Critical Asian Studies
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The Critical Asian Studies Commentary Board publishes public-facing, non-peer reviewed essays by scholars of Asian Studies bringing their expertise to bear on contemporary affairs in the Asian region. Essays typically take one of two forms: 1) Commentary pieces that offer a clear and concise perspective on a social, cultural, political, or economic issue of the day; or 2) Notes from the Field that engage topics confronting the field of Asian Studies as a whole, ranging from ongoing research projects, emerging questions, or field experiences, to issues facing researchers and teachers of Asian Studies. Explore recent Commentary Board essays listed below or use the search bar below to search by author or keyword. The Commentary Board is curated and edited by Digital Media Editor Dr. Tristan R. Grunow. Contact him at digital.criticalasianstudies@gmail.com or see more information at the bottom of the page if you are interested in submitting to the Commentary Board.

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Special Series | Suruchi Mazumdar, Informal Allies: Hindutva Pop Influencers and Propaganda in Digital India

Over the past years India witnessed the rise of right-wing influencers who used pop videos, widely circulated via platforms such as YouTube, to allegedly convey anti-minority rhetoric and disseminate the ideological message of a Hindu-first nation. The phenomenon, called [1]Hindutva pop, refers to a distinct audiovisual genre that combines traditional Indian devotional tunes and DJ-style beats with amateurish video aesthetics[2]. The songs, which enjoy thousands of views on YouTube and are also played offline in areas inhabited by Muslim minorities (Baishya 2022), advocate a strong political agenda.

This commentary calls to position India’s Hindutva pop video phenomenon, as part of a global influencer propaganda framework. This brief intervention suggests that India’s Hindutva pop videos exemplify as well as depart from what Xu and Schneider (2025) refer to as influencer propaganda[3]. By espousing what critics (Chaudhuri and Xiong, 2023) call anti-minority Muslim sentiments that allegedly aligns with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi’s ruling BJP-led (Bharatiya Janata Party) national government’s religious majoritarian agenda, this right-wing cultural phenomenon contributes to the global digital nationalist framework.

Hindutva pop video artists also embody the interplay of personal, political and commercial interests. Xu and Schneider (2025) reiterate the importance of the convergence between the personal, political and the promotional in the influencer propaganda phenomenon (citing Arnesson and Reinikainen [2024]).

Political influencers have been described as social media content creators who advocate for a political or social cause, a candidate to exert political influence over the audience, for monetary gains, or to express commitment to a social or political cause[4].

Hindutva pop video performers are essentially singers and musicians who boast considerable online following (Baishya 2022) and both formally and informally inform the ruling BJP’s political and ideological agenda, as described in media reports[5]. While they do live shows across India’s “Hindi belt” or the northern states[6] and record audio albums, digital affordances remain central to popular Hindu devotional pop music artists’ aspirational labor[7]. A digital entrepreneurial culture and the practice of politics as fun[8] — the everyday display of joy and spontaneity and the digression from strict cadre-based political disciplining — remains at the center of this cultural phenomenon. Platform affordances including likes, shares, hashtags are deployed for circulation and exchange (Baishya 2022).

Notably, the global influencer culture witnessed politicization since the 2020s, propelling the trend of influencers doubling as political or ideological actors (Arnesson and Reinikainen [2024], as cited by Xu and Schneider, 2025). What remains central to this phenomenon is the interplay of the political-personal-commercial rather than direct top-down political control. The core ideas of influencer culture — namely authenticity, intimacy, self-branding, commercialism — shape the practice of politics (Xu and Schneider, 2025). In the Indian case this translates to what critics call Hindu right-wing digital entrepreneurial violence (Baishya 2022).    

Political Patronage and Digital Entrepreneurship

Pop video artist Prem Krishnavanshi, as reported by the news media network Al Jazeera, for instance, uploaded a devotional song on YouTube that drew thousands of views and said: “You are not human, you are butchers; it’s enough of Hindu-Muslim brotherhood” (Rehbar 2022). An engineering graduate from Lucknow, the capital of the northern Uttar Pradesh state, Krishnavanshi nurtured the ambition of making it big in Bollywood or India’s popular Hindi film industry as a playback singer but that was too competitive (Rehbar 2022). Digital entrepreneurship and the complementary online-offline interactions reaffirm the possibilities of the Indian hybrid media system[9] phenomenon in which apps, platforms complement and co-exist with legacy media.

Despite exploiting the potential of digital affordances, Hindutva pop video artists arguably remain in constant conversation with offline Hindu nationalist extremism (Baishya 2022).

Laxmi Dubey, another Hindutva pop singer, ran a successful YouTube channel with more than 300,000 followers; her songs too drew thousands of likes (Rehbar 2022). While not directly employed by political actors, singers such as Dubey — as reported in the media (Rehbar 2022) — were rewarded by the chief minister of the northern state of Uttar Pradesh and a hardline member of the BJP, Yogi Adityanath, for praising the state. Dubey expressed commitment to social causes such as the financial upliftment of Hindu widows (Rehbar 2022).

The aspect of voluntary propaganda or agency remains central to the influencer propaganda framework. It has been argued that influencers, while employed or rewarded by political actors, participate in propaganda voluntarily, for online traffic, economic rationale, or personal conviction (Xu and Schneider, 2025).  

In the run-up to India’s national elections in 2024, Maithili Thakur, another popular Hindutva pop video artist and devotional singer with millions of followers on social media was awarded by prime minister Modi at the government-sponsored National Creators Awards, as reported by the Indian news media network NDTV[10]. This shows the synergy between India’s digital entrepreneurial culture and the political agenda. The national creator awards were organized by the national government to “promote storytellers of a confident, assertive New India” (AFP, 2024, as published by NDTV).   

Since the BJP’s coming to power in the national government in 2014, there have been allegations of so-called weaponization[11] of social media platforms. Digital affordances[12] are said to have been exploited by Hindu nationalist forces. Such trends align with the global success of right-wing populist movements; the latter’s popularity coincided with the rise in digital media participation and facilitated by the inherent technological affordances of social media platforms[13].

A report, published by the Columbia Journalism Review (Chaudhuri and Xiong 2023), noted that deadly violent hate crimes were committed against minority Muslim communities in the Indian state of Rajasthan in 2022. A rally, playing Hindutva pop devotional songs, turned violent in a town in Rajasthan (Chaudhuri and Xiong 2023). The Indian case, while departing from direct cadre-based disciplining and political action, thus is said to exploit digital platforms’ ability to encourage “entrepreneurial’ violence” (Baishya 2022).  

Platform Intermediaries

Xu and Schneider (2025) draw attention to the symbiotic role between platform corporations, non-state actors (domestic and foreign capital), and the state in Chinese digital influencers’ entrepreneurial labour. The Indian case draws attention to the mutually beneficial relationship between platforms (as evident in the complicity of YouTube), local advertisers, and Hindutva pop artists. Hindutva devotional performers continue to maintain popular YouTube pages despite the violation of community guidelines and allegations of hate speech (Chaudhuri and Xiong, 2023).     

A Tow Center analysis, as reported by the Columbia Journalism Review report in 2023, noted that 26 (out of a dataset of 40) YouTube channels participated in a YouTube Partner Program, which allowed monetization possibilities, by allowing channels to place advertisements on their videos (Chaudhuri and Xiong, 2023). Advertising revenue was split between the platform and the video publisher. The CJR report noted that the YouTube Partnership Program allowed the platform to create a channel for artists and music distributors (Chaudhuri & Xiong, 2023). This indicates platforms’ significant intermediary role and platform localization that define India’s right-wing digital ecosystem.

The complicit platform intermediary position and entrepreneurial culture can be said to complement the digital nationalist agenda in India, which offer important insights to the global influencer propaganda framework.  

Notes

[1] Chaudhuri, Pooja and Yong Xiong. 2013. “YouTube hosts Hindutva pop videos that violate its hate policies, auto-generates more.” Columbia Journalism Review, March 8, 2023. Accessed February 15, 2026: https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/youtube-allows-hindutva-pop-videos-that-violate-its-hate-policies-auto-generates-more.php

[2] Baishya, Anirban. K. 2022. Violent spectating: Hindutva music and audio-visualizations of hate and terror in Digital India. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 19(3): 289–309. https://doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2022.2099918

[3] Xu, Jian and Florian Schneider. 2025. Influencers as emerging actors in global digital propaganda. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/13675494251351221

[4] Riedl, Martin J., Josephine Lukito, and Samuel C. Woolley (2023). Political Influencers on Social Media: An Introduction. Social Media + Society, 9(2): 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1177/20563051231177938 

[5] Purohit, Kunal. 2024. “How Hindutva Pop Music Is Aiding PM Modi's Rise.” Outlook, April 13, 2024. Accessed February 15, 2026: https://www.outlookindia.com/art-entertainment/how-hindutva-pop-music-is-aiding-pm-modis-rise

[6] Rehbar, Quratulain. 2013. “‘Hindutva pop’: The singers producing anti-Muslim music in India.” Al Jazeera English, June 2, 2022. Accessed February 15, 2026: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/2/hindutva-pop-the-singers-producing-anti-muslim-music-in-india

[7] Khan, Sarah. 2025. In the Service of the Hindu Nation: Online Disinformation Campaigns by Far-Right Women Political Influencers in India. BioScope: South Asian Screen Studies, 15(2): 192-211. https://doi.org/10.1177/09749276241304979 

[8] Bayat, Asef. 2007. Islamism and the politics of fun. Public Culture 19(3): 433–459. https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2007-004

[9] Chadwick, Andrew, The Hybrid Media System: Politics and Power, 1st edn, Oxford Studies in Digital Politics (2013; online edn, Oxford Academic, 26 Sept. 2013). https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759477.001.0001, accessed 10 Feb. 2026

[10] NDTV. 2024. BJP Turns To Influencers, Youtubers To Reach Young Voters Ahead Of Polls. Accessed February 15 2026: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bjp-turns-to-influencers-youtubers-to-reach-young-voters-ahead-of-polls-5411309

[11] Neyazi, Taberez A. 2017. “Social Media And Political Polarization in India.” Seminar: 31-35.

[12] Udupa, Sahana, Shriram Venkatraman, and Asim Khan. 2020. “‘Millennial India’: Global Digital Politics in Context.” Television & New Media 21(4): 343–359.

[13] Schroeder, Ralph. 2018. Social Theory after the Internet Media, Technology and Globalization. London, UK: University College London Press.

Suruchi Mazumdar is an Associate Professor in the School of Humanities at the University of Nottingham Malaysia.

To cite this essay, please use the bibliographic entry suggested below:

Suruchi Mazumdar, “Informal Allies: Hindutva Pop Influencers and Propaganda in Digital India,” criticalasianstudies.org Commentary Board, March 22, 2026; https://doi.org/10.52698/BRBP3915.

India, Special Series, MediaTristan Grunow