Commentary | Martin Weiser, South Korea’s problematic relationship with truth when it comes to North Korean human rights
When South Korean president Yoon Seok-yeol spoke before the US Congress on April 27 and a day later at Harvard University, he focused global attention on the human rights report on North Korea his government had released in March. By law, the government has been required to submit a report to parliament every year since 2017, but under Yoon’s liberal predecessor, Moon Jae-in, the reports were classified. Likely not coincidentally, a flawed translation of the 450-page report was hurriedly released online before Yoon’s Congress speech. It was taken down again shortly after and a vastly rewritten but frequently still incorrect translation was published only on July 7, which now is distributed digitally and in print.
In his Congressional speech Yoon stressed that “false propaganda and disinformation are distorting the truth and public opinion.” Yet, a closer look at the examples of North Korean human rights violations given by Yoon, what the report says, and how the speech and the report were delivered not just to South Korean citizens but to the global audience, shows that Yoon’s government itself is guilty of “false propaganda and disinformation” through omission, distortion, and false statements. This underlines the bizarre relationship of South Korean conservatives with the truth when it comes to North Korea. Not a single one of the three examples given by Yoon was an accurate reflection of evidence.
In his speech to the US Congress, Yoon claimed evidence of the following executions were included in the government’s report:
“men and women being shot and killed for violating COVID-19 prevention measures; some being publicly executed for watching and sharing South Korean shows; and people being shot in public for possessing the bible and having faith.”
How he selected those examples is unknown, but it is striking that except for the last example this part of his speech was basically copied verbatim from a March editorial on the government report printed in the Joongang Ilbo, one of South Korea’s biggest newspapers.
At the university, Yoon spoke in Korean, with live translation for the audience. His office, in contrast, needed several months to upload an English translation. He only repeated the last two examples there, albeit with important omissions:
“public executions by firing squad for such reasons as watching Korean TV dramas or possessing a bible.”
Closer examination of these specious claims about public executions for watching TV dramas, possessing bibles, or failing to follow COVID regulations reveals how South Korean conservative politicians routinely distort the truth to agitate the public against the Northern half of the peninsula. They regularly argue indoctrination of the population as well as vast censorship of North Korean materials was necessary to prevent a collapse of South Korea’s liberal democracy. But eventually this is self-serving as exaggerating North Korean threats woos voters and the uninformedness of the general population and intellectuals reduces challenges to conservative narratives. For South Korean conservatives, truth on North Korea becomes only a means to an end and false claims, intentional or not, are not questioned as long as it serves their political goals
Longer quotes below are taken from the revised translation of the government report with page numbers provided.
Killed for Watching?
Although criticism of executions is a crucial part of the report, Yoon appears to have been completely unaware of the examples provided in the text. This is especially apparent in his reference to executions for “watching and sharing South Korean shows” and his later claim that even simply “watching” those shows was enough to be executed. Reports by some journalists as well as a PBS description on YouTube showed that many in the public understood Yoon’s statement to Congress in this way, as well. However, the report provided not a single piece of evidence that anyone was executed for watching those videos, although it did offer three examples of executions for importing or sharing them.
Despite a lack of evidence, the text multiple times listed executions for “watching and sharing” South Korean videos in sentences that criticized the excessive application of the death penalty. A similar criticism can be found at the beginning of the report’s summary, which, in contrast, correctly referenced only the sharing of videos:
“There were numerous documented cases of arbitrary deprivation of life committed by the North Korean authorities, and it has been assessed that the death penalty is frequently imposed for activities that do not qualify as ‘the most serious crimes’ justified under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including drug offenses, distribution of South Korean video content, and participation in religious or superstitious practices.” (p. 24)
“There have been testimonies of the death penalty being enforced not only for violent crimes like homicides but also for offenses that are not punishable by the death penalty under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights such as drug trafficking, watching and distributing South Korean videos, or engaging in religious or superstitious activities.” (p. 27)
Notably, the Korean version of the report used a middle dot to connect the words “watching and distributing,” instead of a grammatical particle meaning “and” or any other less ambiguous possibility. The ambiguity of the middle dot caused the authors of the initial English translation to twice turn the phrase into a claim that persons were executed for “watching or distributing” South Korean videos. The revised translation released in July quietly corrected this. The use of the middle dot is especially surprising as two of the three of executions were described as a person first watching and then sharing the videos (sich’ŏng hago yup’o) using the Korean conjunctive suffix go. The official translation of Yoon’s Congress speech also used this phrase, although Yoon himself clearly did not have this meaning in mind.
When this author petitioned the ministry on the problematic use of the middle dot, this was completely refuted. The middle dot correctly showed the “close relationship” of the two words, the responding official argued. Presumably to underline this understanding of the middle dot, the official additionally stressed that the report cited executions of persons that had “distributed the videos and [thereby] made others watch them.”
Additionally, the report left out crucial evidence to suggest a recent North Korean law change allowed for executions of those watching South Korean videos. The law cited in the report, the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law adopted in December 2020, explicitly states that the watching of South Korean videos or even the sharing of South Korean music only leads to long prison sentences and reserves executions for those importing or spreading videos. This was known since early 2021 thanks to a document smuggled out of the country and confirmed by several public executions reported on by outlets like DailyNK and Radio Free Asia. The report refused to acknowledge this information, stating only:
“The Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture enacted in 2020 stipulates that those accessing, possessing, or distributing outside information could face up to ten years of rodongkyohwa (reformation through labor), while those accessing, possessing or distributing South Korean dramas, movies, and music videos could face even harsher punishments.” (p. 36-37)
“Additionally, although the whole text of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture, enacted in 2020, is yet to be confirmed, the Law reportedly includes provisions that allow for the death penalty.” (p. 75)
“Under this law, the maximum penalty of up to 10 years of rodongkyohwa punishment can be imposed for accessing, possessing, or disseminating foreign films, songs, and other forms of media. The punishments are even more severe when it comes to accessing, possessing, or disseminating South Korean movies, songs, and other media.” (p. 262)
The Korean text only spoke of “music” which translators turned into “music videos.” This distorted summary of the evidence was then echoed by other South Korean officials. South Korea’s ambassador for North Korean human rights claimed judges handed down “harsh punishment including the death penalty for simply watching and distributing so-called illegal South Korean content such as drama and movie and music.” South Korea’s public broadcaster KBS also argued consumption or distribution of South Korean dramas, movies, and music could lead to more than 10 years in prison or death. Ironically, despite making several other incorrect statements in that news segment, the same KBS journalist was shortly after promoted to co-host the channel’s weekly North Korea news program.
At the same time, the government’s TV channel, KTV, along with the ultra-conservative newspaper Chosun Ilbo, distorted the facts and claimed the report actually provided evidence that North Koreans had been executed for merely watching South Korean videos, reiterating the following testimony from the report:
“In 2015, six children who graduated from a senior secondary school (high school) were sentenced to death and immediately executed by firing squad in a stadium in Wonsan, Kangwon Province, for watching South Korean videos and using opium.” (p. 75)
“Additionally, another case involved six children between the ages of 16 and 17, who had graduated from senior secondary school, being sentenced to death and executed by firing squad in a stadium in Wonsan, Kangwon Province in 2015. The reasons for their execution were watching South Korean videos and using opium.” (p. 489)
When KTV reported on the release of the government report in March, it stressed that those minors had been executed for watching South Korean videos, but did not mention the drug charges. Instead it glossed over them using the Korean word dŭng, which can be loosely translated as “etc.” This was very close to an editorial released earlier the same day by the Chosun Ilbo, which also only referred to the video watching charge. A few days later, KTV ran an interview segment on the government report, giving it the title “first North Korean human rights released publicly – youth that watched South Korean dramas publicly executed.” The host then asked the invited commentator Kim Yeon-ju, who in 2021 still had been deputy spokesperson of the conservative ruling party, about this execution and allowed her to claim without any intervention that those minors had been executed for the sole crime of watching South Korean videos.
Flawed Interpretation
One reason that South Koreans might have believed that North Koreans are executed for watching their dramas was because the South Korean president seemed to have claimed so twice: once himself at Harvard University and before the US Congress. But this was only due to a terribly flawed simultaneous live translation.
Yoon’s Congress speech was streamed live at midnight Korean time on the governmental TV channel KTV, as well as via the official YouTube account of the president’s office. While KTV only provided subtitles, the YouTube video also included live translation, on which the subtitles were based, by interpreters Hong Geun and Song Min-jae. The two interpreters split the speech in half instead of switching after a few minutes, which might explain why they made so many amateurish mistakes.
For example, a reference to the “more than 100,000 Americans” who died in the Pacific War were reduced to a mere “more than 1,000,” while the “wave of 120,000” Chinese troops at the Battle of Lake Changjin during the Korean War became 120. Twice, the interpreters misheard a word and then showed surprising creativity to adjust the rest of the sentence. “Tales of our heroes were written,” mutated into “The tears of our soldiers are remembered by us.” “Democracy is a community’s political decision-making system to protect freedom and human rights,” was rewritten as “democracy is facing a systemic crisis from communism today; this is where we face difficulties to protect our freedom and human rights.”
Song, who authored the latter statement, was also responsible for translating Yoon’s remarks on the human rights report. Yoon’s claim that North Koreans were “publicly executed for watching and sharing” South Korean shows was turned into “publicly executed merely for watching” them. “Shot in public” for possessing the bible and having faith was lessened to “punished.”
Despite those obvious mistakes the presidential office has yet to alert its citizens to the incorrect translations or upload a correct version of the speech. Apparently this problem was not even raised internally, as in June the Ministry of Unification reused the incorrect translation of Yoon’s words in a video introducing the government report. When KTV re-aired the speech hours later on April 27, in contrast, it had quietly replaced the initial subtitles with the official Korean translation provided by the presidential office hours after the speech.
While this official translation several times embellished the words of the president to make him appear more eloquent than he is, its content can be considered more or less accurate.
Still, one of the slight differences is that his reference to the “dire human rights situation” of North Korea was turned into the “dire reality of human rights,” using the Korean term silsang which comes with connotations of truth. During his speech at Harvard, he also used the same term calling his government’s report literally a “North Korean human rights reality report” and stressed that improving North Korean human rights starts with publicizing the “reality”. That testimonies are never fully reliable, and some facts as written in the report might actually not be true, appears irrelevant in this discourse.
Border Buffer Zones
Both Yoon and the authors of the report showed a similar ignorance of the facts in his second example. While Yoon had claimed that North Koreans were “shot and killed for violating COVID-19 prevention measures,” the Joongang Daily editorial in March still had stressed that this had happened in the border region and without prior warning. While this was still a rather imprecise description of a restricted zone along the border where trespassers face the threat of deadly force, the editorial at least made clear this policy was confined to a very specific area.
The way Yoon presented it to the world, however, made it sound like North Korea threatened the death penalty in general for rather minor violations of anti-COVID-19 measures. The audience might have thought of mask mandates, home quarantine, and other basic policies that North Koreans might violate. In fact, readers of the report might have understood it as a reference to the Anti-Epidemic Emergency Law adopted in August 2020 which, according to the report, allows the death penalty for violations like “illegal entry into quarantined areas.” The Korean report spoke of “entry and exit.” But the report also stated at the beginning that it collected no information on the actual application of this law.
The report cites testimony, several in the initial translation, about a directive according to which anyone entering a border quarantine zone will be shot on sight. The original Korean report stated this happened after 2020, but this was corrected in the translation.
“Another testimony indicates that in 2020, the authorities issued a directive to residents and border guards stating that anyone who enters the border blockade area be shot on sight without warning, citing COVID-19 prevention as the reason. There have been actual cases where people who entered the blockade area were killed by border guards in accordance with this directive.” (p. 69)
A public announcement by North Korea’s Ministry of Social Security dated August 25, 2020 that informed the population about this new directive was not cited by the report, although it also was publicly available by fall 2020. The document made clear that there was no universal shoot-on-sight policy without prior warning and only those approaching the border river would be fired on without warning. Those entering the buffer zones, one to two kilometers wide, without prior approval reportedly would receive three warnings, possibly warning shots, to stop moving before the use of lethal force.
Missionary Executions
The last of Yoon’s examples can be considered the least problematic, but incorrect nonetheless. He claimed North Koreans were “shot in public for possessing the bible and having faith,” and the report did describe one public execution in 2018 that the South Korean president might have been referring to. The Korean report stated the charges were “possessing the bible and spreading Christianity.”
“Among these cases are instances where the death penalty has been carried out for religious activities, including the mere possession of the Bible. In 2018, a North Korean defector witnessed a public trial held in Pyongsong, North Pyongan Province, in which one of 18 defendants was sentenced and immediately executed for possessing the Bible and preaching Christianity.” (p. 77)
Despite missionary activities likely being the crucial crime for this execution, the report claimed in the preceding sentence that possessing a bible was enough to get executed. The Korean text at least included the marker dŭng which, as described above, KTV also had used to hide drug charges of the executed and put the focus on the watching of South Korean videos.
In its summary, the report also tried to obfuscate any difference between punishments for bible possession and missionary activities, similar to the description of the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Law.
“Some testimonies suggest that anti-religious education is given in schools or organizations, while people have been publicly executed or sent to political prison camps for possessing the Bible or engaging in missionary activities.” (p. 35)
The claim about executions for bible possession in the Korean report also was ambiguous on another point: it is unclear if it was referring to an execution or a death sentence which still might be appealed. But the only other reference to a death sentence for the possession of the bible can be found only 170 pages later. In this case, the crime was combined with “engaging in prayer,” again making it unclear if the possession of the bible was the crucial factor leading to the death sentence. Either way, no information was available, the author was told by the Ministry of Unification, if the death sentence given at the public trial was actually executed. The Korean report used the expression “engaging in prayer life” (kido saenghwal) which the initial translation had turned into “a Christian believer in possession of the Bible.”
“In 2019, the 619 Unified Command (grouppa) carried out an extensive crackdown on superstitious activities, resulting in the arrest of approximately 50 individuals. Subsequently, a public trial was held for these individuals in front of a hotel in Pyongyang. A fortune-teller was sentenced to five years of rodongkyohwa punishment, while a shaman who manufactured and distributed drugs received a heavier sentence of seven years of rodongkyohwa punishment. There were two individuals who received a death sentence. One of them, who deceived residents by claiming to have the ability to resurrect the dead, was sentenced to death. The other individual was sentenced to death for possessing the Bible and engaging in prayer.” (p. 248)
If Yoon was thinking of the latter testimony, he ignored the fact that it was a public trial and not a public execution. Although little information is available, North Korea allows appeals to death sentences as well as pardons and the person in this case might still have avoided execution.
Collective Silence
Progressive South Korean journalist and lawmakers who usually are looking for any opportunity to criticize the Yoon government remained silent on the manifold problems of Yoon’s speeches, the report, and their faulty translations and interpretations. The main writer on North Korea issues of the progressive newspaper Hankyoreh, for example, only criticized the report for using unreliable testimonies and a small number of interviewees that left North Korea after 2019. The scrutiny and checks that civil society and opposition parties are supposed to provide are virtually absent in South Korea when it comes to North Korea, leaving amateur mistakes and even absurd claims unchallenged.
This underlines the tragic state of both the field and discourse of North Korean human rights research, which is almost entirely left to South Korean or US activists and governmental actors and no criticism of their fallacies.
While it is always hard to prove intent, it has been a long-standing practice of South Korean conservatives to distort the truth when lies or half-truths can be used to agitate the public against the Northern half of the peninsula.
That Yoon and his administration follow this principle should be expected and, with a far-right YouTuber/professor now heading the crucial Ministry of Unification, the South Korean government’s problematic relationship with truth will likely only intensify over the coming year. The ministry’s Center for North Korea Human Rights Records is responsible for writing the human rights report.
During his inauguration address Yoon lamented that “truth is oftentimes bent out of shape and grossly distorted due to conflicts between nations or because of animosity between different groups within society.” His government’s human rights report on the North and what he did with it is a vivid testimony to that.
Martin Weiser is an independent scholar and lived in South Korea for the last decade researching inter-Korean relations, the history of North Korean studies as well as North Korean human rights, parties, law and media. He received his MA degree in political science from Korea University, Seoul, in 2014 with a thesis titled “Exploring changes in North Korea’s human rights policy.” He can be reached via martinweiser-publiccommentary@mailbox.org.
To cite this essay, please use the entry suggested below:
Martin Weiser, “South Korea’s problematic relationship with truth when it comes to North Korean human rights," criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, August 24, 2023; https://doi.org/10.52698/NYLT5481.