodity exports to Japan. Memories of the war were more marginalized. Even when Abe visited a Japanese memorial and pledged peace, the Japanese media framed his tour as an attempt to secure more natural resources. Outside Japan, the coverage of Abe’s visit to a war memorial in PNG garnered far less attention than to, say, more controversial visits to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo. The disparity seems to underline the Japanese view of PNG as a transactional partner where commerce matters more than addressing the past legacy of fierce military engagement.
The paucity of attention to PNG is common in mainstream Japanese media, where the New Guinea campaign takes a low profile. One plausible reason may lie in the enormous Japanese casualties. Various estimates point to exceedingly high death rates. Around 127,000 soldiers died out of a total of some 150,000 deployed to New Guinea. Another alarming feature is that the majority died not in battles with the Allies, but from diseases, illness, and starvation. Even during wartime, Japanese soldiers whispered to one another: “Java is paradise, Burma is hell, you cannot come back from New Guinea alive (192).” Those soldiers who survived and returned defied the joke.
Postwar Japan’s reconstruction and recovery made the New Guinea campaign an inconvenient chapter of the war. PNG continues to pull strong emotional strings for groups of Japanese veterans and bereaved family members who pay visits to commemorate the deceased soldiers. Some make repeated visits. The latest official statistics from May 2022 show that of 127,600 soldiers who died in eastern New Guinea, the remains of only 51,460 (40 percent) have been identified, while a further 76,180 (60 percent) have not.
Japanese soldiers and visitors recorded the impressions of their journeys both during and after wartime. Veterans wrote of their hardship in memoirs and vented their frustration at the military strategists for their plight. Films and documentaries, including Fukasaku Kinji’s Gunki hatameku moto ni (1972) and Hara Kazuo’s Yukiykite Shingun (1989), have explored violent incidents that the Japanese committed amongst themselves and to New Guineans. Travelers without firsthand experience endeavored to gain an empathetic understanding of the battles and the local people’s experiences. These acts of traveling in time and space comprise vital steps to reimagining history and telling stories about the war.
Storytelling and history-making activities have become more vital in recent years as the war itself becomes more and more distant. On August 15, 2020, Japan commemorated its 75th anniversary of defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, highlighting the anxiety many had felt. Those who remember the war as living memory are now in a minority. Even those who heard war stories directly from survivors are now advanced in years. The shift from testimonies to memory has inevitable demographic consequence on history. Meanwhile, Covid-19 and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have raised essential questions about humanity. Proverbial lessons from history have never been more relevant.
Cultural products of the Asia-Pacific War, not to mention their authors and creators, continue to play vital socio-cultural and political functions today. The senses of and the sensitivities toward history they form, along with the historical interpretations they articulate, turn the authors and creators into historians in their own right. Their works have fed into an extensive catalog of the New Guinea campaign, while informing and reflecting ongoing historical interpretations of the war. Though seemingly mundane, such observations matter in contemporary Japan. In the past two decades, Japan has come under pressure from its nationalist quarters to settle the scores of the past and to revive a more patriotic outlook on Japan’s history. Notably, educational reforms during Abe Shinzō’s tenure as prime minister (2006–2007, and 2012–2020) accelerated patriotism across multiple facets of schooling beyond contested textbooks and put academic freedom in a parlous state.
In the wake of Abe’s assassination on July 8th, many have begun speculating what Abe's political legacy leaves for Japan’s domestic and international policies. On the 11th, prime minister Kishida Fumio announced his intention to resume discussions to amend Japan’s constitution prohibiting war. While constitutional revision was Abe’s political ambition, it remains to be seen whether Kishida will be able to follow through. However, if we look at past controversies, we can anticipate both supporters and opponents of revision invoking Japan’s war memories to bolster their positions.
Revision or no revision, with the centenary of Japan’s defeat looming on the horizon, the time is ripe to take stock of the rich stories that pave the way for re-imagining history inside and outside of Japan. Insights can equip us to think more creatively for a new Asia-Pacific with greater attention to the concerns of the Pacific Island nations. This sensitivity has become even more crucial today. As major powers of the Global North discuss the future of Asia-Pacific, they place greater emphasis on their own geopolitical interests and set their agendas accordingly. When they speak of the Asia-Pacific Rim, they have tended to overlook the islands inside the rim. The scant regard is certainly not what the Pacific Island states wish for or need. The Pacific Island nations have had their issues, concerns, and aspirations. Listening to their voices, be them about today’s concerns or their past, is the first step in overcoming the us-versus-them binary of geopolitical competition and confrontation.
Ryōta Nishino is Designated Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Law, Nagoya University, Japan. He is the author of Japanese Perceptions of Papua New Guinea: War, Travel, and Reimagining of History, to be published by Bloomsbury Academic in October 2022. His research interests revolve around the circulation of history and historical memory in various media such as school textbooks, films, and travelogues.
To cite this essay, please use the entry suggested below:
Ryōta Nishino, “Beyond Zero-Sum Geopolitics: Asia-Pacific and the Shadows of the Asia-Pacific War,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, July 25, 2022; https://doi.org/10.52698/CPDW4488.