Commentary | Roshni Kapur, Growing Afghan-Chinese relations: Security interests dominate economic and political discourse
There has been much discussion on what role Beijing would play on the economic and political fronts, both as a major power and neighboring country, following the US-led withdrawal from Afghanistan. Recently, Beijing became the first country to announce that it has appointed a new ambassador to Afghanistan since the Taliban came to power. Although the move is arguably not tantamount to formal recognition of the Taliban regime, the latter has leveraged this development to encourage other countries to forge relations with the new regime in Kabul. The Taliban’s chief spokesperson, Zabihullah Mujahid said, “It also signals to other countries to come forward and interact with the Islamic Emirate.” Besides Beijing, there are few other diplomats based in Kabul, but all of them assumed their posts prior to the takeover. Only a few countries and organizations, including the EU and Pakistan, have senior diplomats at the level of Charge d’Affaires, which allows them to carry out their ambassadorial responsibilities without officially hold the ambassador title. The appointment of a new envoy could be intended to better facilitate exchanges and investments in Kabul.
“The move could also be a way to demonstrate China’s active attempts to displace the United States ”
Yet, the move could also be a way to demonstrate China’s active attempts to displace the United States diplomatically by advocating for regional stability and reducing the impact of the economic and humanitarian crises raging in Afghanistan. Beijing has emerged as one of the most vocal advocates of the new regime. Following the 5th China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Minister’s Dialogue in April 2023, the joint statement stated “by seizing Afghanistan’s overseas assets and imposing unilateral sanctions, the US, which created the Afghan issue in the first place, is the biggest external factor that hinders substantive improvement in the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan.” Although China’s presence in Afghanistan has substantially increased over the last decade, its engagement continues to be minimal due to factors including the Taliban’s refusal to sever links with terrorist groups, the risk of working with a regime that lacks international legitimacy, and a fragile stability that prevents long-term planning.
Evolution of Chinese engagement in Afghanistan
Because the US was the key foreign player in Afghanistan for two decades, Beijing avoided substantially engaging with Kabul between 2001 and 2010. Its foreign policy orientation on Afghanistan changed after 2010 when it started entering into agreements with the former Afghan government in mining, power, and oilfield sectors. There are vast reserves of minerals of iron ore, copper, lithium, and rare earths along with oil and gas in the country. However, the volatile security environment has hampered progress as seen in the long-stalled Myes Anak project that was signed between the Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC), Jiangxi Copper and former regime in 2007. Beijing gradually deepened its security engagement in Afghanistan when the US, under the Obama administration, announced plans to end its combat mission in the country by 2014. This included joint patrols of the shared border, delivery of military equipment. and high-level visits. It was in Beijing’s interest to have a functioning government in place in Afghanistan that held a monopoly on violence and could fulfill its security commitments to other countries.
The lack of security guarantees from the former Afghan regime prompted China to reach out to the Taliban to urge the latter to sever ties with Uyghur insurgents operating on Afghan soil. Beijing’s foreign policy orientation, driven by realism and pragmatism, encouraged it to engage the Taliban after realizing that the group would eventually assume some degree of power in Kabul. A month before the Taliban assumed power, the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, stated that the group is “a critical military and political force in the country, (which) is expected to play an important role in the peace, reconciliation and reconstruction process of Afghanistan.”
While there are divergent opinions on how much threat the East Turkestan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM/TIP) directly poses to Beijing from Kabul, shortly after assuming power, the Taliban heeded China’s request by relocating Uyghur insurgent groups from Badakhshan province (close to China’s borders) to Baghlan and Takhar provinces in central parts of the country. However, it is uncertain whether this decision was taken to appease Beijing.
Meanwhile, China has held almost weekly meetings with Taliban representatives in Afghanistan in recent months to discuss various investment and economic deals, while the latter has reciprocated by reserving key mining projects for Beijing. The Taliban has offered natural resources to Beijing in exchange for economic projects after realizing that its political establishment may struggle to survive as a hermit state amid international sanctions, blocking of foreign reserves, and isolation on an international level for the continuation of its conservative policies. The Taliban has characterized Beijing as its “most important partner” and a “dependable friend” for investments, development assistance, and infrastructure projects.
Security interests dominate economic and political discourse
Although much media and policy attention has been given to growing Afghan-China relations amid the string of bilateral meetings, while a narrative has been created that Beijing’s interest in Afghanistan could be a game changer, some factors need to be taken into consideration. China’s economic and infrastructure engagement in Afghanistan predates the Taliban’s return to power and continues to be motivated by its security and counter-terrorism agenda, including fighting Uighur militancy and activism in Xinjiang and concerns that the Taliban has not severed ties with Uighur extremists. The latter groups were permitted to conduct their operations in Afghanistan during the Taliban’s first rule from 1996 to 2001. Because the TIP is part of the coalition of transnational militant groups that supported the Taliban in taking over Kabul in August 2021, there are legitimate reasons for Beijing to believe that the new regime is still maintaining ties with the Uighur insurgents.
Although there were presumptions that Beijing would leverage the US’s withdrawal from Kabul to widen its sphere of influence, this has not been the case. China has expanded its economic and political presence in Pakistan through projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) despite the security risks. There has also been a surge of attacks on Chinese nationals and projects since the start of CPEC in 2015; the latest attack took place in August 2023 where a convoy carrying Chinese citizens close to Gwadar port in Balochistan was targeted. Although the security situation in restive areas of Pakistan has undermined Beijing’s economic pursuits in a similar manner as in Kabul, China’s engagement with the two countries is uniquely different. While it sees viable prospects to strengthen its economic presence in Islamabad, it perceives Kabul more of a problem to manage rather than an opportunity to pursue. China is worried that Kabul is turning into a launchpad for militancy that would not only destabilize the country but lead to a spillover effect in the region, including in countries where the former has a stronger economic and on the ground presence.
While in the 1990s the US was perceived as the main enemy, local attention has somewhat been shifted to Beijing. As the latter’s political power expands internationally, it is increasingly being targeted by various groups. Beijing holds the view that militant groups operating in Kabul pose a bigger threat to its projects and stakes in neighboring countries, such as Central Asia or Pakistan, rather than mainland China. There are also anti-Taliban groups that are posing a challenge to the Taliban’s rule. Five Chinese citizens were injured when an attack, claimed by the ISKP, took place on a hotel in Kabul in December 2022 shortly after the Chinese ambassador held a meeting there with Taliban officials. Reports suggest that the ISKP’s capability has increased in and around Kabul to mount attacks in the country’s capital.
For Beijing, maintaining its security interests is the most pressing issue in its engagement with the Taliban, given that it is directly connected to its internal security in Xinjiang. During a meeting in Tianjin in 2021, the Taliban promised China that it would “absolutely not allow any forces to do anything harmful to China in Afghanistan’s territory.” Now that the ETIM is no longer a designated terrorist group by the US, the onus is primarily on the Taliban to meet Beijing’s security needs.
Interest from the private sector in China
While China wants security guarantees from the Taliban, it also seeks sustainability of its investments in the region and greater development in the face of fears that poverty and a dire economic situation would result in a bigger refugee exodus and instability. Although there has been a resumption of some smaller-scale projects both by the public and private sector of China, such as precious metal trading and steel manufacturing since August 2021, the Taliban continues to deal with a range of financial, economic, and humanitarian crises following the disintegration of nominally functioning institutions, collapse of the largely aid-dependent economy, and the freezing of foreign assets. Human and food insecurity has reached alarming levels in terms of poverty, hunger and lack of development.
The diplomatic challenge of giving official aid to a government that lacks legitimacy is likely to dissuade China from becoming the main ODA provider to Afghanistan in the short-to-medium term. Although Beijing has given a range of support from debt relief, to grants ,to goods and materials, to infrastructure development, to capacity building, this assistance has been minimal relative to those delivered by other countries and international organizations. For instance, the US$326.7 million of assistance given by Beijing in 2014-17 constituted only two percent of the US$17 billion in ODA that was sent to Kabul during that three-year time frame. Washington remains the biggest single provider of humanitarian aid to the country; it has provided more than US$1.1 billion of aid since the takeover (both from the State Department and USAID). The US had already sent more than seven times of emergency aid of close to US$55 million than what Beijing donated (of approximately US$7.5 million) when the disastrous earthquake stuck southeastern Afghanistan in June 2022.
Although Beijing has finally included Afghanistan in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), it took a long time for the former to consider the proposal due to security and technical concerns. Moreover, its implementation is likely to pose challenges. Despite reservations from the Chinese government, the private sector has been moving into Kabul. In January 2023, a contract was signed between the Taliban and CAPEIC, an oil and gas company, for oil extraction. In July 2023, executives of Fan China Afghan Mining Processing and Trading Co. expressed interest in investing US$350 million in a range of sectors including energy, construction, and healthcare.
The Afghan Acting Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Shahbuddin Delawar, met representatives of Gochin in April 2023 to discuss exploring the lithium deposits in the country. Reports suggest that the Chinese company is keen to invest US$10 billion, including developing much needed infrastructure, creating approximately 120,000 jobs. The Afghan Ministry of Interior announced in August 2023 that it will set up CCTV systems across the country following a meeting with Huawei executives. The firm is known for its “smart city” networks for state and law enforcement agencies.
It’s evident that the Taliban’s relations with Beijing are practical in nature and are appealing due to the group’s political, diplomatic, economic, and financial isolation by the international community. However, the new regime in Afghanistan may not be motivated to take China’s security interests into consideration if the latter no longer shows economic, diplomatic, political, or humanitarian interest in the country.
Conclusion
The last decade has seen a visible increase in Beijing’s engagement in Kabul, regardless of the regime in power. Beijing faces the challenge of working with a regime that is adamant about holding onto its conservative ideology, despite their misalignment with international norms on human rights, and also continues to provide a haven to extremist outfits that undermine its security interests both domestically and abroad. There are also challenges pertaining to accountability, transparency and governance when development aid is channeled through a regime that lacks international legitimacy.
Nonetheless, Beijing’s support of the Taliban demonstrates its international posturing to distinguish itself from traditional partners, particularly the US. It also continues to project the notion that the West is at fault for the humanitarian crisis in Kabul. Although Beijing has urged the Taliban to make its governance more inclusive and protect human rights and women’s rights, these normative factors do not determine its engagement with the Taliban. China’s foreign policy orientation is motivated by pragmatism, such as stability in a country, rather than ideology.
The high-level engagements between the Taliban and regional powers indicates that the group is forging stronger relations in its own way. As the group continues to face international isolation, regional neighbors are stepping into the void leading to a shift of engagement from the traditional partners to new partners. Many Central Asian countries are engaging the new regime economically and politically with the goal of ensuring security along their borders and preventing a complete collapse of Afghanistan. If Kabul destabilizes, it could result in an intra-tribal and intra-ethnic civil war.
The author would like to thank Mr. Raffaello Pantucci for reviewing an earlier draft of this article.
Roshni Kapur is an independent researcher based in Singapore and a doctoral student at University of Gent. She is the co-editor of the volume, Sustainable Energy Transition in South Asia: Challenges and Opportunities (2019). She has contributed pieces for Observer Research Foundation, Lowy Institute, Middle East Institute and Channel News Asia. Her research area of focus is on transitional justice, conflict resolution, party politics, conflict resolution, identity politics and geopolitics of South Asia.
To cite this essay, please use the entry suggested below:
Roshni Kapur, “Growing Afghan-Chinese relations: Security interests dominate economic and political discourse,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, November 15, 2023. https://doi.org/10.52698/EYBR3233.