Commentary | Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Above Politics”?: Rolling Back into Absolutely Monarchy in Thailand with King Vajiralongkorn
In November 2020, Thai protesters camped out at the Bangkok headquarters of the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), in which Thai King Maha Vajiralongkorn is the largest shareholder with a 23.53% stake. The protests brought the king’s superrich status under public scrutiny, in a country where discussion about the monarchy has long been taboo. Two years earlier, Vajiralongkorn took all state assets in the Crown Property Bureau, worth up to US$60 billion, under his sole possession, making him the richest monarch in the world. “We demand the return of taxpayers’ money,” declared protest leader Panupong Jadnok. This not only represents one of the protesters’ demands for immediate monarchical reform, but also raises a serious question regarding the legal power of the monarchy: Under which law is the transfer of state assets to the king allowed?
Since his enthronement in 2016, King Vajiralongkorn has exercised legal power in an absolute and boundless manner, openly sidestepping constitutional restrictions. The practice of exercising excessive royal prerogatives, especially when at odds with existing laws, is not uncommon for the Thai monarchy. King Bhumibol Adulyadej, father of Vajiralongkorn, occasionally intervened in politics, and thus contested the constitution, which strictly confined the role of the monarchy to be “above politics.” But the notion “above politics” is in itself troublesome.
Historian Thongchai Winichakul argues that Bhumibol redefined “above politics,” or u-nua kanmuang, to legitimize his political own intervention. But “above politics,” for Bhumibol did not mean “stay out of politics.” It instead meant “being on top” of politics, as in power to dominate political life.[1] In the process, the king’s directive was treated as the ultimate authority superseding any other laws.
Because Bhumibol’s political intervention was accepted as political culture, his operation above law was normalized and his extra-judicial power was justified as deriving from his status as Dhammaraja, or god-king. Not only was he fastidiously sacrosanct but also hugely popular, a formula for Bhumibol’s neo-royalism. The Dhammaraja narrative, in turn, served to convert his orders into sacred words of god. Throughout his 70-year reign, Bhumibol exercised his legal power to endorse countless military coups and amnesties. The status of Dhammaraja with extra-judicial power obscured the fact that the monarchy meddled in politics and impeded democratization through legal means.
Vajiralongkorn has inherited the habit of overriding the constitution from his father. Yet, Bhumibol’s modus operandi was starkly different from that of Vajiralongkorn. Vajiralongkorn has abused the royal powers in a way that Bhumibol attempted to avoid. Often, Bhumibol relied on the “network monarchy” to achieve his political objectives, either through the Privy Council or the judiciaries. But Vajiralongkorn has intervened in politics directly and without proxies. He has also extended royal powers, intruding into the public interests and done so with an intention to create a climate of fear. Vajiralongkorn’s unfettered political maneuverings are breaching the tacit social contract between the Thai monarchy and the Thai people.
“Vajiralongkorn’s unfettered political maneuverings are breaching the tacit social contract between the Thai monarchy and the Thai people.”
Following his ascendance to the throne, Vajiralongkorn strove to strengthen royal absolutism in defiance of the constitution. He requested the constitution be amended to legalize his residency overseas without having to appoint a regent, hence enabling him to rule Thailand from Germany. The constitution was previously approved in a nationwide referendum. He also ordered the transfer of two army units to his direct command through the issuance of a royal decree.
Excessive royal prerogatives have also been implemented to manage politics and personal affairs. In February 2019, Princess Ubolratana Rajakanya, elder sister of Vajiralongkorn, was nominated as the candidate for premiership under the Thai Raksa Chart Party, a splinter of the Thaksin Shinawatra-backed Pheu Thai Party. Vajiralongkorn issued a phra borommaracha-ongkarn, or a royal order, prohibiting his sister’s candidacy while condemning Thaksin for jeopardizing the supposed apolitical position of the monarchy.
The Constitutional Court then relied on Vajiralongkorn’s prerogatives rather than existing election law to disband the Thai Raksa Chart Party. In doing so, the judiciary stepped up as the next political arbiter after the monarchy, constructing a “deep state” which controlled the fate of Thai politics.[2] This was eerily similar to Bhumibol’s strategy. In April 2006, Bhumibol told the judges to “do the right thing” to unlock the political impasse at the height of the anti-Thaksin protests. Accordingly, the Supreme Court nullified an earlier election in which Thaksin won a large margin, unraveling the immense royal power over the judiciaries. But a serious drawback is that Vajiralongkorn is neither a Dhammaraja, nor are his words divine.
Next, in October 2019, Vajiralongkorn issued a royal edict stripping Sineenat Wongvajirapakdi, his “royal noble consort,” of her rank and titles. She was publicly humiliated in the Royal Gazette for “elevating herself to the same state as the queen (Suthida)” and for “her misbehavior and disloyalty against the monarch.” Sineenat then disappeared from public eye, sparking rumors of being imprisoned or even killed. The dismissal and punishment of Sineenat was carried out at the behest of the king without legal underpinning. As a result, her fate was undocumented. She was not protected by law and received no trial. A royal pardon saw her freedom in September 2020, when the king ordered her privileges to be reinstated and declared her “flawless,” as if without committing wrongdoing of any sort. While the royal pardon is legal, the reinstating of Sineenat’s position was arbitrary.
Sineenat’s treatment is just one example of the current trend of arbitrary promotion or dismissal within the walls of the palace. From Vajiralongkorn’s own family members to court officials, the military, the police, the judiciary, other civil servants and monks, all have to contend with rewards and punishments to keep them in check. From 2016, there were more than 200 individuals dismissed, demoted, or even imprisoned as ordered by Vajiralongkorn.[3] The punishments were personalized without proper legal processes, permeating fear throughout society.
Vajiralongkorn predecessor Bhumibol behaved within the supposed confines of being “above the law,” legitimized by his accumulated moral authority. Yet now, lacking such moral authority, Vajiralongkorn daringly violated the confines. His limitless legal power provides a backdrop for the current protests. The protest at the SCB aims exactly at contesting Vajiralongkorn’s seemingly unconstitutional activities.
When the king’s words are more sanctified than law, it rescinds the functionality of the constitutional monarchy. Only the ongoing protests can slam on the brakes and stop Thailand from rolling back into absolute monarchy.
NOTES
[1] Thongchai Winichakul, in an interview in Bangkok, said, “What do (the monarchists) mean by ‘above’? To them, it means that the monarchy is a higher authority, commanding over the normal political system” (accessed3 March 2021).
[2] See, Eugénie Mérieau (2016) “Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court (1997–2015),” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46:3, 445-466. DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2016.1151917
[3] I compiled the list of those demoted/dismissed from 2016-2020 based on the information in the Royal Gazette.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun is associate professor at Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
To cite this essay, please use the suggested entry below:
Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “‘Above Politics’?: Rolling Back into Absolutely Monarchy in Thailand with King Vajiralongkorn,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, March 8, 2021; https://doi.org/10.52698/KTPD1440.