Commentary | Annalise Chang, Tom Le, and Sebastian Maslow, A Historic Win, Familiar Politics: The Paradox of Takaichi’s LDP Leadership
On October 4, Sanae Takaichi secured a historic victory against four competitors to become the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s first female president since its founding in 1955. Two weeks later, she became Japan’s first female prime minister after a surprising coalition formed between the LDP and Japan Innovation Party (Ishin). Her rise marks a rare exception in Japanese politics, long dominated by male, hereditary politicians. In a country often criticized for its chronic lack of gender equality, her victory is a major breakthrough for women’s representation in leadership positions.
At the same time, Takaichi’s victory has also raised alarm bells. A former member of Shinzo Abe’s faction, she is widely seen as the torchbearer of the late prime minister’s conservative policy line — one aimed at ending Japan’s “postwar regime” by revising the pacifist constitution and strengthening the country’s defense and international security role, through higher defense spending and a stronger US-Japan alliance. Her hardline stance is underscored by past comments about tightening immigration rules, revisionist views of Japan’s wartime history, repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (we counted fifteen between 2007 and 2025), and a record of press interference as internal affairs and communications minister under Abe in 2015 have deepened concerns that her government could push Japan even further to the right. Takaichi’s ideological stance — combined with her recruitment of the LDP’s old guard into senior party roles and her reluctance to tighten rules on political funding — has already had dramatic consequences. Komeito, the coalition partner that has helped the LDP maintain majority rule for the past 26 years, has now stepped back from the coalition. The move casts doubt not only on Takaichi’s prospects of becoming Japan’s next prime minister, but also on whether her leadership could threaten the LDP’s long-term grip on power. In light of the turmoil and stagnation that have marked Japanese politics and economics throughout the “lost decades” since the 1990s, the intensive political maneuvering now unfolding in Nagatacho — Tokyo’s center of political power — has revived concerns about Japan slipping back into instability and short-lived governments.
Yet much of the hyperbole in commentary about Takaichi’s role in this moment may be misplaced. Takaichi’s tenure as prime minister will face the same headwinds that stymied her predecessors and those who eventually succeed her. First, the strained political relationships in Asia, specifically with South Korea and China, will constrain her conservative impulses as much as they drive her. Japan-South Korea-China relations are a complex dance of economic and security concerns where none of the countries are willing to close every avenue of cooperation over historical disputes. Second, the Japanese prime minister faces an assertive Trump administration that links security and trade relations as part of its “America first,” transactional approach to alliance management. Atop these challenges come economic stagnation, a rapidly aging and shrinking population, and a host of other structural problems that constrain anyone who is to become Japan’s next prime minister.
Immediately after her election as LDP party head, Takaichi moved to include right-wing forces in her new party leadership and cabinet, appointing figures with ties to Nippon Kaigi and the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership (Shinto Seiji Renmei). Yet this is hardly unprecedented — Abe and other LDP leaders did the same in the past. While these appointments may signal that her administration will place a stronger public emphasis on conservative values, they do not represent a fundamental departure from past politics. Rather, they mark a continuation of the conservative policy line established under Abe and the tendency of prime ministers to reward cabinet positions to supporters. That policy tradition has deep roots in the ideological cleavages that have shaped the LDP since its founding in 1955, and that became more visible from the late 1990s amid heated debates over Japan’s wartime past and history education.
Abe’s actions as prime minister can be informative of how Takaichi’s foreign policies may play out. Abe was the longest serving prime minister in Japanese history, by far, with a total of 8 years and 267 days served. Despite being known as a conservative hawk with poor relations with South Korea and China – often stemming from his past statements concerning Japan’s colonial history and his visits to Yasukuni Shrine – relations between Japan and its neighbors during his tenure were nonlinear, were not consistently poor, or without surprising breakthroughs. Domestically, he failed to achieve many of his conservative policy goals, including constitutional revision. Despite being tied to Yasukuni Shrine, Abe only visited once while serving as prime minister in December 2013, in what he claimed was an “anti-war gesture.” The veracity of his position has been questioned, but research has shown that anti-militarism norms and geopolitical sensitivity constrain conservative leaders. It was during Abe’s term that the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement with South Korea was reached after years of frosty relations. Abe also responded to criticisms of his positions on war history by emphasizing he does not deny Japan’s colonial history. And while Japan’s neighbors have been dissatisfied with what they see as an insincere apology, they have found a way to move forward while remaining vigilant of Japanese historical backsliding. Takaichi has had a history of controversial positions concerning Japan’s war history, but following her election as head of the LDP and becoming the presumptive next prime minister, she has demonstrated restraint concerning the Yasukuni Shrine by sending offerings (a common practice among Japanese leaders) while forgoing a visit herself. Cabinet members also steered clear of a visit to the shrine. An opinion poll conducted by Jiji Press following her victory, showed respondents were relatively split on a potential visit, suggesting that it would not have been so politically costly if she did.
Takaichi has established herself as a China hawk and, like Abe, has emphasized Taiwan as a key national security concern for Japan. A hardline position, however, is not a stand alone policy trademark per se, but a bipartisan and a cross-Pacific consensus. The implications of Komeito’s departure from the coalition may prove consequential for foreign policy. Komeito was instrumental in establishing relations with China in the 1970s and has long provided a vital communication channel to Beijing’s leadership. With that channel now defunct — and Takaichi’s new party leadership lacking members with China expertise, it remains unclear whether her government will help stabilize regional relations or contribute to rising tensions. The resignation of Hiroshi Moriyama, who had served as a key liaison with China in his role as chair of a suprapartisan group of lawmakers promoting Japan–China friendship, risks weakening institutional links with Beijing at a moment when Tokyo’s China policy appears set to harden under Takaichi.
It is unlikely that Takaichi will dispute the policy line established by her predecessors or depart fundamentally from what US, EU, and NATO approaches to dealing with China. This entails commitment to regional minilateralism in the form of Quad and AUKUS. More importantly, Takaichi, who has worked as a congressional aide on the Hill, is familiar with the inner-workings of the alliance and has expressed her commitment to strengthening it. Given her nationalist orientation, she has also pledged to revisit the tariffs deal should it turn into an “unequal treaty.” Yet, a radical shift in alliance management is unlikely given the importance of the alliance for Japanese security planning.
Over the last year, many polls show that the electorate is concerned primarily with everyday economic challenges. Moreover, her government as it stands today would lack a clear majority in both chambers of the Diet, and a new coalition with Japan Innovation Party would still only have a razor thin majority. To regain the support from the public, Takaichi’s coalition will have to focus on economic growth and easing the financial pressures created by rising social security costs. Renewed diplomatic friction with South Korea or China stemming from her conservative stance would risk economic recovery. As minister for economic security, Takaichi knows the stakes involved in securing critical supply chains and the potential cost disruption may cause for Japan’s economy. This may temper Takaichi’s nationalist impulses.
Structural and institutional factors such as LDP-internal power dynamics, the stagnant economy, poor demographics, US tariffs, and anxiety over immigration will also be powerful headwinds that will draw her attention in many directions, burning precious political capital and time to address. It may be for these reasons that the main candidates that ran for leadership of the LDP showed little policy differences in key areas, something the media underappreciated. Not one had a qualitatively different immigration, security, or economic policy platform. In other words, anxiety over a turn to the right on major issues would not have been unique to Takaichi, though admittedly, she has been one of the more vocal conservatives.
To begin, the first structural obstacle Takaichi faces is a weakening LDP, which has not enjoyed majority rule on its own for decades, and is currently a minority-rule party under Ishiba. The reasons for the LDP’s decline are many, and will take some time to fix and regain the trust of the public. This alone gives her less political power to push through controversial policies through the Diet. Many had assumed that factional power politics — once the main mechanism for distributing party and government posts — would fade after the dissolution of factions amid scandals over political slush funds. Yet the centrifugal pull of these networks has proved remarkably resilient. Takaichi secured her leadership with the backing of former prime minister and influential power broker Taro Aso. In return, Aso and his allies were rewarded with key party positions. This effectively ended the LDP’s short-lived efforts to address public frustration over funding scandals and its close ties to the former Unification Church. By relying on factional support, the balance of power between the Prime Minister’s Office — significantly strengthened under Abe — and the LDP is bound to tilt back toward the party. A weaker core executive would constrain Takaichi’s ability to act independently, making her more vulnerable to party-internal politics.
Second, Takaichi’s election as the LDP’s new leader is, above all, a reflection of the party’s attempt to stem the outflow of voter support to newly formed right-wing populist parties. For Japan’s conservative elite, remaining in power is imperative, resulting in prioritising adaptation over innovation. Historically, the LDP has responded to political crises by compensating through publicly popular policies. In the 1970s, for instance, it countered pressure from the left by expanding social welfare and environmental initiatives. Facing a challenge from the populist right today, the party’s adoption of nationalist and anti-immigration rhetoric serves a similar purpose: maintaining power through adaptation rather than transformation. However, a populist turn could cause it to lose its moderate conservative base. While the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) under Yoshihiko Noda is targeting the centre-conservative (chūdō hoshu) vote with its policy platform, Takaichi's attempts to embrace the populist right may further weaken the LDP's electoral prospects.
Third, one of the most significant issues for Takaichi to address is the aging and declining population, which ties directly to the LDP’s immigration problem, that is, the lack of a clear immigration policy. Conservative backlash against immigration may be a salve for the growing anxiety over record tourism and immigration, it is at odds with the long term labor and security needs of the country. Despite the growing consensus in the government and public of the need to strengthen the Japan Self-Defense Forces, population decline and related economic stagnation constrains funding and recruitment efforts. Where the population crisis will hit hardest will be the economy. Before the upper house elections in July, an NHK poll found that “social security and declining birthrate” and “rice and measures to combat high prices” were the top concerns. This sentiment has prevailed since Takaichi’s election, with a JNN poll last week finding “measures to deal with rising prices,” “economic measures,” and “policies regarding foreigners” as the most pressing policy issues. Moreover, people expect results from Takaichi, with two recent polls showing 68% of respondents with “high hopes” and 66% with “high expectations.” If she fails to deliver, not only her political career but also the future of her party may be at stake.
It will not be easy. Japan is experiencing record inflation that has steadily exceeded the Bank of Japan’s 2% target. Food prices have been surging; rice prices doubled in the last year and have only recently begun declining. Real wages have been stagnant, and the efforts of US tariffs will begin to show as time goes on. Moreover, the demographics of an aging population and declining birthrate remain a crucial, difficult challenge with long-term implications for social safety nets, economic growth, security, and more. One way to address the labor shortage is by encouraging immigration, but anti-foreign backlash has been strong, demonstrated by the rise of right-wing parties such as Sanseito. Yet, with significant support for immigration in the general public and business community, at least in relation to labor, Takaichi is likely to temper anti-immigration rhetoric. The LDP leadership debate, for example, showed little separation among the candidates, with all advocating for hardline approaches to illegal immigration while acknowledging the country’s larger structural concerns.
Fourth, Japan is likely to expend a tremendous amount of energy dealing with the Trump administration’s tariffs. Unlike South Korea, Japan has seen some relief with tariffs but the new status quo adds new costs that will impact future negotiations and the relationship in general. Trump had a positive relationship with Abe and has already praised Takaichi for her victory, but maintaining that relationship and handling US pressure from the economy to security will require a lot of effort.
Takaichi’s reputation has clearly preceded her, leading to a deluge of strong opinions about the possible consequences of her victory. The response has exaggerated the differences between her LDP challengers while underplaying the milestone of Japan gaining its first female prime minister. While opponents focused on conservative members of her cabinet, Takaichi is likely to have a record number of women in her cabinet.
Komeito stepping away from the LDP since her victory has also provided some clarity for the future of Japanese politics. Ishin has stepped in to provide her the support needed to win the prime ministership. An LDP-Ishin coalition would result in a more clearly identifiable ideological divide in Japanese party politics. This in itself may help to revitalize democratic debate. It is also worth noting that the LDP has long tried to include Ishin into its government. Former chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga cultivated close ties with Ishin’s leadership trying to expand the LDP’s ruling coalition under Abe to secure the necessary political majority to push for the majorities to realize the conservative’s policy agenda to revise the constitution and to bolster Japan’s defense capabilities. However, Ishin has built its reputation with pledges to cut back on Japan’s public expenses by lowering the number of civil servants and parliamentarians. The vector of Takaichi’s economic agenda following Abenomics’ expansionary fiscal and monetary policies point to a different direction.
Securing the prime ministership with Ishin, which seemed all but lost a week or two ago, is an impressive win for Takaichi whose path has not been easy. She had lost to two eventual prime ministers, Ishiba and Fumio Kishida in prior elections, and defeated the popular Shijiro Koizumi, a son of former prime minister and one who has been viewed as a future prime minister for years. As a non-elite woman in Japanese politics, her rise has been exceptional. Yet, her positions and prime ministership are not as likely to be as special. Her positions on taxes, immigration, and security are largely in line with many within the LDP. And unlike Abe, she is unlikely to enjoy the numbers in the Diet, time in office, positive relations with the US, and healthier demographics (under Abe, demographics were already unfavorable, but will only get worse) to change the direction of Japan.
Annalise Chang is a junior at Pomona College studying Politics and Asian Studies. Her current work focuses on international relations in East Asia, spanning security policy, historical memory and reconciliation, and disaster relief.
Dr. Tom Le is Associate Professor of Politics at Pomona College. His current research includes demographics and security, smart cities, and war memory and reconciliation. Le is the author of Japan's Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century (Columbia University Press, 2021), which was recently translated as 『日本老いと成熟の平和』 (Misuzu Shobo, 2025).
Dr. Sebastian Maslow is Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo. His recent research focuses on technology and international relations, Japan’s arms export policy, defense spending, and quantum computing strategy. He is the co-editor of Risk State: Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Ashgate, 2015), and Crisis Narratives, Institutional Change, and the Transformation of the Japanese State (SUNY Press, 2021).
To cite this essay, please use the bibliographic entry suggested below:
Annalise Chang, Tom Le, and Sebastian Maslow, “A Historic Win, Familiar Politics: The Paradox of Takaichi’s LDP Leadership,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, November 6, 2025; https://doi.org/10.52698/UIZE7168.