Commentary | Sike Chan, Myanmar’s 2025 Election: Four Scenarios Shaping a Fractured Nation
Six months after its 2021 coup, Myanmar’s junta pledged election by August 2023. For over two years, China observed patiently, but when August passed without an election, the junta extended emergency rule, citing security concerns—a move that disappointed China.
On October 27, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) launched Operation 1027 in northern Shan State. Initially passive, Beijing intervened after the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) captured Laukkai, preventing further escalation. Despite China’s mediation efforts, the operation resumed five months later, resulting in the fall of Lashio and the junta’s Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC). Amid these developments, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Naypyitaw, fueling speculation about a possible counter-coup within the military. In response, the junta leader reaffirmed his commitment to holding an election by 2025. During his first ever visit to Yunnan, he sought China’s support to expedite the electoral process.
In October 2024, the junta initiated a pre-election census—the first nationwide initiative since its seizure of power. With support from China and India, the junta’s nationwide population and household census achieved a complete count in only 145 of Myanmar’s 330 townships, revealing that it controls less than half the country. According to the BBC, nearly four years into the conflict, the junta maintained full control over only twenty one percent of Myanmar’s territory, while resistance forces controlled forty two percent, and the rest contested. These statistics highlight the junta’s precarious grip on power as it prepares for the 2025 election.
The Four Scenarios
1. Baseline Scenario (Forty percent Probability): Election Amid Controlled Chaos
The Baseline Scenario envisions the junta proceeding with an election as promised. This election is expected to be conducted in “sections”, covering approximately seventy percent of the country. In the initial phase, the election will occur in about half of the nation, focusing on areas within the Ayeyarwady Basin that remain under junta control. To facilitate this, the junta would likely seek assistance from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) and are actively engaged in political dialogue, negotiating their participation in holding the election within their controlled territories and providing security.
China appears to oppose the infiltration of Ethnic Revolutaionary Organizations (EROs) into the Ayeyarwady Basin, a region predominantly inhabited by Burmese. Consequently, it is plausible that China will exert pressure on specific groups within the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), notably the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), to refrain from advancing into Sagaing and compel 3BHA, currently engaged in Operation 1027, to retreat before approaching Mandalay. Thus, in this second phase, it is highly probable that the junta will negotiate a temporary ceasefire with all FPNCC members to enable election in parts of northern Myanmar. If northern Myanmar is brought under control in a manner akin to the post-1990s period, the junta might extend its efforts to include a multilateral ceasefire with the K2C coalition—comprising Karen, Karenni, and Chin groups—or bilateral agreements with individual groups, thereby facilitating election in some Karen, Karenni, and Chin areas during a third phase.
Meanwhile, resistant groups such as the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) in the Ayeyarwady Basin plains are expected to persist in their armed resistance against junta offensives. These groups may either engage directly or act as a buffer defense for EROs. Nevertheless, a military prevention of the 2025 election appears improbable, leaving the National Unity Government (NUG) to counter the junta politically. The international community, including influential nations like China and Russia, may lend their support to the junta’s electoral process. The election period is projected to extend over six months to a year, with the newly formed government potentially receiving recognition from organizations such as ASEAN, the UN, and other international entities.
2. Worst-Case Scenario (Thirty percent Probability): Escalating Armed Conflict
The worst-case scenario posits that the election could exacerbate the armed conflict. Without adequate security arrangements, the junta may be compelled to hold a nationwide election under precarious conditions. The National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) has informed political parties participating in the election that approximately 10,000 security personnel will be deployed nationwide. Of these, 3,000 armed individuals are reportedly recent conscripts enlisted through the People’s Military Service Law, while the remaining 7,000 unarmed personnel belong to the People’s Security and Counter-Terrorism Central Committee. This number of security forces, however, would suffice to secure only a quarter of the more than 40,000 polling stations nationwide. It would also be inadequate to ensure the safety of political party candidates, voter education volunteers, and observers. Consequently, political party members may be compelled to arm themselves and provide their own security, creating a scene in which election is contested under complicated armed struggles.
Additionally, the junta’s plan to invite representatives from foreign governments, such as Russia and China, to observe the election could result in foreign observers entering Myanmar accompanied by their own security teams. Rebel groups are also expected to respond militarily to the junta’s electoral process through tactics such as mutual arrests, ambushes, assassinations, and bombings. This volatile environment would likely escalate the complexity of the conflict. International organizations like ASEAN and the UN would face challenges in recognizing the legitimacy of the junta’s election, while also being placed in a dilemma over condemning the widespread use of weapons and violence during the process. Given that election could only be held in over 150 townships inaccessible to resistance groups, the resulting government would likely face a severe legitimacy crisis. The inability to exert authority over nearly half of the country would perpetuate the government's lack of recognition and its fragile control.
The Intervention Scenarios are categorized into two distinct pathways: external pressure and internal breakthrough.
3. External Intervention Scenario (Twenty percent Probability): Pressure for Reconciliation
The first pathway involves external pressure, domestically and internationally. The junta, despite augmenting its forces through conscription, struggles to achieve the expected battlefield effectiveness due to low morale among troops. While the junta benefits from air superiority—employing airstrikes and drones—it faces significant limitations in neutralizing resistance forces, primarily due to the guerrilla warfare tactics employed by these groups and the frequent malfunctions of overused fighter jets. EROs have established military dominance over large territories, enabling them to achieve de facto self-rule. However, these groups are simultaneously subjected to external pressure from neighboring countries, necessitating the formation of a central coalition to address emerging diplomatic challenges. This coalition may also facilitate physical cooperation with returning NUG leaders in a framework of shared rule. Meanwhile, PDF and some EROs have consolidated control over Anyar and Myaylat (the Dry Zone), successfully disrupting critical military infrastructure, notably, key equipment factories (known as Ka Pa Sa) in western Magway and Bago.
Under this scenario, if the first step—holding the election—proves logistically impossible, the junta may be forced to pursue a second option: initiating a ceasefire and engaging in political dialogue. With its survival increasingly reliant on China’s support, the junta could geopolitically reintegrate into the ASEAN community. This reintegration may be facilitated by Malaysia, the ASEAN chair for 2025, acting on advice from Thailand. To incentivize this process, the junta could release imprisoned opposition leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, while offering to accept the ASEAN chairmanship in 2026 as a diplomatic reward. Upon her release under an amnesty agreement, Suu Kyi may choose to lead national reconciliation efforts through political dialogue, steering clear of direct involvement in party politics or armed resistance. This pathway could pave the way for an inclusive dialogue process involving all parties, offering a viable alternative to election.
4. Internal Breakthrough Scenario (Ten percent Probability): Collapse from Within
The second pathway envisions an internal breakthrough, within the sphere of junta. The military leader, determined to retain power, may forgo election entirely, as he did in 2023. This stagnation could become intolerable for the Beijing, which might signal its approval for a more decisive intervention. In such a case, northern EROs could advance on Mandalay, Myanmar’s second capital, bringing the conflict closer to Meiktila and Naypyitaw. These groups may also deploy large-scale air defense systems to bolster their offensive capabilities. Should at least three RMCs fall and five others come under attack, the junta's cohesion would erode significantly. Trust in the military leader would plummet within the junta’s ranks, exacerbating fractures between the commanding general and frontline battalions. This scenario could lead to a surge in surrenders and defections, ranging from battalion-level units to entire divisions.
The absence of election would likely escalate tensions between the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the junta, while dissatisfaction within the military’s leadership could intensify calls for a counter-coup. Simultaneously, the International Criminal Court (ICC) might issue an arrest warrant against the junta leader for alleged war crimes, further isolating him internationally. In response to mounting pressures, the junta leader and his family may flee to Russia. The imminent collapse of the military could compel the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) to convene an emergency meeting, spurred by pro-junta intellectuals. At this meeting, the 2008 Constitution might be reinterpreted as a transitional framework, leading the military to prioritize its role of defense while relinquishing its political control. Consequently, the military could propose the formation of a ‘Constitutional Assembly’ that includes opposition groups and revolutionary forces to discuss abolishing the 2008 Constitution and transitioning to civilian rule. This could mark a pivotal moment in Myanmar’s political trajectory, offering a pathway to establish a federal democratic system. Rather than pursuing a direct election, the focus might shift toward inclusive dialogue and systemic reform to achieve long-term stability and governance.
Implications
The 2025 election, regardless of how it unfolds, is unlikely to resolve Myanmar’s deep-seated conflicts. The four scenarios outlined above highlight the complexity of the situation, with each carrying significant risks and opportunities. The Baseline Scenario offers a veneer of stability but risks legitimizing an authoritarian regime. The Worst-Case Scenario underscores the dangers of proceeding without adequate security or inclusivity. The External Intervention Scenario provides a pathway to reconciliation, contingent on sustained international pressure. Finally, the Internal Breakthrough Scenario, though least likely, suggests the possibility of transformative change.
For Myanmar’s people, the stakes could not be higher. The international community, particularly ASEAN, China, and the UN, must navigate this precarious situation with care. Supporting inclusive dialogue and addressing the root causes of conflict will be essential for any lasting resolution. As the nation approaches this critical juncture, the 2025 election serves as both a challenge and an opportunity to redefine Myanmar’s future.
Sike Chan is a Research Consultant at the New Rehmonnya Federated Force. With academic expertise in International Development and Political Science, his work focuses on Sino-Burma relations, conflict dynamics, and security issues in Myanmar.
To cite this essay, please use the bibliographic entry suggested below:
Sike Chan, “Myanmar’s 2025 Election: Four Scenarios Shaping a Fractured Nation,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, 2/4/2025; https://doi.org/10.52698/DCCS8966.